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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an investigation into the implementation of computer-based office information 
systems in organizations. The research methods employed are both qualitative and quantitative, 
and include fifteen case studies and a postal survey. A review of the literature and the case study 
research indicated that organizations are taking advantage of the integrative capacity of new 
technology in order to implement integrated office systems, but generally with little strategic 
focus or organizational change. A framework for the identification of strategic uses, based on 
information-processing theory, is presented, together with a discussion of their implications for 
organizational change.
Implementation is both a rational and a political process. The thesis covers both aspects, 
reviewing the literature on the relationship between information technology and organizations to 
show that many of the consequences of implementation for the organization are non-deterministic 
and emerge fromn the process itself. Structuration theory is shown to be a means of unifying 
rational and interpretative perspectives on implementation. This analysis indicates the nature of 
the managerial problem and forms the basis for assessing prescriptive approaches to implementing 
office systems and managing change. An implementation strategy for integrated office systems is 
outlined, and the use of IT and office systems to design new organizations and the use of new 
approaches to implementing second- and third-order change are flagged up as areas requiring 
further empirical research.
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Chapter One 
Research Problem and Methods
1.1 The practical problem.
Peter Keen (1991) has estimated that information technology now represents more than 
50% of all capital investment in the U.S. At the same time, there is increasing doubt about the 
effectiveness of IT investment. The MIT Sloan School of Management Corporation in the 1990’s 
progamme, for example, notes that investment in IT in the U.S. has not been accompanied by 
improvements in white collar productivity (Scott Morton, 1991). A study by Franke (1989), both 
of the U.S. financial industry at aggregate level and of an individual bank, showed that increasing 
IT investment has coincided with declining capital productivity and profitability.
At the level of individual organizations, the problem is expressed in terms of major 
difficulties in implementation and failure to achieve the benefits anticipated from the investment.
It is difficult to obtain accurate figures on the extent of the problem because most organizations 
don’t like to publicise their failures, but estimates have been made. Willcocks and Mason (1987) 
cite a study carried out in 1984 for the DTI and Institute of Administrative Management, which 
estimated that 20% of expenditure on IT was wasted, and reports by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General which noted major losses in public sector IT projects. A survey of computer integrated 
manufacturing by A. T. Kearney (1989) found widespread failure to achieve anticipated benefits. 
Although data processing is a well-understood area of IT, large-scale development disasters are 
still not unknown, such as the £1.3 billion DSS computerised benefits system cost overrun (The 
Guardian, 6 July 1989; The Independent, 7 June, 1993) and the £7 million computer system at the 
Passport Office which increased delays in handling applications and provoked a strike by staff in 
the summer of 1989 (The Guardian, 5 August 1989). More recently, there have been the London 
Ambulance Service information system disaster, which resulted in several deaths (The 
Independent, 27 September 1992), and the cancellation by the London Stock Exchange of the 
Taurus share settlement system project at an estimated cost of £400 million, and a threat to the 
future of the Stock Exchange as an institution and the City of London as Europe’s major 
financial centre (The Independent, 19 June, 1993).
More common than spectacular failures are disappointing, under-utilised systems and low 
levels of take-up, especially of office information systems. A study by the Butler Cox 
Foundation (Farmer, 1987) of office systems in more than 400 organizations in Europe and the 
U.S. found that ’About one in ten installations is a clear success; one in ten is a clear failure; and 
the remaining eight out of ten installations are non-events’. In a recent survey by the Institute of 
Administrative Management and Touche Ross (1991), a third of users did not think that office 
automation had yielded significant benefits to their organisations. Although most organizations 
had pursued mainly efficiency benefits, there were direct savings in less than 15% of projects.
The main sources of these problems are now widely recognised as not technological but
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failure to address user and business needs. In large part, this is a failure of implementation 
approach. Implementation, defined broadly as the entire process of introducing new technology 
into an organization (Walton, 1989) is known to have a major effect on outcomes, in terms both 
of system success/failure and impacts on users and organizations (Klein, 1986; Kling and Iacono, 
1989). In the ’traditional’ system development life cycle implementation is seen as the stage after 
design and testing, when the completed system is handed over to users. A wider perspective on 
implementation sees it as including strategic and organizational change, as well as technological. 
An example is the Leavitt diamond (1965) (Fig. 1.1), a well-known heuristic device used to 
illustrate the interdependence of technology, task, organization, and people. This was adapted by 
the MIT Corporation of the 1990s programme as the framework for the entire project (Figure 
1.2) (Scott Morton, 1991). In their version, ’task’ becomes strategy, seen as the summation of all 
the organization’s tasks, culture is added, and the role of management processes is to integrate 
them all. Implementation is the management process in introducing new technology.
A basic argument of this thesis is that implementation has two equally important aspects, 
which can be called for now the rational-technical and the political-interpretative. So far, they 
have not been very well brought together. The IT-corporate strategy literature of the 80s 
concerned itself with finding strategic applications for IT, without paying much attention to the 
issue of how to implement them. The MIT programme also, to judge from the publicly available 
work, was more concerned with developing frameworks, raising awareness and vision among 
senior executives about the potential of IT, than with implementation. There are signs that this is 
changing; that the perceived problem now is less what to do with the technology than with how 
to manage the organizational change necessary to exploit it (McFarlan, 1992; Benjamin, 1993).
At the same time, there is an extant long tradition of research and practice on introducing 
technology, of which socio-technical systems, job redesign, and soft systems methodology are 
notable examples, and a body of work on managing organizational change, particularly from an 
Organization Development perspective, both of which deal with the ’political’, people, ’soft’ or 
’messy’ aspects of implementing change. Operational Research, Management Information 
Systems, and information systems researchers a) have discovered for themselves in their own 
research the significance of the social and organizational aspects of IT use and introduction; b) 
have increasingly turned to the body of theory and practice just discussed, as well as other areas 
of behavioural science, in order to explain their findings and obtain prescriptions for good 
practice. This has been a difficult exercise for many coming from the IT end because of their 
inadequate grounding in social science, and because of the major disagreements among social 
scientists over their own paradigm.
1.2 Office information systems.
This research focuses on the branch of IT known as office systems (OS) or office 
automation (OA). In the 1980s there were a number of empirical studies of office systems, some
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of the more notable being the DTI OA pilot projects (KMG Thomson McLintock, 1986), 
Wainwright and Francis’ 1984 study of five organizations, Long’s 1987 survey of new office 
technology, HUSAT’s work for the European Foundation (Eason, 1985), and the National 
Computing Centre survey of OS in the U.S. and U.K. (1986). A prescriptive literature on 
implementation also developed, much of it sponsored by the NCC. There were also studies of the 
effects of computers on white collar work (Webster, 1990; Liff, n.d.; Thompson, 1989). On the 
whole, the systems studied were not strategic and did not involve major organizational change. 
Although radical organizational implications for OS had been anticipated for some time (Price, 
1979), the systems were largely departmental and addressed to lower level workers, so that the 
effects on organizations which were observed were mainly at job-level and involved secretaries, 
typists and clerks. Because these systems were still in the early stages of development, they had 
little impact outside those departments, and the effect on organization structure was minimal 
(NCC, 1986). OS as such had rarely reached management level, even when that was part of the 
plan. However, the technology and its uses have both moved on greatly since most of this work 
was done. One phase of the present research therefore involved finding out about recent 
developments in OS and updating knowledge about the implementation and ’impacts’ of OS by 
studying current examples.
The main purpose, however, was to delineate an implementation strategy for office 
systems, which would take into account both the rational and political aspects. In an earlier 
review of office systems development methodologies (Noble, 1991), I had compared seven 
methodologies or approaches, and had found that on the whole those which were strong on 
meeting business needs were weak on user needs and organizational/social issues, and vice versa.
I concluded that there was a need for a methodology or approach for contemporary office systems 
which could address both sides. This was the broad aim of the current project (although I would 
eschew use of the word ’methodology’ both because it is technically incorrect and because it 
suggests a rigour and certainty which is not justified by our current state of knowledge).
1.3 Overview o f thesis.
Because of the way I have defined implementation, this thesis covers not one but several 
different types of issues which I have brought together to bear on the problem. The organization 
of the thesis follows the pattern of the MIT/Leavitt model. The first two chapters deal with the 
’rational’ aspect, focusing on technology and strategy. (I am well aware that the strategy process 
is often far from rational, but the prescriptive approach to the strategic use of technology is 
overwhelmingly rationalist.) Chapter Two is a study of office automation/systems, their 
development and uses in organizations, from both analytic and historical perspectives. Chapter 
Three discusses past experience with the problem of making office systems meet business needs, 
and uses the IT-strategy literature and organization theory to develop an analytical framework for 
OS to indicate three areas in which OS can contribute most to business and strategic needs. The
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case studies are presented at this point in Chapter Four for reasons which are discussed below.
The second half of the dissertation adopts the more political or interpretative perspective, 
and, following the MIT schema, is on the theme of the relationship between IT/OS and 
organizations and people. Chapter Five looks at these issues from a descriptive/theoretical point 
of view, discussing the ’emergent’ perspective on implementing technology in organizations and 
exploring the contribution to it of structuration theory. Chapter Six reviews the prescriptive 
implementation literature with a focus on managing change, and outlines an implementation 
approach for strategic office systems. In the Conclusions I summarise my findings and their 
implications for further research.
1.4 Research methodology.
Because the research problem included such diverse aspects, different methods were 
required to investigate them. Case studies, discussions with practitioners, consultants, suppliers, 
and other researchers, and meetings of the British Computer Society Office Automation Specialist 
Group provided valuable information on technological developments, uses, and problems with 
office systems. Data from recent surveys conducted by the National Computing Centre, Price- 
Waterhouse, and the Institute of Administrative Management were used to gain a fuller picture of 
the extent of dissemination or take-up of OS nationally and internationally. I supplemented this 
by a postal survey of the MDs and CEOs of 250 leading UK companies, in order to find out 
senior managers’ perceptions of the potential benefits of OS and their relation to business 
strategy.
Case studies were conducted in fifteen organizations which were currently implementing, 
or had recently implemented office systems. Half were brief ’snapshots’, based on a presentation 
given to a public meeting, one visit to the organization, or both. These contributed insight into 
how OS are currently being used, the technology and strategy side, but generally did not cover 
implementation in any depth. The other case studies were considerably more extensive, involving 
interviews with a number of different people in the organization, usually over a period of 
months, and provided material on a wider range of implementation issues. As implementation is 
a change process, the most effective way to study it is through longitudinal studies in 
organizations, a contextualist research method which ’has its roots in pragmatism ..., has its focus 
on the event in its setting’ (Pettigrew, 1985). I discuss the role of process models and the implied 
methodology for using them at greater length in Chapter Five. The case study questions covered
1) the inception of the OS, where the initial idea came from; 2) the reasons for introducing OS, 
benefits sought, and strategic aim, if any; 3) the design of the system, especially type and degree 
of integration, applications, and the work and the employees affected; 4) the implementation 
strategy or approach employed (both in intention and in fact); 5) the problems experienced and 
how they were dealt with; 6) results or outcomes to date in terms of benefits realised and 
disadvantages; 7) the relation between the introduction of the OS and organizational change with
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respect to work roles and organization structure.
The case studies represent a variety of organization types, public and private, large and 
small, service and manufacturing. The sample was not selected with the intention of testing 
hypotheses, but to provide a variety of settings, because of the aim of observing how OS are 
currently being used. The number was limited by what was reasonable for one researcher to 
handle. However, in the later stages of the research, an attempt was made to find organizations 
which were using OS technology in ’more advanced’ ways. The resulting sample includes a local 
authority department, two national government departments (one of which was later privatised), 
three manufacturing companies - one local, one part of an international group, and one part of a 
major multinational - and two major multinational IT suppliers.
The case studies provided qualitative information from semi-structured interviews with 
senior managers, wherever possible, with IT and project managers, user department heads, and 
direct users. Documentation such as project proposals, evaluation reports, and user handbooks 
were also obtained. In most cases, the organizations were visited several times over a two-year 
period, which provided an overview of the implementation process while events were reasonably 
fresh in the minds of participants.
The use of the case study material is descriptive and exploratory rather than explanatory 
(Yin, 1984); that is, it illustrates and generates hypotheses (Eisenhardt, 1989), but does not test 
hypotheses or choose between alternative theoretical explanations (Lee, 1989). Because some of 
the cases were very brief and illuminated only the technology and strategy issues, while others 
provided material on implementation and organizational change as well, the discussion of the case 
studies is placed after the technology and strategy chapters and before the implementation 
chapters.
The second half of the dissertation raises issues which could perhaps have been better 
explored empirically by using considerably more in-depth methods, such as participant 
observation in one or more organizations over a longer period of time. This could have produced 
far greater richness of detail, but due to limited time for the research, this would have been at 
the expense of the breadth which was gained by studying organizations in several different 
sectors and at different phases in their use of office systems. There was a choice to be made 
here. Since integrated office systems are still in their early stages, it seemed preferable to learn 
from the experiences of a wider variety of organizations, accepting the limitations of this 
approach, while indicating how theory and practice could be advanced in future by other 
approaches.
In conclusion, this is not a dissertation which explores a narrow area in great detail and 
contributes a jot to theory. The thesis is wide-ranging, descriptive and theoretical, and seeks 
ultimately to improve practice. It brings together empirical information from a variety of 
different sources (including fresh case study material) and literature from several different
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academic traditions to bear on the practical problem of implementing office systems. In 
organizing and analysing the material, I have attempted to make an original contribution in each 
of the broad areas covered, and in integrating these at the end.
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Chapter Two 
Developments in Office Systems
Introduction
This chapter examines the nature of the office and the role of information in it, and 
develops an information-processing view as the basis of a classification of offices. Office 
information systems are distinguished from other applications of IT, and changes in the use of 
computers in the office over the past three decades are examined, showing the increasingly 
integrated character of contemporary OS.
2 .1 Nature and functions o f offices.
2.1.1 Definitions and typologies.
The study of office systems must begin with some conceptualisation of the office.
Offices vary in many respects: the occupations of those who work in them, the kinds of work 
done, size, physical environment, the sorts of organizations they are part of and their functions in 
those organizations (Pava, 1983; Doswell, 1983; Hirschheim, 1986). However, what offices share 
is that they process information rather than producing or handling tangible physical objects 
(Hirschheim, 1985b; Doswell, 1983; Wainwright and Francis, 1984; Newman, 1987; Tsichritzis, 
1986), and this makes them obvious targets for information technology.
Because of the great variety of offices and office work, there are a number of typologies 
which have selected different aspects of the office as bases of differentiation. Doswell (1990) 
for example shows that the office has been modelled as: 1) a place and its equipment, 2) activities 
that occur and who performs them, 3) activity types or functions, 4) communication flows, 5) 
conversation, 6) procedure flows, 7) decision making, 8) databases, and 9) agents. He concludes 
that no one model is sufficient, as an office consists of all of these aspects. Hirschheim (1986) 
distinguishes typologies according to their underlying theoretical perspective, which can be seen 
as a continuum, ranging from the ’analytic’ perspective at one end to the ’interpretative’ at the 
other.
The former sees the office as an environment where people perform a variety of functions 
to support the successful running of the organization. The functions are conceived of in 
terms of largely formal and structured actions or activities. The latter conceives of the 
office in terms of mostly unstructured and informal human action (p. 30).
Hirschheim notes that the analytic view is much more prevalent and underlies most classification 
schemes. The three analytic approaches are the office activities view, which is concerned with 
what activities are performed and by whom (time spent in meetings, and so on), the office 
semantics view, which is concerned rather with the reasons the work is performed, with 
procedures and goals, and the office functions view, which concerns procedures which can be 
combined into higher level functions, the functions combining so as to relate to the organization’s 
goals. As the semantics view seems to be a subset of functions, the activities and functions views
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will be discussed here.
Software development has tended to focus on office activities because activities are
observable, relatively unambiguous and measurable, and easier to apply technology to
(Hirschheim, 1985b). In the activities view, the information processing task is conventionally
broken down into information capture, storage, manipulation, retrieval, and distribution
(Hirschheim, 1986; Wainwright and Francis, 1984). Office work is seen as comprising sets of
tasks, such as ’production of correspondence and other text, taking messages and passing them on,
filing and record keeping, time scheduling and diaries, dealing with incoming and outgoing mail’,
etc. (Antill and Clare, 1991, p. 13).
Office activities are also commonly classified in the IS literature according to the
routineness of the work (and the closely related issue of the type of worker), probably because
routine, structured work lends itself to computerisation. Newman (1987) thus classifies office
tasks as either procedural (routine; ways of dealing with recurring tasks) or problem-solving
(dealing with the unexpected). He points out however that there are many procedural elements
even in problem-solving work, to which computer technology can be applied. Panko and
Sprague’s typology of offices (1982) is based on the routine/non-routine distinction: Type I
offices are 1) volume-routine - high volume of transactions, routine information processing -
mainly clerical workers; Type II offices are concerned with policy-making, planning, R&D,
finance - mainly managerial, professional and non-clerical staff. Wainwright and Francis located
types of worker on a continuum, with those who organize and disseminate information
(professional, managerial, technical) at the creative end, and those involved in storage and
retrieval (mainly typists, clerks, and secretaries) at the routine end. Pava (1983) developed
different methodologies for computerising routine and non-routine office work.
An exclusive focus on office activities can result in the computerisation of procedures as
they currently exist under the manual system, losing many of the potential benefits of applying
technology (Simons, 1984; Tsichritzis, 1986). It may also underestimate the amount of routine
information-processing carried out by managers and the amount of non-routine work handled
regularly by ’lower-level’ workers, thus rigidifying existing organizational roles. In any case, the
routine/non-routine distinction is more appropriate to the data processing era than to today’s
technology which can be used to support, not automate, many non-routine tasks.
Types of activities performed and by whom are less significant from a business
perspective than the purpose or function of the office in the organization. Gunton (1983) lists
seven types of office, based on a functional classification:
Managerial office - direction and co-ordination 
Transaction office - group of clerks receives and processes documents - 
high-volume processing 
Working professional office - individual tasks together constitute the 
function of the office 
Casework office - clerks responsible for progress of one or more cases
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Engineering office
Machine room - like typing pool
Physical handlers - e.g. post rooms, stationery stores.
Gerstein (1987) has a similar functional typology; four of his types correspond to Gunton’s:
Administrative office - ’general office’, including executive and 
managerial 
Back office - processes transactions 
Professional - medical, dental, legal.
Technical office - design, scientific
But he adds:
Service office - provides information to customers, suppliers, or 
members of the organization.
Newman (1987) proposed a functional classification which is less descriptive and based more on 
the way the office supports the business:
1) Contract negotiation: selling and promoting products, purchasing materials, recruiting 
staff, negotiating with labor unions.
2) Contract implementation: paying bills, invoicing, paying staff.
3) Organization of work: planning, assigning tasks, scheduling activities, monitoring 
results — all of the functions directly associated with management.
4) Support: typing, mail collection and delivery, reception, secretarial support.
5) Supplying information to clients and customers. Researching, collecting and processing 
data, writing, consulting. Generally through either project or case work (newspaper, 
solicitor).
Newman notes that while ’the first four functions exist within every organization ... information 
supply is prevalent in organizations within the information industry’.
2.1.2 An information-processing view.
Both the activity and functional typologies are more descriptive than analytical, and 
derive more from an IT perspective than a management or organizational one. If we apply a 
systems perspective, an organization is seen as an open system seeking to maintain its integrity 
and stability while interacting with its environment. Information is required to deal with or 
reduce variety and uncertainty (Ashby, 1956), which can arise from three sources: 
task/technology (Perrow, 1971; Galbraith, 1973), the environment, and the interdependencies 
between tasks which require co-ordination (Thompson, 1967; Tushman and Nadler, 1978). 
Uncertainty, and therefore information-processing needs, are greater: the greater the complexity 
of the task, the more dynamic the environment, and the greater the interdependence among 
subunits. The main function of the office is to handle the organization’s information-processing 
needs.2
2. Organisations also require information in order to reduce equivocality or ambiguity arising 
from task, environment, and interdependencies. As equivocality involves lack of clarity rather 
than lack of data, it is reduced by rich media such as face-to-face communication rather than by
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A parallel view of the organization sees it as consisting of three main aspects: an operating 
or technical core concerned with performing primary tasks (’production’), an outer ring or 
strategic level which deals with the environment, and a co-ordinative level which mediates 
between the two and integrates specialised activities (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1974; Parsons, 1964). 
Organizations may or may not be formally structured so that units focus around these three basic 
aspects; usually they are not. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have discussed the organization design 
implications of the core/boundary distinction for structural differentiation and integration.
Some typologies of offices reflect these different kinds of information processing needs 
and aspects of organizations. Thus, Butera and Bartezzaghi (1983) identify two main functional 
types of offices: 1) main process offices which perform a primary task; 2) control and co­
ordination offices, which are mainly concerned with managing organizational units. The DTI 
reports made a similar distinction between line and support activities and added a forward 
planning function: 1) line - client services, such as sales, orders, deliveries, after-sales support);
2) support services - resource management: staff, buildings; 3) future options - R&D, corporate 
planning.
In examining the strategic use of IT, Porter (1985) and Porter and Millar (1985) also made
a basic distinction between primary and support functions:
primary activities are those involved in the physical creation of the product, its marketing 
and delivery to buyers, and its support and servicing after sale. Support activities provide 
the inputs and infrastructure that allow the primary activities to take place.
Porter and Millar took into account the information intensity of both the product and the process. 
The greater the information content of the product and of the processes in the primary activity, 
the greater the relevance of IT to competitive advantage.
Besides primary and support offices, the information-processing view points to the 
importance of boundary-spanning offices (such as Newman’s ’contract negotiation’ office), which 
deal with the environment, either at the immediate interface with the customer or supplier, or in 
terms of surveillance and long-range planning. Marketing, sales, service, links with suppliers and 
distributors, and corporate planning and much top management activity is concerned with the 
environment, although at different levels and with different time horizons.
From the information-processing perspective therefore there are three main categories of
offices:
primary (perform the core value-adding task of the organization), 
boundary-spanning,
co-ordinative (manage the relations between the other two, and among organizational
information systems. This indicates one of the limitations of information systems. Nevertheless 
equivocality is an an important issue in organization design from an information-processing 
perspective (Daft and Lengel, 1986).
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units).
This simplified scheme focuses on the functional importance of the office’s work to the 
organization, allows one to consider the industry dimension via the information intensity of the 
product and primary processes, and directs attention to the possibilities for strategic office 
systems.
The scheme can be elaborated as follows:
I. Primary. In industries where the information component of the primary activity is high, the 
main activity of the organization is carried on in offices - e.g. financial services, information 
services, government, professionals (solicitors, architects, general practitioners). These core 
offices may be front-office - deal directly with the customer or client, back-office - process 
orders, claims, accounts, records, or both at the same time (especially in small organizations). 
Tasks will be both routine and nonroutine. Even in industries with tangible products, a large 
amount of information processing goes on, both indirectly and directly supporting manufacturing 
operations.
II. Co-ordinative. All industries have administrative offices, which support the organization as a 
whole. They include functional departments such as personnel, payroll, accounts, as well as the 
executive functions of planning, control and co-ordination. In a small organization these 
functions are combined in one general managerial office; larger organizations typically have large 
departments, often with several subdivisions, devoted to each function. These are generally back- 
office in that clients, customers and suppliers normally do not have access to them; they are 
concerned with the internal functioning of the organization.
III. Boundary-spanning. In all industries the main activity of the organization is necessarily 
supported by boundary-spanning offices which handle inputs and outputs, such as sales, service, 
purchasing. Their importance to the business varies, depending on the industry - in some they 
are critical for survival because they are closely linked to the success of the primary activity 
(examples are booking services for airlines, hotels, and theatres; raw material procurement in 
some industries [Porter 1985]). They too usually have front-office and back-office aspects but 
they are often combined in the same physical space.
2.1.3 Interpretivist and social action perspectives
The information-processing view of the organization is analytical and rationalistic; it 
reflects the organizational imperative view of the relationship between organizations and 
information systems (Markus and Robey, 1988) and a technical as opposed to a political or 
critical view of the nature of management and organization (Reed, 1989). It is particularly useful 
in thinking about information systems in strategic terms, as I will attempt to show in the next 
chapter, but it is only partial.
Reflection on the nature of information shows why an interpretivist perspective is 
particularly relevant to office systems. The difference between data and information is that data
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does not become information until a meaning is attached to it by a human observer. Information 
can be defined as a symbol to which a meaning is attached (Checkland and Scholes, 1990); it 
therefore depends on interpretation, which is itself dependent on social norms including language. 
Further, information is itself highly symbolic (Feldman and March, 1981) and a source of power. 
The social character of information indicates the possiblity of differences of interpretation and 
interests, the complexity of office work and the potential difficulties in implementing 
technologies which handle it.
Writers including Suchman and Wynn (1984) have demonstrated the highly social and 
context-dependent character of office work, where informal interaction is often an essential 
aspect of getting the work done. Office work is often co-operative, unstructured, discontinuous, 
and rich in variety. Office information systems then need to be seen as social action systems with 
a language and organizational context, not just as technical systems (Lyytinen et al., 1991).
Hirschheim (1985b) observes the following differences between the analytic and 
interpretative perspectives:
There is a danger of going so far down the interpretivist track, however, that one overlooks the 
existence of structural constraints on human action. An adequate account encompasses both the 
rational-analytic aspects of office systems, ie. the intentions behind the introduction of 
technology, which may act as constraints, and the way that technology is interpreted and shaped 
by social actors at different organizational levels. This point is developed further in Chapter 5.
2.2 Developments in office systems.
2.2.1 Definition of office information systems.
Office systems can be defined as the convergence of computers, telecommunications, and 
office machines, used to support office functions and activities (Olson and Lucas, 1982; Jarrett, 
1984; Hirschheim, 1985b; Long, 1987). Beyond this, there is not much agreement as to what 
office systems are or how exactly they differ from other kinds of information systems, although a 
difference is generally perceived. Confusingly, the terms ’office automation’, ’office systems’, 
and ’office technology’ are used by different writers to refer to what appears to be the same thing 
(Hirschheim, 1985b). Some writers simply provide a list of facilities, including word processing, 
electronic mail, and electronic filing (Boddy and Buchanan, 1986; Lucas, 1981). This is a
Analytic
Office operations Deterministic, rational, overt
Interpretative 
Non-deterministic, political, 
covert
Agent, culture 
Shared social meaning of 
actors
Symbolic, non-empirical 
Phenomenological 
Qualitative 
Understanding
Organization as: 
Office action
Structure
Manifest behaviour
Research paradigm 
Research methods 
Focus
Observable, empirical 
Formal models, empirical 
Quantitative 
Analysis
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technology-based, not a business definition and reflects an activities view of the office. We 
clearly need a good classification of the applications of information technology (Mason, 1984).
2.2.2 Analytical approaches.
Some analytical approaches to computer applications have been based on Anthony’s (1965) 
structural model, which divides management activity into operational control, management 
control, and strategic planning. The degree of structuring of the activity is often also taken into 
account. Thus, Lucas (1982) classified information systems according to Gorry and Scott 
Morton’s framework for decision support systems. The dimensions are the nature of decisions 
and type of managerial function (Fig. 2.1). Transaction processing falls outside the framework 
altogether because it is routine clerical work and not managerial. MIS are seen as supporting 
management control and strategic planning decisions. Lucas noted that most IS so far were in 
the structured operational control cell because ’these problems are similar in many organizations 
and are among the most easily understood’.
Figure 2.1 
Types of Information Systems 
Adaptation of the Gorry and Scott Morton Framework
Transaction processing 
Routine clerical
Type of Function
Decisions Operational Control Management Control Strategic Planning
Structured Order processing Budgets Warehouse location
Accounts payable Personnel reports Transportation
mode mix
Semistructured Inventory control Analysis of variance Introduction of 
Production planning new product
Unstructured Cash management Management of Planning for R&D
personnel
After Lucas 1982
Churchill, Kempster and Uretsky (1969), using the dichotomies structured/unstructured 
and planning/control, developed ’a hierarchy of computer applications based not only on 
increasing levels of sophistication but also on the outputs of lower types being necessary inputs 
for higher types’ (Figure 2.2). Types 1 and 2 are clerical systems, while type 3 and type 4 
systems ’are oriented towards ... managerial rather than clerical activities. The essence of 
management-oriented systems is that they involve either unstructured environments or planning 
functions’ (Friedman, 1989). Churchill et al. regarded their types as four stages in the 
development of computer applications, which most organizations would probably go through in 
sequence.
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Figure 2.2
Computer Applications and Management Activities
Type of computer 
application
Categories of mangement 
activities
Type 4 Planning unstructured 
activities
Type 3 Planning highly 
structured activities
Controlling relatively 
unstructured activities
Type 2 Controlling highly 
structured activities
Type 1
Churchill et al. 1969, in Friedman, op. cit.
These analytical schemes help to show how computerisation has progressed from 
structured, operational systems towards less structured activities and managerial functions. They 
do not help us distinguish office systems from other kinds of information systems, because office 
work includes all three levels and both structured and unstructured tasks.
2.2.3 Historical approach.
The conceptual confusion about office systems is due in part to the fact that their nature 
has actually been changing very rapidly. An historical approach is therefore useful for 
understanding the nature of office systems. The aim of this section is to show how the use and 
meaning of ’office automation’ and ’office systems’ have changed, and how technological and 
organizational developments have led towards integration.
Electronic technology has been applied to the office in four overlapping stages, which are 
data processing, isolated applications, departmental office automation, and integrated systems 
(Figure 2.3). Putting dates to these stages is to some extent arbitrary, because at any given time a 
few ’leading edge’ users are well ahead of the rest, the earlier stages continue into the present 
(Ward, 1990), and there is a great tendency within IT to anticipate the next stage, what Friedman 
(1989) calls ’advancing the clock’. One has to distinguish between what is technically possible 
and what is in widespread use. The phases used here concern technology which is generally 
available and widely utilised in the appropriate contexts.
Data Processing 
MIS
Word Processing 
PCs
Generic OA 
Integrated OS
Figure 2.3 
Development of Office Systems
1960 1970 1980 1990
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2.2.3.1 Data processing and management information systems.
When the term ’office automation’ was first used, it referred to the computerisation of
standardised office tasks previously carried out manually by clerical workers. Routine clerical
work which involved number-crunching was the first candidate for office ’automation’.
...in the early 1960s, the term ’office automation’ was widely used to connote the use of 
computers in such applications as billing and invoicing, accounts receivable and payable, 
payroll processing and the like. Today we regard these as accounting applications that 
have long been moved into the domain of the data processing organization, but at the time 
in question, these functions were performed by office personnel; consequently, 
implementing them by computer was ’office automation’. (Hammer and Zisman, 1979.)
This use of computers in the office is now almost entirely subsumed under the term ’data 
processing’ or ’transaction processing’. The practice spread from the information-based 
industries where it was first extensively used to control the costs of an expanding clerical work 
force:
By the mid-1960’s most large businesses had turned to computers to facilitate such routine 
’back office’ tasks as storing payroll data and issuing checks, controlling inventory and 
monitoring the payment of bills (Giuliano, 1982).
Management information systems, which developed in the 1970’s, fed off the data processed by
the mainframes and were intended to improve management control. Rockart and Scott Morton,
writing in 1984, documented the development of MIS through what they called the accounting,
operations, and ’information’ eras:
In the first era accounting functions were automated. In the second, during the mid to 
late 60s, the emphasis changed from systems aiding the accountant to systems aiding first- 
line operational personnel. In this era, manufacturing control systems and on-line order 
entry systems were instituted. As in the first era, most of the second wave of systems
merely enabled companies to process paperwork faster and more accurately The first
two eras, in which accounting and operational applications were developed, produced 
many internal data bases useful to management.... (the) third era of applications focuses 
on providing information to middle and top mgmt.... and on facilitating both data analysis 
and communication of analytic results and other facts.
The objectives of this first phase of office automation were to increase productivity and 
obtain tangible cost savings by reducing staff levels or increasing output with the same number of 
staff. It was largely technology-led in that applications were determined by the ease with which 
computers could be applied to them, not by strategic need. Efficient data processing could be 
strategic to the organization in some circumstances (Ward, 1990), for example if cost leadership 
was essential to its competitive stance (Porter, 1985), as in information-intensive industries such 
as insurance and banking. In most other cases, although the computerisation of routine back- 
office functions could be cost-justified, it conferred no real strategic or competitive advantage on 
the organization (King et al., 1988).
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Problems
Friedman (1989) has pointed out that the main constraints on computer system 
development from the mid-60s to early 80s were technical ones. Mainframe computers were 
large and expensive, programming was difficult, and so most installations were overseen by 
technical specialists, with little involvement of users or functional managers. Because 
installations were technology-led and neglected users’ needs, there were many problems in 
implementing both data processing systems and MIS. The result was many unusable DP systems 
(Wainwright and Francis, 1984), and managers wading through reams of computer print-out 
which seemed to provide every kind of information except what they could actually use. There 
was also considerable fear that the automation of office work would lead to white collar 
unemployment and to mind-deadening jobs (Hoos, 1960).
2 .2 3 .2  Isolated applications.
In the late 70s and early 80s, processing capacity increased and appropriate software was 
developed which made the high-volume routine handling of text technically feasible and thus 
made computing much more widely applicable in the office. Doswell noted in 1983: ’the 
automation of office procedures is not now mainly concerned with data processing’, and cited 
Strassman’s 1976 estimate that less than 1% of all organizational information processing costs 
could be attributed to number-processing activities.
Although hardware suppliers began to offer OA products at about the same time, what 
turned out to have more lasting significance in the 70s and 80s was the use of microelectronics in 
isolated pieces of office equipment, notably in word processing and personal computers. By 
1983, the Policy Studies Institute found that two-thirds of British offices which were already 
computer users had word processing. An Infratest survey for the European Foundation in the 
UK in 1984 found that 100% of financial organizations used some computers, some WP and telex. 
86% of manufacturing organizations and 68% of commercial and professional organizations used 
some computers. The figures for WP were 58%, 64% and 70% respectively (see Figure 2.4) A 
survey of the use of OA facilities in 1987 among Price Waterhouse’s panel of companies with five 
or more DP staff showed that 71% reported considerable use of word processing by secretaries - 
by far the most widespread ’office automation’ facility (see Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.4
Percentage of U.K. Organizations with Each Form of Equipment 
Manufacturing Public Commercial Financial Professional
Some Computers 86 37 68 100 68
Some WP 58 74 64 100 70
Telex 86 20 100 44
Fax 31 16 32 16 53
Infratest 1984 in EF Working Paper Series
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Figure 2.5 
Spread of Office Automation Facilities
It is significant that the only other facility with considerable use at that time was 
spreadsheets. After stand-alone word processing, the major office technology success of the 
1980s was the personal computer. The dramatically reduced costs of microprocessors, the 
introduction of the IBM-PC in 1981, and the frustration of managers and professionals with the 
delays of the DP department in dealing with their requests for system development led to a 
proliferation of PCs in the office, to the point where organizations became anxious to re-exert 
control (Jarke, 1986).
A large-scale survey of the use of office technology by U.K. and U.S. organizations 
published in 1986 by the National Computing Centre found that the most widely used 
applications were storage and retrieval, text preparation, data preparation, and information 
collection (see Figure 2.6). The electronic office equipment in most general use was still 
photocopiers, electric typewriters and dictation machines, but the use of stand-alone WPs and 
micros exceeded 60% of organizations. In continental Europe, a cross-national survey carried out 
for the European Foundation found that less than 2% of the small and medium sized firms 
studied had a DP system, microcomputer, or WP system.
Lists of equipment are not very informative as to how it is being used. Surveys of 
applications show that for the most part office technology was being used in isolation. Thus the 
Price-Waterhouse survey showed that in contrast to the widespread use of WP and PCs, less than 
a third of the organizations in their sample used an integrated OA package. In the earlier NCC 
study about 30% of organizations used electronic messaging and less than 10% used LANs. The 
European Foundation (1986) noted ’when it comes to the actual introduction of new systems there 
is a degree of caution and reservation. Preference is given to those systems which do not involve 
organizational changes in the company, e.g. the introduction of word processing or graphic 
systems alone’.
While PCs had from the start been conceived as personal support tools, and the concern 
was more with increasing effectiveness than with efficiency, the objectives for introducing WP 
were to extend the efficiency gains for data-handlers to handlers of text, ie. from clerks to 
typists and secretaries. Cost savings were often sought by organizing word processors into pools, 
which was generally unpopular both with the word processor operators themselves and with their 
internal customers. While staff were on the whole enthusiastic about word processing, there was 
failure to reach the full potential and it was often used like a typewriter because of lack of 
training and poor implementation (Liff, n.d.; Johnson and Rice, 1987). PCs have been generally 
extremely popular with individuals, although they have presented many problems to 
organizations, especially lack of standardisation and control (Immel, 1985; Jarke, 1986).
This phase of office automation represented the mechanisation of isolated activities and 
not integrated systems (Tsichritzis, 1986). The technology was usually introduced piecemeal 
(Butera and Bartezzaghi, 1983; Pava, 1983) and facilitated the work as it was currently being
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National Computing Centre 1986
carried out (Long, 1987). It was directed mainly at typists, secretaries, and clerical workers 
(Wainwright and Francis, 1984; Long, 1987), although many professionals and some managers 
enthusiastically took up PC use. However, the very widespread use of WP and PCs has served to 
familiarise many office workers with computers and thus to prepare the ground for the next 
phase.
2.2.3.3 Generic office automation.
There appeared to be a need for a type of computing which would support various kinds
of office work and which would be more integrated. In the early 80s, hardware manufacturers
brought out minicomputers linked to terminals and peripherals such as printers, usually together
with a software package including several facilities such as word processing, electronic mail,
databases, diary and calendar. This phase or type of system I refer to as ’office automation’
because of the conception which lay behind it of automating the individual office. Some
examples of packages from the 80s (many of which are still around in some form) are: IBM Profs,
Disoss (now replaced by Office Vision); Data General CEO; Olivetti-Quadratron Q-Office, DEC
All-in-One; ICL Officepower. In retrospect, generic OA can be seen as a first step towards
integrated office systems, because it integrated different facilities into one software package, and
linked previously independent devices to each other.
The role of OA in relation to other forms of computing was perceived differently by
various writers. Meyer and Boone (1987) saw OA as supporting unstructured office work on
behalf of individual users:
OA is distinguished from MIS in three important ways. First, OA provides tools to 
individuals and groups of users, who then operate the tools themselves. MIS operates a 
centralised resource on behalf of the entire organization. Second, OA applies to 
unstructured knowledge work, while MIS processes routine, well-structured transactions. 
Third, OA tools work with data that belong to the users, while MIS processes 
organizational data.... If an information service is interactive, operated by and at the 
discretion of a user, it is considered part of the domain of OA.... We define OA as 
’computer- and communications-based tools for thinking’ (pp. 4-5).
Jarke, in a study of micro-mainframe links (1986), located the function of OA as the support of 
the working group.
microcomputers were originally perceived as personal support tools, whereas most 
mainframe applications concern the organization level.... Micro-mainframe technology 
[which includes OA] allows another organizational level to be supported: the working 
group which synthesizes individual contributions into a completed project or work task... 
Here, the computer-commmunications systems serve as a medium of cooperation and 
negotiation among group members. (Emphasis added.)
The DTI report saw OA as supporting the departmental organizational level; OA ’fills the 
middle ground of computing, providing an important bridge between individual resources 
provided by PCs and more conventional mainframe (or super-mini) computing’ (see Figure 2.7). 
The DTI office automation pilots constituted an important part of a flurry of interest in
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Figure 2.7
.OA system s are departmental in 
nature, providing facilities to groups. 
The group facilities are broadly similar 
to those provided to individuals via 
popular PC packages.
OA as Departmental Systems
Group A
OA Group B
Group C
OA s y s te m s  are d ep artm en ta l In natu re .
Executive
Support
Text
Production
Case Handling
Case Record Archive
Key
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KMG/DTI
OA in Britain in the early 80s. The NCC began a major programme of work on OA in 1980 
(published in 1982-3), and 1982 was Information Technology Year. The DTI-sponsored office 
automation pilot projects (1981-85, publ. 1986) were conducted in twenty organizations, with the 
objective of helping both user organizations and suppliers learn how best to exploit the 
technology.
The DTI reports (KMG, 1986) suggested four generic application areas for OA: text 
production, case handling, management support, and the management of large, especially 
geographically dispersed projects. The pilots included examples of the first three. The relation 
of the different applications to existing software is shown in Figure 2.8, and the facilities 
required by each application type are shown in Figure 2.9.
Fig. 2.8
Office Automation - Application by Software 
Types of applications PC Software
Text production WP
Case handling - integration of WP with 
information storage and retrieval Database
Management support - Spreadsheet
planning/decision making 
executive communications 
general (diary etc.)
KMG/DTI
Figure 2.9
OA Facilities Required by Application Type
User level Personal (PC) Dept. (OA) Corporate (DP) External
Typing 3 3 0 0
Clerical 0 3 1 0
Professional 3 2 0 3
Mid Mgmt. 3  3 1 1
Top Mgmt.
self 1 1 2  1
their staff 3 2 3 3
Key: 3 = Yes 2 = Probable 1 = Possible 0 = No
KMG/DTI
Problems
The problems with the DTI pilots varied according to type of application. The case 
handling system, which was the integration of WP with information storage and retrieval, was 
used as WP. In management support, the users’ needs were not understood and the benefits ill 
defined. In text production, which was seen as joint drafting of reports using but beyond WP, 
the need for the facility had been over-estimated, and it was considered benefits would be major
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only when several people needed to work together to meet a deadline. Part of the problem was
resistance to change within the organizations, but suppliers were implicitly criticised for giving
insufficient support and not focusing on business needs. The report stressed that OA should be
application-driven, whereas the hardware manufacturers were concentrating on providing more
and better quality facilities. The report also noted that links to mainframe and to PCs were
essential. The results were therefore on the whole disappointing, although a great deal of
learning had taken place (NEDC, 1987).
The main problems with generic OA were lack of take-up, and that it was technology-
not business-led. A generic facilities-based approach had been developed for the administrative
office, and was not directed at specific business needs. One seldom hears of large-scale failure,
as with DP, because the systems had been pitched at the administrative level, use was
discretionary, and failure was represented by unused boxes sitting in cupboards or storerooms,
low levels of financial benefits realised, and low levels of exploitation of the facilities available.
The ’paperless office’ also turned out to be an illusion (Immel, 1985). Where OA had
been introduced paper was not only still in evidence but had actually increased, and the total
numbers of staff had not noticeably dwindled at that time, partly due to the need to employ
numbers of computer specialists (Long, 1987). Lack of take-up or failure to invest resulted from
lack of understanding of what OA was supposed to do, and of how it could be cost-justified.
2.2.2.4 Integrated systems.
The need for integrated office systems (integrated - between systems, across functions,
between sites, inter-organizational) had been recognised throughout the 80s (Simons, 1984).
Gunton (1988) had observed that where office systems were introduced departmentally they were
’islands of automation’ within the organization; possible links with existing DP systems were
overlooked. Long (1987) foresaw a new phase of office technology which
involves the outright elimination of many intermediary (routine information handling) 
functions, and has been brought about by the proliferation of p-c-s and the increasing 
ability to interlink them with one another and with databases... (a) movement towards 
ultimate integration and interlinking of three underlying technologies (data processing, 
telecommunications, office machines) is now underway with the development of the 
’multifunctional work station’, which will integrate information retrieval, processing, 
storage and communication into one functional unit.... This second phase will also see the 
routinisation and even automation of some aspects of professional and technical jobs 
....(and) will allow organizations to make dramatic changes in their structure and 
functioning, and to provide new products and services.
Farmer (1988) observed:
...in the mid- to late 1980’s, a significant minority of large organizations began 
experimenting with application systems that linked central databases to electronic mail, or 
word processing to electronic mail and spreadsheets, or some other combinations of data 
processing, office systems and personal computing. To facilitate these integrated 
application systems, leading suppliers began providing various sub-routines (called 
’application program interfaces’...) that eased the integration process... integrated 
applications systems break traditional boundaries between data processing, office
20
automation and personal computing, to meet specific, not general, business requirements.
The reasons integration had not been achieved earlier were both technical and 
organizational. They included lack of integration of software and hardware, incompatible 
standards, cost, managerial and professional resistance to keyboards, and unusable systems 
(Wainwright and Francis, 1984). The existing base of incompatible computer systems which 
survive from the previous eras acts as a major obstacle to investment in integrated systems.
There are still technical obstacles, but while it was once nearly impossible to create links, there 
are now products which enable systems to work together. Suppliers are far more concerned with 
the issue, some have joined together to promote Open System Interconnection standards, and 
some unlikely partners have begun to work with each other (e.g. IBM and Apple). At the same 
time user organizations are more aware of the problem and establishing IT policies to ensure 
greater standardisation of hardware and software among their units.
’Integration’ currently has several different meanings:
1) the integration of data and text with image and voice (multi-media);
2) the convergence of equipment based on different technologies, especially communications with 
computers (NEDC, 1987);
3) the integration of existing software facilities (WP, email, databases) into one coherent package 
with a consistent interface to the user, and consistent procedures across facilities;
4) integration of existing systems: networking of PCs and links with mainframe computing, or of 
OA with PCs, DP and MIS;
5) integration of departmental systems with each other across functional boundaries, into 
corporate, organization-wide networks;
6) integration of communications across organizational boundaries (inter-organizational systems).
All of these different forms of integration are going on concurrently. The more technical forms 
of integration facilitate and support organizational integration. The focus here is on the 
integration of systems (Integration 4, 5 and 6) and through them, of organizations.
Several writers have commented on how OA is being integrated with end-user computing 
and other systems:
End user computing involves two main strands of activity which are increasingly difficult 
to distinguish. The first was the development of mainframe tools which could be used by 
staff outside data processing to analyse corporate data...The second strand... has been the 
use of personal computers.... A third related activity has been the spread of ’office 
automation’, in particular word processing, which can no longer be seen as separate from 
either corporate information processing or end user computing....’office automation’ is 
merging into end user computing on the one hand and corporate information processing 
on the other. Today end user computing involves the convergence of Information Centres, 
personal computing, and part of ’office automation’ (Lockett, 1988). (Emphasis added.)
As I define it, an integrated office system will usually include standard OA facilities such 
as word processing, electronic mail, and access to databases from one terminal. Ideally, these 
different facilities will have a common interface to the user and a consistent set of procedures 
(Integration 3). Further applications will depend on the needs of the particular type of user and
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the nature of the business - desk-top publishing, spreadsheets, etc. Various architectures are 
possible; integrated systems may be distributed, ie. consist of PCs and peripheral equipment such 
as printers, interlinked by local area networks (LANs), or linked by means of a mainframe, a 
minicomputer or a PC which acts as a fileserver. Terminals may have their own processing 
power and storage facility or not, again depending on user needs. An essential feature is 
electronic communication: people on the system are linked by way of electronic mail and access 
to shared files and databases. External communication from the computer via email, telex and 
fax, and access to databases outside the organization are also possible (see Figure 2.10).
Whereas the staff affected by the earlier phases of OS were mainly clerical and secretarial, 
integrated systems are intended to include professionals, technical workers and managers - ie. all 
information workers. Thus integrated systems have to be able to deal with far less structured 
problems, must be flexible, easy to learn and adaptable to user needs. The aim is not to automate 
the work, but to support workers in their tasks (Newman, 1987). Since much office work is co­
operative rather than individual, systems must be able to support group working (computer- 
supported co-operative working). They may support business processes and will be at least 
departmental, probably cross-functional, interdepartmental or organizational in scope. The 
rationale for investment is far more likely to be improved quality of work, organizational 
performance, and service to customers and clients rather than conventional forms of cost-benefit 
analysis.
While at present it is still possible to distinguish between office systems, DP and MIS, and 
personal computing, in the very near future these differences will be eroded as they all become 
linked together in integrated systems, which can have profound effects on organizations. From 
being merely administrative support systems, office systems can become the basis of 
organizational computing. Because they will affect more levels, different types of work and 
worker and cross functions, sites, organizations, etc., they are likely to have far greater 
organizational impact than departmental systems. We know from the IS literature (Keen et al., 
1982) that integrated systems are particularly difficult to implement. Thus the objectives and 
implementation process for integrated OS should differ from those of past OS. These issues will 
be discussed in the next chapters.
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Chapter Three 
The Organizational Uses of Office Systems
Introduction
In this chapter I show how the uses of office systems in organizations have moved from
an exclusive focus on productivity and cost-displacement to more strategic objectives. I apply
the information-processing view which I developed in the previous chapter to indicate strategic
uses for OS.
3.1 The benefits o f IT.
Investment in new technology occurs for three broad types of reasons: increasing
efficiency, increasing effectiveness, and improving strategic position (Lockett, 1988). Increasing
organizational efficiency involves improving the ratio of inputs to outputs (Hofer and Schendel,
1978). Increasing effectiveness means improving the ratio of benefits to costs, for example by
improving quality, performance and flexibility. ’Efficiency is productivity (output over input); it
is cost-oriented; it is concerned with internal performance, action without waste, doing things
right. Effectivenesss is value (benefit over cost); it is results-oriented; it is concerned with doing
the right things’ (Synnott, 1987, p. 74). Meyer and Boone (1987) refer to cost-displacement
versus value-added benefits. The former focus on efficiency and productivity, while:
value-added applications make the user more effective, although they do not necessarily 
save time. The effectiveness has leverage on a greater portion of the organization - it in 
turn produces profits, making many others more productive.... The term ’value-added’ 
refers to those applications that focus on organizational effectiveness.
Strategy concerns the way in which an organization seeks to match its distinctive 
competences and outputs to its environment, so as to realise its goals - above all, organizational 
survival. Competitive strategy involves positioning so as to achieve a sustainable comparative 
advantage in competitive markets (King et al., 1988). While efficiency, effectiveness and 
strategic benefits are analytically distinct, technological and structural innovations are often 
introduced to obtain several types of benefits at once. Also, efficiency and effectiveness often 
promote a particular business strategy. Nevertheless, the term ’strategic’ implies a higher order of 
benefit, which will not only help the organization to perform more effectively but to perform 
excellently, compete successfully, or to survive.
As we have seen in Chapter One, there has been a general concern about failure to realise 
returns from IT investment (Child, 1987; Strassman, 1985). One explanation is that benefits exist 
but are not visible or are passed on to the consumer. Another explanation is that the lack of 
payoff to firms is real, and has occurred because investment has been applied to low-payoff areas 
or has not been accompanied by any real change in the way the organization worked or was 
organized. Franke (1989) speculated that technological change would not produce productivity 
improvements until experience in producing and using the technology had been accumulated.
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Another reason it is difficult to measure real benefits is that the nature of the benefits 
sought tends to change as experience with the technology gathers. Mohrman and Lawler (1984) 
have distinguished three kinds of change: alpha change, which is a change in the level of existing 
outputs; beta change, the adoption of new standards for the same kind of output; and gammma 
change, which is non-comparable change, meaning that things are done differently, there is a 
new world view, and hence a redefinition of effectiveness. Information technology, because of 
its cybernetic nature, is often adapted by users to achieve new goals. A focus on achieving only 
low-level, alpha objectives will lead to disappointing results.
There is a correspondence here with Naisbitt’s idea (1984) that technology goes through 
three stages: initially it takes the line of least resistance and is used in limited areas; in the second 
stage, it is used to improve existing products, and in the third new uses are found growing out of 
the technology itself. The kinds of objectives sought tend to change with the development of 
technology, which makes possible new applications.
3.2 The objectives o f office automation.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there has been a general problem of making 
office systems meet business needs. This was caused partly by the limitations of the technology 
itself which made integration difficult, but also by management’s focus on traditional capital 
investment criteria and computerising routine work at lower organizational levels. With very few 
exceptions, organizations have invested in office automation and office systems in order to 
increase efficiency, increase productivity, save costs, or avoid future costs. The cost- 
displacement objectives of the DP era persisted into word processing and beyond into office 
automation. The studies conducted in the 80s showed that the focus of generic OA continued to 
be on cost savings and improving the productivity of typists, secretaries and clerks. (Pritchard 
and Cole, 1983; Long, 1987, Gunton, 1988; King et al., 1988). The NCC’s 1984 postal survey of 
750 UK and 750 U.S. organizations (1986) found that organizations on the whole applied the 
same kind of justification requirements to office technology that were applied to DP and as a 
consequence ’most were still concentrating on the short-term productivity benefits of 
automation’.
According to the survey on office automation conducted recently by the Institute of 
Administrative Management and Touche Ross (1991), this attitude to office automation/systems 
is still by far the most common one. The survey found that nearly all the benefits sought by OA 
users were efficiency benefits at the task level, and OA was aimed primarily at administrative 
and clerical workers.
The problems with a focus on efficiency and productivity are, first, that the benefits 
themselves are small and difficult to realise, and second, that it diverts attention from the much 
greater benefit to be gained from increasing effectiveness and organizational performance. The 
well-known Booz, Allen and Hamilton study (Data General Corporation, 1983) of office
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productivity calculated time savings of 15%, which was supported by NCC research (Wilson and 
Pritchard, 1983). However, these could only be converted into cost savings if employees were 
able to use the time saved in productive ways, or by reorganization or reduction of staff numbers 
(Farmer, 1988). Strassman found that when IS/IT was used to automate repetitive information 
intensive tasks the return on investment was much lower, only 5-10% (Ward et al., 1990). The 
IAM/Touche Ross survey found that a third of users did not think that OA had yielded 
significant benefits to their organizations, and there were direct savings in less than 15% of 
projects. 78% experienced either no change or an increase in staffing levels. However, over half 
of users sought, and thought they had attained, the objectives of better management of the 
business, increased productivity, and improved information flows.
Lack of understanding of what OA is supposed to do, and of how it can be cost-justified, 
have resulted in low take-up or failure to invest. The non-users in the IAM/Touche Ross study 
gave as their reasons for not investing in OA: no clear office systems strategy (48%), costs (44%), 
unclear or intangible benefits (35%), unsure of what OA can do (23%). The main benefits they 
would have anticipated were improved information flow (80%) and better management of 
business (just over 50%). The suppliers’ focus on efficiency and cutting staff costs and paper 
have obscured the true gains which could be made in terms of effectiveness, performance, and 
job satisfaction.
There has also been reluctance to invest large sums in what are seen as merely
administrative systems, which are assumed not to have any major impact on performance or
competitiveness, and whose costs therefore must be kept as low as possible (Price, 1979; King et
al., 1988). Cost justification is complex because of the intangible and in many cases
unquantifiable nature of the benefits, especially when users are managers and professionals.
Value-added benefits in particular may not be sought because they are intangible and therefore
often difficult to cost-justify (Price, 1979; IAM/Touche Ross, 1991; Meyer and Boone, 1987).
As the benefit potential shifts from savings, which provide a measurable target, to 
business improvements, dubbed the ’intangible benefits’ area... future computer 
applications will increasingly involve the company in speculative, business risk. In this 
respect, much of tomorrow’s IT investment will be no different from any other form of 
strategic innovation. (Price Waterhouse, 1988/89.)
The systemic nature of OS also presents difficulties in justifying the investment:
One of the main obstacles to the implementation of the more wide-ranging facilities of 
office automation is undoubtedly the difficulty of justifying the total system by adding 
together the cost-effectiveness contribution of each of the elements of the system.... 
office automation is less of a series of ’applications’ than an ’enabling environment’. It 
will not always be easy to attribute benefits to the presence of a device such as a terminal 
and those benefits may arise somewhere other than where that terminal is sited 
(Hughesdon, 1984).
As part of the current research, I conducted a mail survey of 250 leading British
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companies in order to find out the extent of use of office automation/office systems and the 
companies’ objectives in investing in them (details of the research are given in the Appendix to 
the chapter). Of the 41 who replied, 27 used office systems, and a further 8 planned to introduce 
them within the next two years. Although the response rate was too low (and probably skewed 
towards OA users) to generalise about the extent of OA use, the results on the main objectives in 
investing in office systems contrast with the IAM’s survey. In this study, 83% of those replying 
saw office systems as important to their company’s strategic objectives, and use of office systems 
was related to the perception that they are strategically important.
Improved communications and customer service were clearly the leading strategic 
objectives (Table 3.1 in the Appendix), followed at some distance by cost reduction and improved 
management control. Co-ordination of functionally and/or geographically distinct parts of the 
organization (not easily distinguished from communications), was another important theme.
Many respondents had both effectiveness and efficiency in mind in considering the strategic use 
of office systems, but in general, effectiveness outweighed efficiency issues by about 3 to 1 when 
office systems were considered in relation to MDs’ strategic objectives. This study therefore 
indicates that while efficiency and cost reduction are important, effectiveness and strategic issues 
such as better communications and internal co-ordination, customer service and responsiveness 
outweigh them as reasons for OA investment.
One cannot be sure of the reason for the apparent conflict with the IAM/Touche Ross 
findings, but it could be due to characteristics of the sample, ie. the nature of the organizations 
and the level of the respondents surveyed. Unlike the IAM study, the organizations were selected 
for their high performance, and the respondents were chief executives. One would expect this 
group to be more likely to think strategically about their IT investments than a cross-section of 
managers and organizations. Another possibility is that office automation/systems were defined 
differently in the two surveys. The CMRU findings are consistent with the those of the Price 
Waterhouse IT Review 1989/90 to the effect that the benefits sought from IT generally are 
moving from savings and coping with data to more intangible and strategic ones.
3.3 The strategic use o f IT.
This section draws on the IT and corporate strategy literature and organization theory to 
suggest how integrated office systems can provide strategic benefits.
One response to the disappointing experience with generic OA and low take-up was the 
view that real benefits could not be gained from generic OA, but from either DP (cost savings) or 
from business-specific, bespoke applications, which ’have a direct impact on the main function 
of the organization - that is, they affect in a significant way the "customer" or the service 
provided’ or ’specific operational applications intended to improve operational procedures 
associated with a particular business function.’ Clients were advised to begin implementing IT 
with specific business applications and to add on generic OS later (Farmer, 1988.)
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However, it is not that clear that business-specific applications must always be built first. 
In integrated systems, generic office facilities can be linked to specific applications, used as a 
front-end into them, or may be used as a prototype for discovering or designing specific 
applications (see the Tetrapak and Bank of Scotland cases in Chapter 4). Also, strategic 
applications may grow from the use of generic OA, especially with user learning and innovation. 
It is the integrated character of office systems not the business-specific applications which 
provide strategic advantage, as is shown below.
Strategic applications for IT became in the 1980s a sort of Holy Grail; academic authors 
and consultants vied to show they had the best means of finding them. Those (known and 
publicised) examples where IT had demonstrably provided competitive advantage appeared in one 
textbook after another, and various schemes for matching IT strategy to corporate strategy were 
devised. Integrating IT with the business also became a major concern of practitioners. Price 
Waterhouse found that in 1988 the top issue of concern to DP managers was integrating IT with 
corporate strategy. ’For the first time, a technical concern with making the computer work has 
been ousted by a management concern with making it work for the company.’ At the same time 
the benefits sought were moving from savings and coping with data to more strategic ones: 
’follow-the leader applications, tying-in customers, suppliers, resources, etc., improved sales 
through IT enabled marketing strategy, product improvement and distribution systems’.
However, doubts emerged whether there were in fact many applications of IT which 
could confer a sustainable competitive advantage, ie. one which would not be immediately wiped 
out by competitors catching up (Scott Morton, 1991; Finlay, 1991). The problem for most 
organizations was not so much being the innovator as matching the industry standard. Any 
lasting advantage for the pioneers might be, not the specific application itself, but the experience 
and organizational learning which had gone into finding and implementing it, which could 
provide a higher platform for further innovations (Porter, 1985). It is also doubtful whether 
strategic applications will be found through strategic planning procedures which may be slow, 
cumbersome and excessively bureaucratic. The evidence is that most strategic applications have 
been discovered by users (Ward et al., 1990; Meyer and Boone, 1987). In any case, it appears 
that some of the most widely-publicised methods and strategic planning for IT are not used by 
many companies, and strategic uses of IT to deal with the marketplace or other aspects of the 
environment are not being found as a result of the information technology strategy formulation 
process (King et al., 1988; Galliers, 1988). It is difficult to link IT to strategy because of 1) the 
nature of the corporate strategy formulation process (or in some cases, entire lack of it), which 
Turner (1986) has described as diffuse, covert and obscure, 2) problems of communications 
between IT specialists and top managers, few of whom understand IT.
Although the strategic IT literature is rationalistic in its assumptions, it helps provide a 
very useful focus on how information technology could be deployed to serve the mission and
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strategy of the organization as a whole, as well as ways of identifying strategic applications.
There is considerable convergence on the idea that IT can be applied strategically in four main 
areas: 1) external links, 2) internal integration, 3) new or improved products and 4) executive 
support.
Ward et al. (1990, p. 22) abstracted from 150 empirical examples four main types of 
strategic systems:
1. those that link the organization via technology based systems to its 
customers/consumers and/or suppliers
2. those that produce more effective integration of the use of information in the 
organization’s value adding process
3. those that enable the organization to develop, produce, market and deliver new or 
enhanced products or services based on information
4. those that provide Executive Management with information to support the development 
and implementation of strategy.
Venkatram (1991) identified five ’levels of IT-induced business reconfiguration’:
1. localized exploitation, where the concern is with efficiency only;
2. internal integration, which aims to increase all three types of benefits;
3. business process redesign - similar to the value chain;
4. business network redesign - external links with suppliers;
5. business scope - new products.
The first two levels are achieved in an evolutionary way. The changes required for Levels 3-5 
are revolutionary, in that existing business processes are no longer treated as a constraint on the 
IT infrastructure, but ’the basic logic for configuring the business activities itself is questioned’
(p. 137). He argued that technology push and competitive pull would force firms to reconfigure. 
Earl (1986) had also argued that IT could be applied strategically to facilitate new ways of 
managing and organizing, and to develop new businesses.
One of the main findings of the Management in the 90s programme was that IT enabled 
integration of business functions including: within the value chain; end-to-end links of value 
chains between organizations; substituting part of the value chain via subcontracting or alliances; 
internal or external electronic markets (Scott Morton, 1991). Benjamin and Scott Morton (1986) 
argued that the steadily improving cost-performance ratio of IT and ability to improve 
interconnection led to new cost-effective applications, allowing new products and new forms of 
integration of organizational forms and processes which support strategy. They saw technical 
integration, especially interconnectivity and data accessibility, as fostering:
1. process integration between several people or groups;
2. functional integration - combining, rearranging, eliminating the process performed;
changing functional boundaries, e.g. between engineering and manufacturing in product 
development;
3. inter-organizational integration.
Rockart and Short (1988) saw the contribution of IT to corporate strategy as lying in the
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effective management of interdependence, which is the need to ’achieve concurrence of effort 
along multiple dimensions of the organization’, ie. between product, functional, and geographic 
divisions, and within each dimension. From empirical research, they found IT enabled 
integration in six organizational contexts:
1. across the value-added chain in the three main functions: new product development,
product delivery, and customer service;
2. within functions, improving co-ordination across sub-units;
3. supporting team-based work via ’groupware’, including email, voice mail, computer
and video conferencing;
4. planning and control for senior managemnt - team-based planning cycle may be
conducted on-line via a network;
5. between line businesses and IT function;
6. inter-organizational.
3.4 Strategic uses o f office systems.
In a parallel to the strategic use of IT, Wainwright and Francis (1984) argued that office 
automation enabled an organization to: improve co-ordination of the same activities; take on new 
tasks, enter new markets, expand operations; and adopt different structural forms. Gerstein 
(1987) identified three major areas where OS could provide potential benefits: enhancing the 
organizational infrastructure, especially through improved communications; providing tools for 
effectiveness, such as document management and support for group working; and redesign of the 
work process by automating the flow of work.
Office systems, integrated systems in particular, are strongly implicated in the 
organizational integration strategies discussed in the strategic IT literature. These include 
integrating the value chain, links to customers and suppliers, computer-mediated group working 
(team support), and organizational infrastructure. They can be seen either as part of the delivery 
system, or as a platform for it, because they can provide the common ’front-end’ through which 
links are accessed, especially electronic mail, data bases and group working.
Three of the main strategic uses of IT which I have abstracted from the IT strategy 
literature (external links, internal integration, and executive support) can be related to the 
information-processing view of the office which I derived from organization theory and 
discussed in Chapter Two. Information needs are greatest 1) in internal processes, especially in 
primary tasks where the information content of product or process is high (internal integration);
2) in areas which span the boundary between the organization and the environment (external 
links, some aspects of executive support systems; 3) in co-ordinating the relations between the 
core and boundary-spanning areas, and among other organizational units (internal integration, 
control aspects of executive support) (Figure 3.1.) Each of these is discussed in turn below.
3.4.1 Internal process integration.
As we have seen, uncertainty arises from task variety and complexity (Perrow, 1971) and 
from the interdependence of subunits which work together to perform the primary task
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(Tushman and Nadler, 1978). Although this interdependence is usually thought of as linear and 
sequential, it often includes a great deal of reciprocity, and processes can also be intensive, 
extensive, or mediating (Thompson, 1967; Mason, 1984) (Figure 3.2.) Much office work consists 
of these non-linear conversion processes (Pava, 1983).
In intensive technologies (Thompson, 1967), many inputs go into a single unique object, 
as in a custom product or human services. In the office, this type of technology is represented 
archetypically by the case management or case processing system (Mason, 1984). Producing a 
document which is a joint effort, or preparing a bid which involves several different departments 
is also of this type. Computer-mediated group work and electronic document management are 
especially relevant to this kind of technology (see the Training Agency, GKN and BAe cases in 
Chapter 4).
Mediating technologies match diverse inputs to diverse ouptuts; the brokerage firm is the 
exemplar, but the type also includes estate agents, airline reservations, dating bureaux, banks and 
other financial institutions, which use information to identify and service suppliers and customers 
and match them. Here information is central, and the application of IT is a major source of 
competitive advantage. (See the Bank of Scotland case in Chapter 4).
Extensive technologies produce diverse outputs from a single input, such as oil refining. 
The application of IT here is in support of OR models which aid allocation decision-making.
In internal operations, OS can improve integration between interdependent activities and 
for complex tasks, better understanding of what is happening within each activity. The benefits 
are improved efficiency and speed of processes, reduced costs and improved customer service 
(e.g. on-time delivery with reduced inventory (JIT)), leading to greater competitiveness.
Application of IT to internal operations can therefore support different generic competitive 
strategies (Porter and Millar, 1985) and is a particular factor in time-based competition (Stalk and 
Hout, 1990).
Porter (1985) has shown how IT can be applied strategically to internal processes within 
functions and between functions across the value-added chain, the input-output or 
transformation process by which the firm creates value (Porter and Millar, 1985). The idea of the 
value chain focuses attention on work and information flows, on interdependencies which exist 
between activities which may well cross functional boundaries, and how to reintegrate them.
Within the chain, every activity has both a physical and an information-processing component, 
the balance between the two varying by industry and also historically. The greater the 
information intensity in the value chain, the more strategic IT will be, because information is 
used to co-ordinate and smooth the flow of activity from one stage to another, and as a factor of 
production at any individual stage (Mason, 1984).
The value chain applies above all to primary activities, which are not however identified 
exclusively with operations; they include inbound logistics, outbound logistics, marketing and
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sales, and service (Figure 3.3) - all activities with a high information-processing component, 
many of which are carried out in or from offices. The value chain concept can also be applied to 
secondary tasks or support activities, most of which are carried on in offices.
Porter (1985) intended that the value chain idea could be applied to any industry. 
Obviously, the kinds of offices in which the value chain concept has the most strategic 
application are primary activity offices. However, the ability to co-ordinate linkages between 
parts of the value chain, and between primary and support activities, where IS may be essential, 
can also be strategic.
The value chain does not necessarily correspond to existing organizational demarcations or 
functions; it provides a broader perspective on organization structure and suggests how functions 
could be reorganized to promote effectiveness. Hammer (1990) develops this theme in his article 
on reengineering work processes, in which he argues IT should be used not to mechanise old ways 
of doing business, leaving existing processes intact, but to radically redesign business processes. 
The technology which facilitates this includes shared databases, computer networks, and expert 
systems. The potential benefits are staff reduction, faster turnaround times, and staff job 
enlargement. Fundamental processes must be identified in terms of what they are trying to 
accomplish, ignoring functional divisions. Linear processes can be compressed, and jobs designed 
around outcomes rather than specific tasks - the jobs of the ’case manager’ and ’customer service 
representative’ are given as examples. If work is reintegrated in this way, decisions are made by 
those who do the work and controls built into the processes, the need for managers to supervise 
and co-ordinate it is also reduced. Hammer’s examples are all of office work. Venkatraman 
(1991) similarly argued that organizations should aim to ’reconfigure the sequence of tasks to 
better exploit IT capabilities’. Reconfiguration is not simply a consolidation of stages but a 
’reassessment of the fundamental logic of the business process’ (pp. 137-8).
Time-based competition is one of the strategic reasons for process redesign. The need for 
speed of response is a driving force behind highly-coupled integration and communication 
systems (Gunton, 1989). Rockart and Short (1988) showed how IT could provide tighter coupling 
both within and between the three main areas of organizational activity: product development, 
product delivery (which includes but does not equal manufacturing), and customer service. All 
three are major factors in competition (Stalk and Hout, 1990), and can be speeded up by IT- 
enabled process integration across functions (Keen, 1986; Benjamin and Scott Morton, 1986).
The IAM/Touche Ross report also found that successful OA projects support or automate 
specific business processes rather than individuals, and are targeted at work groups whose ’job 
functions are directly related in performing a specific business activity’. They recommend that 
an organization planning to implement OA 1) identify key workgoups, 2) analyse key functions 
and tasks, 3) determine information flows, 4) decide on revisions if necessary to existing pattern 
of working, using O & M and business systems analysis to develop a system to meet the needs of
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the group.
The idea of business process redesign is being applied by in the U.K. by organizations 
such as Reuters, Rank Xerox, and National Provincial, and by management consultants Nolan- 
Norton/KPMG and the Butler Cox Foundation. It has been carried out extensively in the U.S. by 
Texas Instruments, Ford, Kodak, Motorola, Hallmark Cards, AT&T, IBM Credit and Bell 
Atlantic {The Financial Times, 24 May 1993).
3.4.2 Spanning boundaries.
OS can be used in three main boundary-spanning areas: 1) customer response; 2) inter- 
organizational systems, in the supply chain; 3) in surveillance and strategic planning functions 
such as marketing and competitor analysis, where both external databases and expert systems are 
applicable.
A logical extension of the internal value chain is across organizational boundaries to 
customers and suppliers. These boundary-spanning activities are information-intensive and 
primarily office functions, and many of the well-known strategic IT examples come into this 
category (American Hospital Supply, American Airlines). The improvement of what Porter 
(1985) calls ’vertical linkages’ between the firm’s value chain and those of suppliers, distribution 
channels, and buyers, can benefit both parties and provide strategic benefits. The supply chain is 
a main focus of time-based competition (Stalk and Hout, 1990). Information systems can play an 
important role in joint optimisation of activities on both sides and improved co-ordination 
between chains. They also can provide greater responsiveness to customers, with faster delivery 
and turn-around times. They depend not only on creating electronic links, but on a good IT 
infrastructure. The export insurance case study is an example of improved customer response, 
faster delivery and turn-around times.
3.4.3 Organizational platform/infrastructure.
The integration of business activities through an IT platform is the distinguishing feature 
of Venkatraman’s (1991) second level of organizational transformation. He envisages it as a 
combination of technical and organizational integration, which will be strategic in that it will 
’permit exploitation of efficiency-related benefits of compression of time and distance as well as 
effectiveness-related benefits of information sharing across the business process’.
An organizational IT infrastructure may be seen as providing considerable effectiveness 
benefits and thus be implemented for these reasons. It is also strategic in that it provides the 
necessary base for strategic applications (Venkatraman, 1991). According to Scott Morton (1991, 
20) ’a robust information technology infrastructure..., including an electronic network and 
understood standards’, is one of the preconditions of successful organizational transformation.
But such an infrastructure can also be strategic in its own right as a major factor in 
organizational co-ordination.
According to the MIT research, many fewer organizations say they have reached this level
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than the first one, but that ’a major initiative among leading corporations is the creation of an IT
platform that could permit organizational integration of their business processes’ (p. 132).
According to Chris Yapp of ICL, 80% of organizations are now struggling with this stage. The
survey of MDs I carried out for this project indicated that improved communication was the
main objective for implementing office systems. Major computer suppliers such as IBM and
DEC (see case studies) have already created such platforms, and American Airlines is
implementing one (Hopper, 1990). Another example from the case studies is Tetrapak.
3.4.4 Designing new organizations - the new management paradigm.
A fourth strategic application for office systems, which emerges from those just described
above, is enabling the design of new organizational forms.
The emphasis of the 1980s was on how to use IT to support existing corporate strategy,
which was derived from matching the firm’s capabilities to its environment. By the end of the
80s, technology had come to be seen as an environmental factor in itself, which should be taken
into account in the formulation of strategy. The continuing order-of-magnitude improvements in
cost/performance ratios were seen as making possible new strategic choices.
What seemed to stand in the way of these choices being made was the persistence of
bureaucratic organizational forms (Andriessen, 1991) and the continued attachment of
management to an organizational paradigm rooted in the previous technological era. As we have
seen, there is a lag between the introduction of new technology and the making of the
organizational changes necessary to exploit it successfully (Child, 1987; Franke, 1989). Liu et al.
(1990) have argued that the existing technology system is stagnating because its designers share an
outdated paradigm for organizing:
new technologies have immediate effects on the contents of jobs and on skills and 
qualifications, but for a while, they do not modify the existing organization. However, 
the old organization design increasingly becomes sub-optimal with respect to the 
possibilities the new technology creates...from that point on, a new form of organization 
that was at first only marginally applied, gains importance and diffuses, because it 
provides ways to apply the new technology for producing new products with superior 
performance and/or radically reduced production costs, (p. 10)
Freeman, Perez and Dosi (Dosi et al., 1988) have similarly argued that IT represents a new
techno-economic paradigm, having pervasive effects throughout the economy at national and
global level and requiring organizational and institutional change.
Freeman, in one article, refers to these ideas as ’the new technological determinism’.
just as the process of world-wide diffusion of major technical innovations is a prolonged 
one, taking several decades or even longer in some case, so is the process of diffusion of 
managerial and organizational innovations at enterprise level, and of social innovations at 
national level. This applies especially to those organizational and social innovations which 
have facilitated and accompanied the most radical technological innovations and there are 
numerous examples of this interdependence in the world-wide diffusion of new 
technologies, such as the assembly-line or, at an early stage of industrialisation, the 
applications of steam power. Both of these entailed major changes in the structure of
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industry and in management systems as well as in much new machinery and equipment 
(Freeman, 1987).
Discontinuities arise while organizations seek to discover the forms which are needed to exploit 
the technology. Firms which are successful in adapting their organizations will succeed with the 
technology and in the marketplace, so that eventually all competitors will be forced to adopt the 
same forms.
Freeman et al. do not specify the kinds of organizational changes required; however, Liu 
et al. hypothesise that: work will be organized to regulate unpredictable variances, not routine 
tasks; co-ordination need not be separated from production; the organization will be more 
concerned with open process, having rationalised and computerised as much as can be, and will 
manage complexity more than reduce it: organizations will be ’designed as explicitly collective 
learning processes’ (p. 18).
The need for flexible organizational response to an unstable or turbulent environment is a 
truism of contemporary organization theory. Mintzberg for example has argued that a dynamic, 
complex environment requires a decentralised, organic organization and co-ordination by mutual 
adjustment (1979). According to Kanter (1985), innovative companies are integrative, in that 
they are:
matrix-style,
have vague and ill-defined roles, overlapping territories (redundancy), encourage team 
work,
have an integrative, participative management style, 
lateral relations more important than vertical, 
less emphasis on efficiency, quantitative measures, 
strong local autonomy.
These interrelated and consistent policies regarding organization structure, human resource 
management, business strategy and other aspects of organizations can be seen to represent a new 
management paradigm.
Work from manufacturing has also suggested what the features of a new organizational 
paradigm might be. According to Child (1987), flexible response to an uncertain market 
environment and successful exploitation of AMT (advanced manufacturing technology) appear to 
require:
multi-skilling, role convergence, multi-functional teams 
integrated control, devolved initiative (’simultaneous loose-tight 
properties’)
rapid mutual adjustment, high degree of integration between groups and 
levels.
Whiston (1989) has argued that greatly increased organizational integration must occur for
technological integration in manufacturing to be successful:
(firms) begin to evolve toward an integrated free-flowing anatomy (in short, an organic 
unit with many operational feedback loops) to develop further the market sensitivity and
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effectiveness of delivery to the marketplace of the total system (pp. 580-1).
Full effectiveness is reached when the shop-floor operatives are much more fully 
involved and participative in the total operative system; when the management hierarchy 
layers are reduced and when... departmental functions - R&D, marketing, design, 
operations - are much more closely interwoven into a much more organic unit (600)
IT researchers have long anticipated that IT could be used to redesign organizations (Beer, 
1974 and 1981). Checkland, for example, had written in 1978 that if an organization were 
treated as a system of information flows, it could be ’usefully treated as a net of semi- 
autonomous work groups linked by an information network’ (1990, p. 77). Since then, a number 
of other writers have seen information technology as 1) facilitating 2) making possible 3) 
requiring, the kinds of organic structures which organization theorists and management educators 
had been advocating for many years. IT becomes a tool for ’organizational transformation’ (Scott 
Morton, 1990).
Malone (1985, 1988, 1991) uses economic arguments based on Williamson’s transaction 
cost theory. He argues that computers have been applied successfully to the production function 
and can now be applied to their second major function, which is co-ordination. If organizations 
group to minimise the costs of co-ordination (ie. communication and decision-making), the cost 
of co-ordination is one of the main influences on structure. According to Malone, IT reduces the 
unit costs of co-ordination - the transmission and processing of information - and may therefore 
lead to a shift back from less to more co-ordination-intensive organizational forms, e.g. from 
product hierarchies (divisionalised form) to functional hierarchies (centralisation of some 
functions, such as R&D), or to decentralised markets (to retain maximum flexibility). IT will 
lower the transaction costs of markets, leading organizations to replace vertical integration with 
the use of external suppliers. This can be seen in both the DEC and IBM examples in the case 
studies. Another consequence of the reduced cost of co-ordination will be increased use of 
internal markets:
For example, the widespread use of electronic mail, computer conferencing, and 
electronic markets can facilitate what some observers have called ’adhocracies’, that is, 
rapidly changing organizations with many shifting project teams composed of people with 
different skills and knowledge. These organizations can rely heavily on networks of 
lateral relations at all levels of the organization rather than relying solely on the 
hierarchical relations of traditional bureaucracies to co-ordinate people’s work.
This is illustrated in the case studies by DEC.
Rockart and Short (1989, 1991) incorporated the idea of IT-enabled networks into their 
earlier argument concerning organizational integration. They never define the concept of 
networks very clearly, but what they imply are electronic communication networks (presumably 
based on electronic mail) which provide horizontal and vertical linkagaes, on an ad hoc basis as 
necessary. Networks are neither part of the formal nor the informal structure but a
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’communication-rich environment’, which is seen as critical to managing interdependence. They 
allow firms to maintain or increase their size and complexity and still be responsive to the 
environment; they therefore affect both structure and strategy. Applegate, Cash and Mills (1988) 
have also argued that IT enables large organizations to have the advantages of small ones.
’Cluster’ organizations (network or adhocracy) present new options for managerial choice of 
organization structures, management processes, and human resources management.
Huber (1984, 1990, 1991) and Huber and McDaniel (1986) argued that environmental 
complexity and turbulence, together with the increased availability of information, require 
organizations to engage in better and faster decision-making, adaptability and innovation. The 
increased data storage, transmission and processing capacity of advanced IT facilitates 
communication across time and space, faster and better organizational intelligence and decision­
making. IT will affect organization design because it affects central organizational processes.
The environment and competition will eventually force organizations to use IT to support 
organizational goals; managerial intention will play more of a role as experience is gained. New 
organizational forms (’symbiosis’) will appear, especially where the product is knowledge or 
knowledge-based. They also foresee the use of adhocracies, network organizations, and the 
increased importance of organizational learning (Huber, 1991).
Keen’s (1991) analysis is that organizations attempt to meet environmental complexity by 
increasing their organizational complexity, which leads to many problems. IT platforms enable 
organizations to reduce their complexity by simplifying work procedures and co-ordination (via 
video conferencing, groupware, EDI, telecomms), making firms location- and structure- 
independent (interfirm networks), and supporting teams of specialists.
Drucker (1988) has gone further and suggested that IT and knowledge-based organizations 
require a different kind of organization, specifically: 1) reduced management levels and numbers,
2) more expertise in operations, rather than in central management, 3) more knowledge at lower 
levels, 4) organized around task-focussed teams, rather than (functional) departments, 5) 
increased individual responsibility. All this is to be achieved by 1) a shared mission with clear 
simple objectives, and 2) self-control of work and performance via feedback.
Andriessen (1991) carefully reviewed research on the organizational effects of the 
communication aspects of IT. While qualifying the notion of impacts (see Ch. 5), he concludes 
that electronic mail, computer conferencing, and video conferencing do increase the efficiency of 
existing communications, increase interactivity and therefore foster the growth of groups. 
Organizational communication and collaboration are thereby improved. IT however does not 
entirely replace face to face meetings, especially for negotiations, and while some remote working 
is popular with professionals, teleworking is not replacing traditional patterns of employment. He 
concludes that the organizational implications of the use of electronically-mediated 
communication are: increased interaction across vertical and lateral boundaries, and therefore less
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hierarchical structures; rapid co-ordination via mutual adjustment; more use of markets, 
networks, and interfirm collaboration. The reason that more organizations have not adopted the 
technology is that it requires a completely new management philosophy, ’non-Tayloristic and 
non-bureaucratic’, which is either not suited for or not acceptable to all of their units. But it 
may come about as a result of conscious strategy (adaptation to market forces) and unintended 
change from below. The very thorny issue of how to implement a new organizational paradigm is 
discussed in Chapter Six.
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Chapter Four 
The Case Studies
Introduction
As discussed in Chapter One, the research included fifteen case studies, seven ’snapshots’ 
and eight more extensive ones. They all illustrate the different perceptions, uses of and 
objectives for office systems, and the trend towards integration discussed in the second and third 
chapters. The more extensive studies also provide material on implementation and organizational 
change, which are the topics of the next two chapters. Although the case study material has been 
used to illustrate general points made in other chapters, they are presented here in full so they 
can be understood coherently, in context. The brief case studies are grouped together and 
analysed first, followed by the longer ones. The individual cases are organized under the 
headings: Background, Initiation and Objectives, Design (a brief description of the system, 
especially the degree of integration), Implementation, Outcomes and Organizational Change 
(where appropriate).
4.1 Snapshots.
1. BRITISH AEROSPACE MILITARY AIRCRAFT DIVISION 1990
Background
The BAe Military Aircraft division is an example of the use of an office system for 
administrative support, which had unanticipated strategic benefits. Each of the highly 
independent businesses of British Aerospace does its own IS planning; however, BAe as a whole 
had decided in 1986 to standardise on DEC, although IBM DISOSS was still in use at some sites. 
Bridges had been built between the different businesses, although they do not ordinarily need to 
communicate except in customer-supplier relationships. BAe has a private global network for 
messaging, but this was used abroad mainly by travelling staff. The Military Aircraft division 
occupied six sites, employing 3000 people in 1990. The finance and technical departments 
already had information systems.
Initiation
Plans were developed in 1985 for office automation covering two sites and 1200 users in 
Kingston and Weybridge, partly because the limits of the capacity of the existing VAX had been 
reached in any case and would have had to be supplemented by another VAX. Kingston was 
already running All-in-One for 200 users. The plan was to provide individual office support to 
management and professional staff and their secretaries, to provide access from anywhere within 
BAe via the internal communications network and worldwide by use of dial up links, and to 
provide managers with access to general and national business information. Links were to be 
provided so that users at these sites could communicate with other sites, including non-All-in- 
One services (an emulator allowed connection to ICL services and a DECnet/SNA gateway 
allowed connection to IBM).
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Objectives
It was recognised that the system would be difficult to cost-justify, but OA was 
anticipated to be cheaper than meeting the demand for computer facilities separately. Cost 
reduction was important because government contracts were no longer on a cost-plus basis. The 
objectives for the system were to increase administrative and management productivity, control 
staff costs, reduce paper, and increase communications. The IT manager also saw it as a way of 
controlling PC use, and saving valuable data otherwise lost on PCs. But investment was on the 
whole an ’act of faith’.
Design
The system installed was based on DEC equipment and All-in-One. Telex, phone 
messages, and external document transfer were available from computer, and they were looking 
forward to having fax and telephone on as well. The system had few links with manufacturing. 
Small applications were developed centrally for user departments.
Outcomes
The IT manager found it difficult to evaluate quantitative benefits but secretarial and 
other administrative staff had been reduced. There had been no organizational change except for 
the role of the secretary, who had become more of an administrative officer. ’Even’ senior 
managers were beginning to use the management information systems. There had been an 
estimated improvement of close to 7% in management productivity, but this had not resulted in 
there being 7% fewer managers, and the whole question was regarded as a joke. The OS could 
facilitate organizational change by improving internal communication downward, but they have 
in any case been going towards a more open system of management. The division had not yet got 
to the sharing of information throughout the organization.
Conclusion
This was basically a generic OA system with some intraorganizational links but otherwise 
little integration and which was not perceived strategically. There were however benefits which 
could be regarded as strategic, including better decision-making and timeliness. The Ministry of 
Defence and foreign governments were increasing their demands for information from suppliers 
of military equipment. The office system made it easier to put together proposals for contracts, 
resulting in better bids put in as late as possible. One contract gained in this way could pay for 
the whole system. This result was seen as incidental to the OS, whereas it could have been the 
rationale for investment.
2. GKN GROUP SERVICES 1988 
Initiation, Objectives and Implementation
GKN Group Services at Group Headquarters Administration began implementing an 
interdepartmental office system at corporate headquarters in 1983 with a DTI grant. There was 
no cost justification; the objectives were to improve communications, timeliness, and quality of
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information. Implementation had been incremental, department by department, and voluntary - 
no department was forced to be on the system.
Design
The Xionics OS was a text-based database system with three levels, corporate, 
departmental, and individual user group directories. There was access to external databases via 
Telecom Gold. Otherwise the system was not integrated. GKN’s operating divisions didn’t have 
and didn’t want an OS. Xionics was not compatible with any other system. Group HQ could not 
interact with their own IBM mainframe (for data processing). They could only transfer text via 
Telecom Gold, and had to communicate with their subsidiaries by fax and telex. Consequently 
they were looking in the future to Unix, shared databases, and networks.
Outcomes
Despite its limited integration, the system supported that part of the corporate strategy 
which involved growth by acquisition. Takeover bids were put together on a project basis at 
corporate HQ, with teams from the legal, corporate finance, taxation, and business development 
departments working together. Project directories would be set up for the user group on each 
bid, which could be put together more efficiently and quickly on the OS. Therefore, this was a 
good example of computer-supported group working on strategic projects, although the term 
itself was not used.
3. TETRAPAK 1988
Background
Tetrapak is a worldwide organization owned by a Swedish family but based in England 
which specialises in packaging liquid food - milk, fruit juice, etc. The firm mainly does not 
make cartons, but sells machines and packaging materials to food producers. It is now one of the 
largest packaging companies in the world, and has 46 marketing companies worldwide, with 
strength in Europe and the Far East. It is also geographically dispersed in the UK, with 
production in Wales, offices in Scotland and Dublin, etc. At the Kingston HQ, there are thirty 
administrative staff, including a small data systems department, finance, and the chairman’s 
office. In addition there are 345 production staff, 40 sales and marketing, and 110 technical 
service staff.
Organizational communications are difficult because of the geographical spread, and also because 
of language; English is the official company language but Swedes will speak Swedish together. 
Initiation, Design and Implementation
From the late 60’s the company had Data General mainly for financial systems. In 1982-3 
they decided to go into office automation to overcome the shortcomings of PCs and minis, and 
installed two office systems, Wang and CEO on an experimental basis; the users chose CEO 
because of ease of use; it used exactly the same keystrokes across different functions. A pilot 
group taught others as demand grew eventually to 2500 users, linked desk-to-desk at 60 sites
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throughout world using the same software. CEO can be used as a front end for other applications 
and vice versa. In the future they were looking to connectivity; users should have total access 
wherever they are, to be able to print out remotely, internationally without knowing how to 
designate printers. Another issue was compatibilty, the interconnection of IBM PCs with CEO, 
which Data General was working on.
Outcomes
Savings were estimated at 10% on administrative staff costs. Evaluation showed that there 
was significant demand for email but not for word processing. Electronic mail answered the 
problems of difficult communications internally, language, poor information distribution and the 
disruptive effect of time zones. People move around offices a good deal, and can now be 
contacted through any terminal throughout the world. Email provided large cost savings 
compared with other means of communication, and also reduced delays. Foreign customers could 
cope with written English better than with the spoken word. Also salesmen visiting customers 
could give them up-to-date technical specifications on the spot, providing competitive advantage. 
They had expected an increase in vertical communications, within departments, but found there 
was an increased flow of horizontal peer-to-peer communications. The production site had the 
lowest number of users, but they used it for more important matters, such as the changeover 
between shifts.
Conclusions
Tetrapak, in introducing an organization-wide office system, had built for itself a global 
communications platform. Although not yet fully integrated, it was a good basis for integration, 
which it was moving towards.
4. BRITISH TELECOM INTERNATIONAL 1988
Background
British Telecom International is a division of BT which controls satellite TV (for the UK) 
and all satellite links globally. It is co-ordinated with BT through the Board. BTI implemented 
an office system with intra-company global links and was in 1988 moving towards greater 
integration.
Initiation and Objectives
The OS was initiated in 1984 in a proposal to the Board from the computing department. 
There was no cost/benefit analysis; OA is seen as a corporate resource, a central overhead. 
Department managers who wanted to come on the system had to come up with a business case, 
but it was not costed. Improved communications was the main reason they gave.
Design and Implementation
The office system is based on Digital ’All-in-One’, a standard OS package with links to 
external data bases and to MIS. The system is country-wide, and also communicates with BTI 
offices all over the world. Implementation started from the top, the MD’s office, and followed
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levels of management. In 1988 they were at level 3, people who control budgets, and were going 
to level 4. Development of applications was user-led. There was no compulsion to use it, but 
everyone wanted it.
Outcomes
There had been no loss of jobs so far, but the system had changed the work of one 
department. They were seeking more integration, developing links into existing IBM systems. 
They could access the IBM, see the data, but couldn’t as yet do anything with it.
5. ROYAL MAIL 1991
Background
The Royal Mail at Chesterfield was attempting to build an organizational platform, but 
became rather bogged down in pilots and trials. Existing IT systems were piecemeal: PCs, DP for 
finance and personnel, and a generally low level of computer literacy. The organization did not 
have an IS strategy regarding technical standards, hardware and software products, and naming 
conventions. In 1991 they were evaluating a two-year OA trial, with plans to implement 
throughout the business. If this went ahead it would cover 4,500 users across the country, 
including headquarters in London and Croydon, and 64 district offices with their satellite offices 
which handle delivery of mail.
Initiation and Objectives
Initiation of the organization-wide project came from the IT department to the MD, and 
was seen as linked to the organization’s mission statement, concerning improved management 
processes, products, customer and employee care.
The OA pilot was conducted at two sites, one district and one central headquarters 
department. The Ipswich district headquarters and its satellite offices with 160 users (which later 
became Anglia Division with 18 offices and 180-190 users) piloted a system consisting of Office 
Vision on AS400s plus PC Support (’file transfer’, so people could use spreadsheets etc.). They 
had documented seven communication flows, including operational systems (information on 
traffic, staff hours, absenteeism) but had not yet tackled work processes. So far the OS had been 
seen as a support tool which made tedious tasks easier and eliminated unproductive work. 
Evaluation found that the main benefit was to speed up management account reports. Managers 
using facilities on the system were better able to select and focus on the information they really 
needed.
At the headquarters site, the Personnel Department in London and Croydon, they installed 
a LAN with QED, including some OA facilities and standard PC packages. This was not as 
successful as they’d hoped because it missed out most of their communications, which were 
outside to the districts. However, the Personnel Director was won over; ’now I know what you 
mean by increased morale’.
In any extension of the project, the IT department would be expected to quantify
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productivity benefits. A reorganization was underway into nine fairly autonomous divisions, 
with links to headquarters mainly for strategy. They anticipated increased need for 
communication of management information, but the main information flows would probably be 
within divisions, with reporting links to headquarters. Lateral communications between divisions 
was not currently seen as important but could be in future, and they wanted to make that 
possible. Some of the project would be funded by the business, but the divisions would decide 
how to progress at their own expense. The IT department wanted to develop a standard template 
for a division, with 90% of it transferable. In late 1991, a meeting of the Policy Committee for 
the project was to decide whether to extend the system and how; in fact it decided to conduct 
more pilots and trials with Lotus Notes.
6. BANK OF SCOTLAND CENTRAL BANKING SERVICES 1989
Background
The Bank of Scotland had always been progressive in its use of technology; it was the first 
UK bank to introduce branch terminals in 1968, home banking in 1985, and international small 
payments in 1987. It saw rapid response time and its low cost base in Scotland as providing its 
competitive edge.
Initiation and first phase
In 1983, the Central Banking Services started a new line of business, syndicated home 
loans, and it was the assessment and approval of loan applications which was the object of this 
study. Assessment and approval of one home loan application could involve the writing of 40 
different letters, to the seller, the applicant’s banker, employer, solicitor, surveyor, the insurance 
agent, insurance company, syndicate members, securitisation, and the Bank of Scotland’s own 
Accounting System. They expected growth to double and
computerised the assessment of applications by bringing in an OA package. In 1984 they selected 
Data General CEO because they wanted a system in in four months which would also be able to 
grow, be applicable to other areas, and reasonably compatible with IBM mainframes.
Outcomes
Despite problems arising from user underestimates of the number of letters per day and 
insufficient disk space to handle all the filing, they were able to meet their target and to get an 
agreement out to the customer within 48 hours 80% of the time, and could cope with a 
quadrupling of their volume of business without increasing staff. They reckoned that the cost of 
£1.5 million was paid for in 8 months. The cost justification was based on staff cuts because it 
was tangible, but that was not perceived as the real benefit.
Second phase
Expecting the business to double (in fact it quintupled), they decided to embark on a 
second phase by at least doubling the hardware. They installed a DG MO/IOOOO with an ethemet 
link to the previous system, and added bespoke programs, links to the London office, and a link
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via an emulator to the IBM mainframe as before. CEO became more of a shell into user 
applications, subordinate to the bespoke system.
Conclusions
This OS was clearly strategic in that it computerised a business process and enabled the 
bank to get in a system quickly in order to support growth in a new product. It would not have 
been possible to identify the requirements beforehand because users didn’t understand the 
technology and had too little experience with the new product. There were difficulties with the 
initial implementation because users were swamped with work and management were not in 
control. The bank could be said to have used the office system package as a prototyping tool, a 
means of discovering their requirements for more tailor-made application software for the new 
product. They were also moving towards greater integration of the OS with other systems.
7. FORWARD TRUST 1989
Background
Forward Trust is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Midland Bank, whose business is 
lending/leasing via motor dealers and factoring for small businesses. It has a small head office in 
London, but the directors and processing are in the Birmingham head office, which includes 
Management Services and Finance Services.
Initiation and Objectives
The organization perceived speed and quality of response as increasingly decisive to 
competitive edge. Also they saw they were in a technology race with competitors. Their 
objectives, which included reducing defaults and a more sympathetic approach to customers, 
could be achieved only through use of the technology.
OS were used strategically to improve speed of response for internal business processes 
and external links, and for internal integration. This was fully cost-justified and could be done 
at low cost because they built on mainframes already used for DP.
Design
In the middle of 1988 they standardized on IBM PCs, replacing all 350 terminals in their 
network with IBM PS/2’s with DISOSS, PROFS, and Lotus on Tokenring. They had 1200 internal 
terminals, a ratio of 1:2, and anticipated moving to 1:1 in 1-2 years time. 250 to 300 out of 2000 
people were on PROFS, and they could put on another 400 who would benefit. In the London 
head office the majority of people were on PROFS. All of the factoring was done on PROFS.
The idea was to have everyone from the MD down to the junior supervisor linked. Business 
centres would be integrated by packet-switching.
Lending was done directly and through dealerships and building societies. Thirty-eight 
business centres handled relations with dealers via on-line systems, which had been very 
successful. Forward Trust provided 700 terminals for dealers in their own premises.
Outcomes
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It had been a successful low-cost operation, which had also gained them new accounts. 
They expected to be virtually paperless in about 18 months. They had been looking for staff 
savings, and were now looking for revenue increase not cost reduction. The next project was 
credit processing. This would change the culture and cut out many layers, as authorisation would 
pass electronically.
Conclusions
Forward Trust illustrates the advanced strategic use of OS to support business processes, 
intra- and inter-organizational communications in an industry based on information. The OS is 
an essential part of the means of running the business, and an enabler of strategically necessary 
organizational change.
4.2 Extended studies.
8. BLT LTD. 1990-1991
Background
BLT Bridge Ltd. is the U .K .’s leading independent producer of commercial vehicle 
springs, formed in 1987 as the result of a management buy-out from British Steel.
Manufacturing and administrative offices are together at one site. Many changes were 
introduced by the new owners, including Total Quality Management, updated Human Resource 
Management policies (fair pay, single status, multiskilling, share ownership, improved 
communication), and a management development programme. There was a large capital 
investment in plant, but very little new spend on IT, with the result that existing systems had 
become ’isolated islands of automation with no upgrade path, slow and unreliable, out of date, 
with whole areas of the business not supported’.
Initiation and Objectives
The consultants who were advising the buy-out urged the company to apply for a DTI 
grant for a Manufacturing Systems Review. This was carried out in 1989 and identified problems 
in most functional areas, outdated and manual systems, lack of integration within functions and 
between functions, with consequent need to transfer data and inaccurate/inconsistent data. The 
consultants identified as reasons for investing in IT: 1) inadequacy of existing systems; 2) cost 
reduction; 3) better management information; 4) to support delegation of responsibility to lower 
levels; 5) dramatic improvements in response time. The company’s competitive strategy 
emphasised quality, technical innovation and new product design, and responsiveness to customer 
demand. IT investment was seen as a means of meeting these strategic objectives as well as 
improving internal control, co-ordination, and planning. BLT perceived itself as having fallen 
behind other companies in IT, and as having to make an enormous leap to catch up and if 
possible, to get ahead in some areas.
Design
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The plan was for four main systems integrated by a common database: material control, 
manufacturing control, financial control, and CAD. CAD was seen as significant in improving 
responsiveness to customers and technological innovation. EDI links to customers and suppliers 
were another important feature. The company was already electronically linked to three 
customers - major vehicle manufacturers - due to customer pressure, but the system which 
already existed involved rekeying, while the new one would make it possible to eliminate this and 
to transfer designs directly. An MIS was planned for when the information became available, but 
they did not yet have it. What were defined as ’internal networks’ including electronic mail and 
word-processing had relatively low priority, after all this had been accomplished.
Implementation
Implementation began as the recession was beginning to bite in 1990. This assisted 
implementation in that fewer orders had to be filled during the changeover period, but people 
were also being made redundant because of the drop in orders, which could be blamed on the 
new system. The Financial System was implemented first, because it was relatively self- 
contained. For this reason, and because the department was already computer-literate, there 
were few problems. The core MRPII system however was all integrated and had to go live all at 
once. It had been developed in six months, very fast compared with the supplier’s other 
customers.
Outcomes
Even three months after implementation, there were still many problems, because the 
shop floor workers were not used to computers and had had inadequate time for training before 
the system went live. In the offices, responses varied. The Sales Department were said to be 
resistant, because they had a purpose-designed system tailored for them over the years which 
suited them perfectly, and they didn’t want to change to the new one which did not meet their 
needs so well. The Purchasing Department were quite positive about it because it reduced 
computer print-out and would provide more management information. In Planning there were 
many problems which required additional programming. EDI and CAD were said to be going 
well.
Organizational Change
Managers thought they could only have made so big a leap in technology because of the 
organizational changes they had already carried out and the ’strong culture’ thus established. As 
for subsequent organizational change, it was thought at first that this would come about in an 
evolutionary fashion, after people got used to the system. However, five months after 
implementation began the IT manager was talking about making radical changes to jobs soon, 
rationalising lines of communication and responsiblities. This was not only because of the 
technology, although the system did highlight some deficiencies. Consultants who were then in 
were recommending changes in practices which were perceived as having been wrong before
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anyway.
Conclusions
The case study shows the strategic nature of IT to a small manufacturing company, and 
the large amount of information required in the manufacture of even quite a simple product.
Having fallen behind in IT development, the company’s basic need was not for an office system, 
but to control production and planning through MRP and MIS. However, CAD and EDI were 
definitely factors in competition, and EDI had already been imposed by customers. Office 
systems in the sense of generic OA were very low priority, probably because they were not 
required for intraorganizational communication. However, office functions such as planning, 
sales and purchasing were necessary parts of an integrated system. BLT also illustrates some of 
the problems arising from the rapid implementation of integrated systems, and the complex two- 
way relationship between the introduction of IT and organizational change.
9. KFS TOOLS 1990
Background
KFS Tools is the world’s largest manufacturer of high speed steel cutting tools, employing 
about 1100 people in the U.K. The main site at Sheffield manufactured twist drills, reamers and 
some cutters; other products were manufactured at Worksop, Nuneaton and Aldridge. 
(Manufacturing was subsequently moved from the Sheffield site.) Company headquarters were at 
Sheffield with branch sales offices in London, Bristol, Birmingham and Glasgow. Since 1975, the 
company has been a member of the KFS Group which has headquarters in Gothenburg, Sweden, 
manufacturing plants in Sweden, Italy, Germany and Brazil, and sales companies in France, 
Belgium, Germany, Holland, Spain, the U.S. and Canada. The main product of the group is 
bearings; tools make up 12% of turnover.
The company’s marketing strategy is based on consistent high quality, a broad range of 
products, and excellent service. The manufacturing strategy is to produce top quality engineers’ 
cutting tools by means of continuing investment in modem methods of manufacture and 
machinery. KFS has a total quality management programme and has been engaged for some time 
in introducing HRM policies including a flexible, multiskilled work force, less direct supervision, 
and new bonus incentive systems. They were looking towards computer-integrated 
manufacturing (CIM) eventually but currently lacked money for the investment; meanwhile, they 
were concentrating on making other improvements in manufacturing.
Initiation
KFS had already undergone significant computerisation in the office. The first 
mainframe had been introduced in 1966. Ten years before the initiation of the office system, the 
mainframe in Sheffield handled DP with 50-60 terminals, and there was stand-alone WP. During 
the 1980s, functional managers, led by the MD, began using PCs extensively. KFS had examined 
IT strategy in relation to business strategy about four years previously, using critical success
47
factors among other techniques, and had implemented most of what they had planned by the time 
of the interviews.
The objectives for the office system PCS (Personal Computer Service) were 
’administrative efficiency and managerial effectiveness through an integrated system’. One aim 
was to integrate WP with electronic mail so that typists could share facilities with others, 
removing the need for printing out and sending on memos, and reducing paper. Electronic mail 
was seen as particularly useful because it allowed communications with other factories in the UK, 
and with branch (sales) offices. Electronic links with customers and distributors were viewed as 
part of a differentiation strategy. IT was an important element in an effective distribution 
strategy, because customers value quick delivery. The idea of the customer link appears to have 
come from the Board, who said they ’should just do it and be the first’.
Design
PCS ran from the mainframe through VMS which had recently become available for 
mainframes of this size. PCS was used by over 200 users in the UK, including 6 directors, 50 
managers, 104 departments, 8 secretaries, 77 staff, and 68 international links. Facilities included 
email, word processing, notepad, graphics, memos, and personal documents. They could receive 
and send telex on the system and had been looking at fax but considered it very expensive. The 
system included general company information such as lists, directories, room bookings, company 
policies, procedures, and regulations, which standardises company-wide information and makes 
sure it’s up to date. It also contained general information such as country codes and exchange 
rates.
PCS has linked the office system with data processing and corporate databases. From the 
same terminal users can go into either PCS or data entry, for those who need to change data, 
including sales order processing, manufacturing support systems, personnel, payroll, WIP, the 
bonus incentive system, assets register, and material control. PCS has been an important 
extension to existing MIS and managers’ use of PCs. Facilities including spreadsheets can be 
brought down from the mainframe to the PCS. An important use has been access to company 
data such as sales and production information via (IBM) Stairs databases. They can for example 
see whether any large orders came in yesterday, send listings, make queries regarding stock, etc. 
Company databases can be drawn down, bits extracted, manipulated, incorporated in a document 
and sent on or printed out as a report.
One of the objectives of PCS was to get management information on the system and keep 
it there, to avoid piles of print-out. The MIS on PCS presents current performance measures in 
colour graphics. Most are updated monthly, some are updated automatically daily. The 
principle is exception reporting; routine information is recorded in the system, and only 
anomalies called to the attention of the manager for action. Management information includes 
lead times and variances between how long a factory estimates that a job will take, and how long
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it actually takes. This can be collected for each factory and compared, enabling improved 
management control.
Electronic mail is used internally and externally, nationally and globally. The ’KFS 
telenet’ (dial-up packet switching via BT and X.25) facilitates internal integration of the five 
factories and branch offices in the UK. Production planning is done centrally; orders are 
assigned to factories, which then decide how to carry it out locally.
An electronic catalogue and electronic links with customers and distributors are used to 
support a differentiation strategy. At the time of the research, no competitor was using such 
links. The on-line ordering system provides direct computer links with 17 major customers and 
sales companies. The customer links his or her own computer via a modem and BTel to KFS’s 
system, amd can query and order from a menu. The customer provides a specification and the 
system comes up with number of recommendations, advising the speed, cost, etc. of various 
alternatives from the KFS range. When the customer makes a choice, the order is picked up by 
the KFS mainframe, sent to factory or warehouse and if in stock goes out within 2 hours on the 
same day. The ordering system provides speed of response, and has saved orders which might 
have been lost to a competitor. There is also a catalogue on diskette which KFS sends customers 
to use in their own PCs. This contains technical information and is mainly for browsing. 
Implementation
The implementation strategy has been top-down and incremental. IT has been led from 
the top, by the vision of the then MD, and the IS manager. The PC phase, for example, began 
with the introduction of colour graphics to the MD. When talking to a customer, the MD would 
have up to date sales information regarding buying patterns etc. on his desk. The functional 
managers soon demanded to follow, because they were at a disadvantage without one - ’the MD 
would call up on the PC information (say about sales) in the morning half an hour before 
everybody else, and ring them up about it; if they didn’t know they’d look stupid’.
The IS department developed the system with the cooperation of MDs over the years. 
The good relationship between the IS manager and top management was seen as indispensable. 
Their approach was to give users generic facilities, not specific to function, which could then be 
tailored to suit their needs, and altered again as the users gained experience. They described this 
as very top-down, ’autocratic’, but felt they had to take the lead, ’because users don’t know what 
they need, know what they want, when they get it decide they didn’t want it’. They designed 
PCS themselves from scratch, and added on facilities in an evolutionary fashion instead of 
planning it all out in advance. Ideas for applications came from managers, depending on how 
knowledgeable about IT they were. The Swedish parent company had been very supportive and 
had a good system without which could not have developed their international links.
Outcomes
One major benefit has been speed of communications, and the ability to disseminate
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information more widely. Sales offices can see what is in stock and tell customers what they can 
have now and what will be available in three days. Orders are sent from any of three warehouses 
in the UK, whereas they used to be linked to local sales offices. The number of sales branch 
offices has been reduced from five to three. They have gained competitive advantage abroad 
because they can handle sales queries quickly via electronic mail. The system has taken one week 
out of the ordering cycle, reduced stocks, and evened out the demand pattern. For example, the 
Canadian warehouse was growing fast and couldn’t manage its stocks. They would just stop 
ordering when they had too much, resulting in peaks and troughs. Ordering is now automatic, so 
there is a smoother pattern, and better inventory management.
Another advantage has come from improved management information, e.g., the ability to 
interpret trends. Email has saved on telephone costs. They had reduced staff by more than half 
with doubled business, and had halved the number of secretaries. Apart from this it was hard to 
see any organizational changes as a direct result of the technology, but they acknowledged that 
knowing the technology is there could influence future decisions about organizational change.
The amount of paper had not decreased. Another concern was over-use of email, 
resulting in everyone receiving copies and wasting time having to go through it all. In some 
cases when a memo went to several people it was not clear who was supposed to act on it, and if 
several did there was duplication of effort. A need for filters and for discipline was recognised. 
Conclusions
KFS provides a good example of clever use of IT/OS in a manufacturing company. 
Evolutionary development, a conscious policy of accumulating organizational learning and 
experience with technology under the guidance of an aware and informed top management, and a 
history of cooperation between senior management and the IT department, all contributed to the 
eventual development of strategic applications of IT/OS to intra- and inter-organizational 
communications.
10. IBM HAVANT 1990
Background
At the time of the research, the Havant plant of IBM UK had been in existence for 20 
years, employed 2,000 people, and made one-third of all disk files for IBM internal use. These 
went into PS2s made in Greenock, into AS400s, and sometimes direct to customers. The plant 
also made communication controllers, banking machines, and flexible circuits for IBM. Disk files 
are also made in Japan, and there is internal competition for IBM business. There are research 
labs at Winchester, head office at Portsmouth, and offices in London.
The then Director of the Havant plant, John Ward, had been impressed by Japanese 
management practice, and saw problems in his organization arising from the way that hierarchy 
impeded work or information flows, and the way that processes cut across the functional areas. 
Both technologies, the OS and the manufacturing systems, were seen as means of achieving the
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changes he sought. At Havant, manufacturing had ’become a process’; JIT and computer 
integrated manufacturing had been applied to integrate the physical processes of supply, 
manufacture and delivery. Company-wide electronic links had been developed between product 
development, manufacturing and marketing. R&D had been pulled into product lines, via cross­
functional teams with product responsibility. The electronic system enabled all sorts of different 
data to be brought together and linked to suppliers.
Initiation and Objectives
The office system at Havant was seen as essential to achieve further change. It was 
initiated in 1982 by IS management, with top management support. Aims were improvements in 
quality, reduced delivery time and WIP, reduced administrative overheads, increased 
productivity, simplified communications, and a network infrastructure. There was about the 
same time a corporate directive to install PROFS, a generic office system, throughout the UK and 
the Havant plant director was ’100% supportive’ because he wanted the other managers to be 
educated in the use of computers.
Implementation
A PROFS pilot was conducted in 1983. At the same time, a study was conducted of how 
information moved at Havant and how managers used it. This showed that the information used 
by management was late, not credible, pushed not pulled. There was a need to provide business 
information, for IT training, help facilities, and that the system had to be available all the time. 
This led to a formal implementation plan. In 1984, PROFS was installed throughout Havant. An 
IS team of 10-12 was divided into system maintenance, education and help desk. The latter 
liaised with ’VM reps’ - senior reps in each user function. Implementation started with the senior 
management group, followed by the business functions. It took 18 months, while they trained 
150 per month. Managers had a three day course, secretaries 5, professionals 3 half days. The 
senior management team had personal tuition of two hours each.
A productivity review took place once everybody was on the system. Each of the 200 
managers was interviewed singly about how they used the system, and if they were below a 
certain standard, they were brought up to it. They were also offered more training, 6 X 1/2 day 
sessions on different topics, which were optional and open to anyone.
A later study showed that for example in inventory reporting, of thirteen people dealing 
with the one process, five added no value. Information available Day 1 would not reach the 
Director until Day 27. 71% of managers’ time was spent in meetings, at less than half of which 
their attendance was actually required; the others they attended just for information. The Havant 
Management Information System (HMIS) was developed in response to these needs for consistent, 
timely information. It appeared to managers as an extension of PROFS, with which they were 
already familiar.
In 1985 a study was done of 20 senior managers, establishing their goals, CSFs, and
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measurements required in order to produce a framework for the development of the MIS for the 
rest (ie. a generic MIS). In the first stage of its implementation, the HMIS ’captured goals, 
critical success factors, and business measurements for individual managers’, providing it in 
graphic or text form, with red, green and amber exception reporting. The next stage was the 
creation of an HMIS Information Directory in 1988, which drew data from the plant’s operational 
systems automatically, making it more reliable and timely.
Design
HMIS functions mainly at the operational and planning/control levels, using internal data, 
rather than at the strategic level. It has no external links, although senior executives could link to 
external databases through their PS2s. The main gateway to external systems is at Warwick, 
everything has to go through it for security reasons, even their international internal links. The 
office system is separate from MVS, the system for processing plant data and controlling the line. 
Inventory costs are also on MVS. Tools exist to pull operational systems across to HMIS. 
Personnel, payroll, and finance are at a different site at North Harbour.
The system was based on three 3081 processors, and had 2250 users, 1800 of whom were 
regular users. 1200 may be logged on at a single time, and 2000 log on each day. Only specialists 
use PCs, the rest are dumb terminals. The ratio of terminals was 2:1 to start with, is now 1:1. 
There had been a definite extension of use. Help desk questions were now coming in at 60 per 
day, which is a reduction from the early days, but the character of queries had changed, from 
routine things to how to use the extra facilities. Telex but not phone (voice) or fax is on the 
system.
The Purchasing Department is linked to their 60 suppliers all over the UK. They had a 
much larger number of suppliers and have been working to reduce them and to improve 
relationships generally.
Outcomes
The result of the overall IT strategy was a fourfold increase in productivity, and large 
improvements in quality. The perceived benefits of the OS were productivity gains, more succinct 
communications, faster product introduction design to delivery, the creation of a base for CIM. 
Meetings had become shorter and more focussed because people no longer attended just for 
information. The reporting process had been simplified, and there was a common style. Also the 
system made it necessary that every bit of data be owned by someone.
The success with MIS was seen as due to active executive sponsorship, an IT strategy, 
goals/objectives, and the skills of the business analysts who came from the user departments, not 
IT specialists. There was also a change in the IS department, it had become much more user- 
friendly and less remote in every way.
Organizational Change
Personnel officers reported minimal structural change as a result of the system, but there
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was disagreement as to whether the managers’ role had changed and whether there were fewer 
levels. Most change had occurred in the secretarial role. Only senior management now had 
personal secretaries. There were now seven managers to a secretary, who set up meetings, 
organized diaries, and did the larger graphics. The numbers had been reduced from 70 to 40, and 
many were now contracted through agencies. Apart from the senior managers’ full-time ’IBM’ 
secretaries, there were IBM temps drawn from former full-time employees. Secretarial work had 
become more boring; whereas they had been more of a personal assistant, they were now much 
less so. The managers became more self-sufficient, and secretaries knew less about what was 
going on, for example, they saw much less of their mail.
There were culture/process changes at the same time as the introduction of the OS not 
attributable to it. The major organizational changes at IBM have occurred in response to its 
strategic situation rather than as a result of the office system. There had for example been a 
major transfer of administrative support staff into manufacturing or marketing, multiskilling on 
the shop floor, a pushing of accountability down to lower levels which had reduced the middle 
tier. The reward system had been altered and career routes for professionals established. There 
had also been a major drive to change the ’culture’, typified by the slogans ’right first time’, 
’respect for the individual’, ’excellence in everything we do’, ’the customer is always right’. 
Conclusions
The office system at Havant was thus seen as a platform for organizational 
communications and for management information, a means of increasing productivity and 
reducing clerical and secretarial staff. A potential for organizational integration was clearly 
recognised, the office system was originally seen as one means of fundamentally restructuring the 
organization; this was also being attempted through other means and from the corporate level.
Internationally, IBM was badly affected by the recession and by the downturn in the 
market for mainframes, resulting in a 92% drop in profits and the loss of 17,000 jobs as of July 
1991. Losses were almost $5 billion in 1992, its worst ever year, and another $285 million were 
lost in the first quarter of 1993 (The Financial Times, 21 April 1993). In 1992, IBM UK lost 
£616 million and 1,000 jobs. As part of an international restructuring programme intended to 
decentralise decision-making, Havant was designated an industrial business centre with increased 
control by local management (The Financial Times, 2 April 1993).
11. IBM UK and Europe 1990-1991
Initiation and Objectives
IBM UK consists of Marketing and Services, a major UK function with 14,000 
employees, manufacturing plants at Havant and Greenock, and a software development lab at 
Hunsley. In the early 1980s, the organization began developing a national company-wide office 
system when a nation-wide network was installed linking word processing centres, simultaneously 
with trials of an office support system for managers and professionals. This was followed by a
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pilot with 900 users in the Midlands, and on the basis of this and IBM experience in other 
countries, the decision was made to extend the system to Marketing and Services throughout the 
UK. This was cost-justified on an expected productivity benefit of 7 % at the end of the three 
year implementation period. Other objectives were to improve communications across the 
organization so as to increase effectiveness and efficiency, quality and speed of response. NOSS 
(National Office Support Service) consisted of notes and messages for communication alone; 
however the productivity benefit achieved was almost double that anticipated by the end of 1987, 
and later resulted in a 20% overall productivity improvement.
Implementation
Implementation of NOSS took nearly three years and cost £70m. It was planned location- 
by location, with two half-days training. Secretaries were trained to be ’support administrators’ 
to give support to users, backed up by a regional support organization and a telephone hot-line. 
Experience with the trials and pilot had shown that resistance could be expected from secretaries 
because of fear of job loss, and from managers and executives over fear of being shown up as 
unable to use the keyboard. However, users moved gradually from competence to confidence 
over a period of eighteen months. As a result, the network had to be dramatically expanded so as 
to provide the high availability and response time users expected. Support services such as 
administration, help desk and training had to be permanently resourced.
Outcomes
As a result of its experience with NOSS, IBM learned that OS involved fundamental 
change in terms of its cross functional impact, that there were major impacts on the jobs of 
secretaries and of managers, and that demands on network capacity grew dramatically as users 
become more confident.
The OS helped IBM to implement its organizational strategy of reducing administrative 
staff and expanding marketing by shifting employees from one to the other. One member of 
marketing staff noted that his department is in three locations due to historical accident, and his 
function had changed twice in the last year without his having to move house. IBM had 
previously reorganized from an industry-based structure to a geographically-based one because of 
the problem of communications; they subsequently were able to reorganize back to an industry- 
based structure, in part because of the OS. In 1993, IBM UK planned to reduce headquarters 
staff from 2,500 (in 1991) to 100, involving compulsory redundancies if necessary (The Financial 
Times, 30 June 1993). One can only speculate on the extent to which the office system makes 
such dramatic cuts possible.
Although the OS had been very effective as a communications vehicle, it is not integrated 
with business applications, so that marketing staff cannot access information from company 
databases (although this had been a long-term goal). As IBM changes its business to software and 
services, there is a need for processes to support this, e.g. to evaluate risks, including allowing
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salesmen access to own-company information. For example, by making research information 
available to salesmen, one company turned them into consultants.
Interorganizational systems: agents and dealers can contact IBM databases. IBM makes 
increasing use of third parties, subcontracting work to business partners. The office system links 
to them as well as to customers via the Mailexchange service. The UK Marketing Information 
System ’UMIS’ is a database of product information, configuration tools, suppliers and customers, 
which resulted in a productivity improvement of possibly 60%.
Extension of the OS throughout Europe.
Globally, 350,000 IBM employees already have access to a terminal, many having two or 
three, so that they can receive mail and messages anywhere in world. In 1991, the office system 
was being extended by the introduction of Office Vision throughout Europe, which is IBM’s 
largest single market. This was intended to replace the variety of software in use in different 
countries, and by standardising, to make communication between countries easier, reduce the 
number of large computer sites, and economise on expensive computer support staff - ’reduce 
programmers maintaining different environments’. Like NOSS, the European OS would also be 
used as a marketing example and when developed would be offered externally. Above and 
beyond the previous facilities, the system would include graphics, executive decision support, 
integration of fax, expanding electronic forms, and electronic signatures. This could all only be 
done as a common program. Everything will be distributed through the network, e.g. training 
will be on the system because unlike the first round, these are computer-literate users who can 
define their own training needs. The system was seen as having low functionality spread widely, 
and as a base for more exciting things such as Executive Decision Support and business 
applications.
Implementation of the European OS
Implementation was being carried out top-down; the project was being driven from Paris 
by very senior managers - ’God speaks to them’. The need for well-defined standards and 
business applications required a common IT strategy and was therefore an executive decision.
The project extends from Turkey to Iceland and involves 100,000 users. In every case they will 
have an Office Vision/VM base. As for software, they had standardised by comparing the 
software in use in different countries, and selecting the best ones. Some packages will be 
mandatory, others not; locally people will still be able to use their own custom software, but only 
the standard packages will be supported. The UK had been given the job of implementing the 
European OS, providing supply and support to each country, which would then support its own 
centres. The Strategy/Architecture/Requirements were being handled in Holland.
The system had been piloted in Switzerland in September 1990, and approved at the end 
of November. In 1991 it was being introduced in Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Austria and 
Belgium; 85-90% (75-80,000 people) would be on by the end of the year. Australia and New
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Zealand, Japan, and South America had agreed to use this platform, but the 200,000 users in the 
U.S. had their own version.
12. INSURANCE SERVICES GROUP 1988-89
Background
The export insurance organization is a Government Department which, since 1919, has 
insured UK exporters and financiers against the risk of non-payment by foreign buyers. Its 
Insurance Services Group (ISG), dealing with short term credit business has always been the 
market leader in its field, but during 1986-87 business insured by ISG decreased at an alarming 
rate, which led to the developments discussed here. The Insurance Services Group has its head 
office at Cardiff and nine regional offices which are the main point of contact with the 
customers. Internally, IS Group was divided into Underwriting, Claims, Customer Services, 
Marketing, Planning, Policy and Resource Management. There was only one major competitor in 
the UK, but as the Group was considering extending business into Europe after 1992, this 
situation could change. At the time of the research, ISG was running at a profit and either 
privatisation or agency status was anticipated for the future. In the event, it was privatised in 
1991 by being sold to a Dutch export credit insurer.
Initiation and Objectives
A crisis arose when ISG’s market share declined from 36% in 1978/9 to 20% in 1986/7 of 
UK non-oil exports insured. Market research revealed competitive weaknesses including the civil 
service image, and perceptions of the organization as slow, inflexible, and unresponsive. Other 
disadvantages included price, administrative overheads, and inability to insure domestic trade as 
well and thus spread risks. Factors giving competitive edge in the industry were: quality and 
speed of service so that customers can commit to contracts quickly, data on buyers (which the 
organization had), and non-bureaucratic documentation. At the same time there was continuing 
Treasury pressure to increase efficiency and reduce numbers of staff, while servicing a large debt 
caused by the recession of early 80s.
The response was a marketing strategy of improved quality and speed of service, 
flexibility on price, tailored cover and facilities, quicker response time to credit limit 
applications, and (in response to 1992) an expanded database on European buyers. In 1986 ISG’s 
new management viewed investment in IT as crucial to turning around the business. The first 
priority was to improve the speed of response to customers’ credit limit applications (below). 
Implementation
The system had been initiated along with a number of cultural changes, intended to make 
the Department operate more like a business. The objectives were very clear. The Board in 
conjunction with IT department had direct responsibility for IT strategy. Financial appraisal was 
rigorous, formalised, and dealt with at Board level.
Implementation took 18 months from initial consideration to first implementation. The
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ISG had learned from earlier mistakes to involve users and to use formal methodologies. 
Participative sociotechnical design was a feature of the process; end users were involved in system 
development, and there was a Job Design Working Party and an IT agreement with the trades 
unions which included job satisfaction. The methodologies they used included SSADM, 
COMPACT, and PROMPT. There was a training road show, HQ trained regional staff, with one 
hour training on the screens, optional sessions on keyboard skills, and telephone hot lines. The 
system was also marketed to users, with monthly bulletins focussing on business decisions and 
performance, and team briefings focussing on business gained/lost/maintained. They reported no 
real opposition from staff, and observed that their approach helped them to screen out a potential 
disaster in Claims. The strategy was incremental, to ’implement the grand plan bit by bit’, give 
people something they can use quickly even if it has to be thrown away later. However, the total 
effect was Tike a big bang’, in that it was a move from a totally paper-based system to one which 
was almost entirely electronic. Overall factors contributing to success were seen as high 
management commitment and high business relevance.
Design
The new system involved upgrading the mainframe and doubling the number of terminals 
and printers to 400 dumb terminals and 400 PCs (as of March 1989), at a cost of approximately 
£10m. over two years. They were also introducing office systems in the OA sense, but were not 
going for it fully because it was too expensive.
Implementation of CLAM
Before 1985, Credit Limit Applications were all processed manually, with only after­
event computer recording. Broad-based buyer information was only available on paper. All 
credit limit applications were sent by post from the Regional Offices to be dealt with by 
underwriters in Cardiff. All applications were regarded as similar insofar as they needed 
professional underwriters to assess risk and set rates. They were dealt with by different levels of 
underwriter according to the value only.
The underwriting process was computerised in stages over a period of three years. In 
1985-86 they undertook a ’Risk Scoring’ Pilot Study as a consequence of which there was a 
change in underwriting philosophy which meant that insurance cover could be authorised by the 
Regional Office in the 45% of applications where the value was under £20,000 and the buyer was 
within the OECD. The result was an immediate increase of turnaround within 24 hours from 
18% to 42% at the Regional Offices. Later this principle of ’standard limits’ was extended, 
raising 24 hour turnaround to 65% of applications.
The underwriting system was introduced in two phases, CLAM(RO) in October 1987 and 
CLAM(HQ) in August 1988. The inputs, which are customers’ credit limit applications, and 
buyer and customer records, were all put on-line. The outputs are the decisions on the 
applications, which are recorded on the databases, and letters to the customers which are printed
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automatically. Buyer records are also amended automatically. A clerk at the Regional Office 
entered application details, and if it fell within the standard limits it would be dealt with 
immediately at the Regional Office, if not, sent to Cardiff for professional underwriting. In 
Phase 2 the system was extended to the underwriters, who now dealt with applications as 
electronic records. This was characterised as a decision support system.
Outcomes
This computerisation of part of the underwriting process increased from 18% to 78% the 
proportion of credit limit applications on which decisions were despatched by close of the 
business day following receipt of application, with no deterioration in quality of underwriting 
decisions. Following this improvement, greater customer satisfaction has been evidenced by 
market research. In 1987/8 the amount of business ISG handled increased for the first time since 
1984, and subsequently increased on an accelerating trend. The initial cost was quickly 
recovered. There was better use of staff because people could concentrate on the more 
complicated types of business. There was an increasing focus on the underwriting context of 
buyer companies, ie. countries, trade sectors, UK exporter, buying country paying history. 
Underwriters could make regular visits to the markets they underwrote, leading to more informed 
decisions. Better information was available on buyers. Information was made available for 
planning by developing a risk portfolio. There was a general perception of success, from top 
management through middle management, underwriters, to clerical workers.
Organizational Change
The most obvious effect was a change in relations between the Regional Offices and 
Cardiff, with decentralisation to the regions of 65% or more of underwriting, which they did not 
do before. There was also centralisation of management control over the regional offices, with 
better measures of performance. Buyer Sections in ROs had much less contact with Cardiff, but 
were much closer to customers. At Cardiff, there was a large reorganization of underwriting 
from six groups to four.
The major effect on work was a shift in the division between routine and nonroutine. A 
Job Design Working Party found effects to have been mainly on lower-level AO and EO jobs. 
The regional office clerical staff who now issued guarantees received a change of title, but no 
promotion or increased pay. They spent up to 70% of their working day on VDUs on-line 
processing, which is relatively repetitive. The staff accepted the need for this, but didn’t want 
any more of it. As a result, the Job Design Working Party recommended an organizational 
change to Account Management, which would merge the Buyer, Guarantee Submission and Issue 
sections so that one person is the contact for the customer, resulting in a composite, diversified 
and more worthwhile job with less time spent on VDUs, but at the time of the research this had 
not yet been implemented.
The major effects in Cardiff were on the EO grade. They did not move into more
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interesting market and trade sector work to the extent anticipated, but because of the 
development of risk scoring EOs had some of the underwriting work they had lost restored to 
them. The underwriters’ perceptions were that it was an easy system to use, with no major 
problems. There was increased job satisfaction, more professionalism and more responsiveness to 
customer enquiries, more tailoring of business to specific customers. However there were also 
comments about laborious routing through the screens, some underwriters were still resistant, and 
increased specialisation was possibly leading to increased differentiation and barriers between 
underwriting groups.
Conclusions
ISG represents the use of IT to computerise a major business function in order to reverse 
competitive disadvantage and decline. The computerisation of Credit Limit Applications 
involved the redesign of a business process, the pulling together of organizational information via 
computer which made possible a much quicker response to the customer. To do this required the 
routinisation of part of what had been considered a professional function and its assignment to 
less skilled workers, and a consequent freeing up of the time of the professionals to devote to the 
deepening of their knowledge and expertise. Records were also automatically updated, keeping 
them timely.
13. SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT 1989
Background
The Sheffield City Council Education Department has been under heavy pressure 
stemming from decisions of central government to reduce the functions of the LEAs and severely 
to curtail local government spending. Implementation of the 1988 Education Act, including the 
National Curriculum, Local Financial Management of Schools, and the encouragement of 
individual schools to opt out of LEA jurisdiction have come at a time of increasingly severe 
budget constraints, as well as Council policy to devolve responsibility to departments, and clients’ 
expectations of better service and responsiveness. A departmental office information system, 
with links to the Council mainframe and to schools, was seen as a key to organizational survival.
The Council already ran major applications such as Housing and the Treasury on ICL 
mainframes, and had developed two corporate systems for financial accounting and orders, and a 
personnel system, which could be taken down to department level. Corporate IT strategy allowed 
departments to decide their own computer applications, within relatively loose constraints of 
buying British and the ability to be networked. ICL developed a new series called CLAN 
running Officepower, a generic office package with the same principles across applications, based 
on Unix but with the ability to incorporate PC compatibles running MS-DOS. The aim was to 
enable departments to communicate when X.25 came in. Computer Services in 1986 conducted a 
study of office automation at the instigation of the Council, in response to compulsory 
competitive tendering and the council policy of decentralisation. They established technical
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criteria, surveyed and made presentations to potential users. The Education department ’came 
onto the system as result of this project.’
The Education Department at the time had about 300 employees at Central Campus and 
responsibility for over 230 schools and 6 tertiary colleges.
Their previous experience of IT was very limited; they used the Council mainframe mainly for 
Financial Accounting, and had one word processing team on five pieces of outdated equipment. 
Of 25 staff users 95 % had no WP experience, and secretaries had at best stand-alone word 
processors which also needed to be upgraded.
Inititation and Objectives
When in September 1988, CLAN became available through the Council, the Head of 
Schools Branch, who had previous IT experience, presented an OS strategy to senior managers in 
the department, in which the role of IT was seen as enhancing support and delivery to 
pupils/students, the community, and the staff. Although the immediate need was to replace 
obsolete word processing kit and to increase the efficiency of the typing pools, other 
anticipated benefits were:
1. combat limitations of physical/geographical environment (old buildings, 
dispersed sites)
2. improve access to information
3. improve communication
4. improve information for decision making, enable managers to monitor and 
co-ordinate
5. enable forecasting
6. avoid duplication, repetition
Design
The projected plan was to put word processing on CLAN, provide Officepower for the 
senior management team and their secretaries, link with schools and colleges, and to link with the 
Council mainframe and other departments via X.25. Departmental databases such as property, 
and students/pupils, could go on CLAN. The cost, which was estimated at £50,000, could be 
paid for by staff savings in word processing, and in the event six typing/secretarial posts were 
lost through natural wastage.
Implementation
The project was approved and a full-time IT team set up, including the Project Manager, 
his understudy, two people from Computer Services, an IT Trainer based in the Training centre, 
a Systems Administrator, and an ICL Project Manager. This group met every 10 days to two 
weeks from start to finish, to oversee all details. There was also a support team for Officepower 
including a liaison officer from Computer Services. The implementation plan was to:
1. raise awareness
2. enthuse users and non-users
3. give personal support - train and develop
4. managers to create an environment in which people can develop/
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contribute.
The project was implemented in phases because of its size and complexity. The choice of word 
processing for Phase I was determined by the need to increase efficiency and because the largest 
immediate cost savings could be made there.
Phase II, the senior management team, was dictated by high visibility and the need for decision­
making support. Phase III was the department databases and electronic mail to link up schools, a 
large and complex project, some of which went on concurrently with Phase II.
Phase I had been completed at the time of the research. Word processing was brought in 
as a ’big bang’, because ’the requirements were quite clear’ and there was a deadline determined 
by school holidays. A Systems Administrator, appointed from the staff, was given a deadline of 
one month to co-ordinate the training of all the secretarial staff in word processing on the 
system. The secretaries however had wanted a phased introduction because of their lack of 
experience. At the same time, the opportunity was taken to reorganise the seven existing 
secretarial/typing teams into four. This was in part a response to a longstanding complaint that 
two of the teams had all the boring work, and in the reorganization, an attempt was made to get a 
better balance between the teams. This was done with consultation of team leaders. At the same 
time the teams were balanced between experienced and less experienced staff, and an attempt 
was made to create a supportive atmosphere in each team. There was considerable user 
involvement in the reorganization, in deciding how they would work in future and their 
requirements of the system. Basic training for staff was conducted by ICL on site: two days basic 
WP, followed by four days working on the new equipment, followed by 2 days more of training. 
Outcomes of Phase I
There were problems, because Team Leaders and the Systems Administrator did not have 
the opportunity to be trained before the rest of the staff and so could not assist them when they 
were learning. Also, when teams returned from training, they did not have time to consolidate, 
but went straight back to a full work load, meanwhile covering for other teams which were away 
for training. Although it had appeared logical to carry out the reorganization of the typing teams 
at the time the system was introduced, it resulted in most of the staff having to learn the new 
system at the same time they were doing unfamiliar work. This added greatly to the pressure 
they experienced, which was described as ’horrendous’. ’Wasn’t fair, we were asked to do too 
much.’ There was opportunity later for more training.
Technical problems, the need to document for ICL’s project management, and shortage of 
terminals (4 for a 6-person team) created additional difficulties. Nevertheless, service levels were 
back to normal in a month and all the team members were enthusiastic. They felt their skills had 
increased, and most found their jobs more interesting. Team Leaders received a promotion and a 
salary increase, as a result of early consultation with the union.
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Implementation of Phases II and III
Phase II, the Senior Management Team, was split into two parts, secretaries and managers. 
Senior management secretaries were introduced more gradually to the system than the typists 
because their work is more complex, and they had to learn more programs. Senior Managers 
were supposed to be trained by their secretaries, but after several months they were still using the 
system the least, partly because of lack of time to learn it, but also because the databases they 
needed access to were not yet on the system. Also the five members of the SMT were not a 
working group needing to communicate with each other but a great deal more with their own 
branches.
Phase III, including the computer link with schools, was in progress at the time of the 
research, with a network pilot project, so that the users could find out what their requirements 
were. School heads had already come up with all kinds of ideas.
Conclusions
The great bulk of government work consists of information handling, so it is not 
surprising that government departments have been major computer users. The Education 
Department saw IT as enabling the organization to respond better to its customers and therefore 
as strategic to its survival. It was the recently available integrative capacity of the technology on 
offer which made this possible. Like BLT, there were problems with implementing rapidly on a 
tight budget, which put a burden on users, but because of otherwise good relations with them 
these were overcome.
14. THE TRAINING AGENCY (TEED) 1989
Background
The Training Agency (when research began; formerly the Manpower Services 
Commission) is now part of the Department of Employment. It has its head office in Sheffield, 
with 2000 staff in five buildings, and a head office in London. It is organised in divisions, 
whose names and functions have changed, along with those of the TA itself. Staff described the 
organization as ’volatile’, a ’political football’, which needed to be able to adapt quickly to 
changes imposed by changing economic conditions and government decisions.
The old MSC was not traditionally a big data processor, and had no mainframe at head 
office. It had isolated word processing and PCs at head office: two word processing pools and 
350 PCs, plus 500 micros nation-wide, and some computerised systems within divisions. The 
Computer Branch of the MSC had a bad reputation in the organization, partly because of slow 
delivery of promised systems. The existing Information Processing (1983) and 
Telecommunications (1984) strategies called for adherence to international standards for system 
interconnection (a Civil Service requirement), single terminal access, that systems should be easy 
to use and cross-divisional, based on Unix. They were in principle in favour of OA, with the 
(far-sighted) proviso that local links should be possible between office systems and that in the
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long run, OA and DP should be able to communicate.
Initiation
The OS project was initiated in 1985-86 by the then Chairman of the MSC, who had been 
on the main board of Rank Xerox. He and his chief civil servant were based in London and he 
wanted to be able to communicate with his Management Committee (the CMC), who were in 
Sheffield. At the same time, the head of the Computer Branch had just set up an office 
technology section, which subsequently became MASCOT. Because they recognised their lack of 
expertise in OA, they chose to work with consultants, and together with PA conducted a 
requirements study in April 1986 by interviewing the 12 members of the CMC and their 
secretaries and their support community. A PActel report ’Office Technology Support for the 
CMC’ (July 1986) identified a need for integrated OT. The report noted the large amount of 
document preparation in the MSC, the limited use of OT which, together with pressure for more, 
especially word processing, could result in an uncontrolled ad hoc expansion. It noted the need 
for better access to information both in the CMC and in the MSC generally. However, it found 
the members of the CMC had very little need (or indeed wish) to communicate with each other; 
they communicated much more with the divisions they headed and with the Chairman. As 
communication flows were vertical not horizontal, installing technology for the CMC would not 
be cost-effective. The report stated there would be no staff savings but there would be 
productivity and quality improvements, and a reduced need for recruitment in the future. Staff 
commented later that they tried to identify cost benefits before the initial decision was made, but 
gave it up because it was ’appallingly difficult’, especially in the case of the TA, because it was a 
moving target. On the other hand, in their view anything which made it easier to produce 
documents couldn’t fail. Officially, they estimated a break-even in the 5th year of the system’s 
life. In any case, the idea was to use the first installation as a prototype, to try to extrapolate 
effects on organization.
Design
The system which was eventually installed in February 1988 as MASCOT I was based on 
Q-Office software, tailored in house, running on Olivetti hardware. There were four AT&T 
minis in Sheffield and one in London, connected by an X.25 network. There were 130 users with 
100 terminals, mostly dumb, plus printers, an OCR scanner, etc., using Unix on a network. It 
was possible to move easily from one facility to another, e.g. from WP to e-mail, back into WP, 
by means of short-cut commands from within a document. Incoming mail could be read in via 
OCR. There were three levels of access, individual, group, and everybody.
Implementation
At the request of the CMC, the Computer Branch and PA consultants produced a report 
in October 1986, which placed the previous OT study in a broader context, including the use of 
computers throughout the MSC and existing IT strategies in the organization. It noted and
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evaluated the following strategic options:
anarchy - let user departments go their own way
evolution - as anarchy, but within framework of policy (standards)
’genetic engineering’ - 
pragmatic - build slowly on what is there
prototype - continuous process of refining requirements to deliver solutions 
centralised - centralised control and planning - steady growth 
technology push - Computer Branch looks for niches for new products 
’big bang’ - as centralised, but faster
The strategy adopted took neither of the extremes, anarchy or centralisation. The idea of 
introducing OT immediately throughout all of the MSC head office had already been rejected 
because of the cost and the lack of experience in the organization to implement such a large 
project. The October report recommended a prototyping strategy for the long term, plus some 
elements of pragmatic and evolutionary for the short term - especially, setting standards and 
guidelines for the purchase of new equipment in divisions not participating in the first phase, so 
that eventually systems would all link up. The target was ’to provide OT facilities for all staff 
who need them in the head offices of the operational division’ by the end of the decade - about 
1000 users and 600-800 terminals.
The CMC agreed to a pilot based on the CMC plus a vertical slice consisting of a division 
(the Special Measures Directorate) which was small and compact, a discrete group, at a separate 
site from the main headquarters at Moorfoot. It also had its own links to the field. However, 
soon after the Treasury approved the project and it started, a government decision was made to 
hive off the Employment Service from the MSC, and with other consequent changes the user 
base changed, the number of users went down, the majority moved buildings, and many jobs 
changed.
Implementation began with the top management group, the Director General’s Strategy 
Committee, because there was pressure to get them on first and the need to get management 
commitment. Terminals were provided to all their secretaries. Later, specialist staff regretted 
this, because there were problems with the printers which affected these high profile users, who 
were upset because they couldn’t get their work out. Their bosses could not be persuaded that a 
temporary downturn in production was inevitable. There was conflict between the secretaries 
and the specialists, and although the latter outranked the secretaries one or two grades, they dared 
not challenge them because they were protected by their bosses.
Existing IT policy indicated that office automation should have implementation 
procedures distinct from those for DP, and that due weight should be given to organizational, 
management and staff problems. There was a high-level OT steering committee, senior managers 
were reported to be keen, a structured project management methodology (PROMPT) was used, 
users were involved and job design received attention from in-house psychologists.
64
User participation
Three user representatives from the SMD were seconded to the MASCOT project 
implementation team, which also included Computer Branch staff. According to one of the 
technical staff, this was a key to the success of the project, as user reps told technical people 
what users would not stand for (e.g. long activity diaries). He saw the user reps’ role as 
communication channels. Eventually they became the local experts.
However, the user reps went through a long period of not knowing what their role was, 
and felt they hadn’t had enough training. Their colleagues asked them questions they couldn’t 
answer, which made them feel inadequate and demoralised them for a time. For example, one 
aspect of user involvement was to give users demonstrations of the three shortlisted suppliers’ 
products. This was not a lot of use because the selection of a system was based on cost according 
to Treasury procedures; they could only comment on things like colours of screens, and the user 
reps didn’t know enough to comment on the choice of a system. The user team also engaged in a 
working practices exercise, asking users how they thought the system would help them with their 
jobs, and what they would like. This was not a success because it was too early to get useful 
feedback; even the team didn’t know what system would be, the user reps didn’t know enough to 
tell users what the system might do and how, and the users knew nothing. Another example was 
that user reps believed that all the users’ forms would be on the system, and they weren’t 
although they could have been, because the user reps didn’t have the knowledge and when they 
asked ’why can’t it do this’, they got long technical explanations. One user rep’s view was ’we 
missed it’ - getting what users wanted on screen.
However, user reps eventually went away for five days’ training in Q-Office at the 
Olivetti training establishment. A prototype was put in for the team to get experience with, but 
it kept falling over, which was very frustrating for them. The technical people couldn’t see why, 
but it would have been to users.
Training
User training was organised by a user rep, and was considered a great success. It ran 
throughout implementation and covered all grades of staff, most of whom had never used a PC. 
Modules A and B took one to a reasonable level of competence, C was advanced WP for typists 
and secretaries. Module A took two days and covered word processing, email, diary, and a little 
about card box (database). When they went back to work they had a box on the desk and could 
use it right away with support from the team. Initial training was in mixed groups of seven or 
eight people, but secretaries and typists were trained separately with more emphasis on word 
processing. They found however that all users needed keyboard familiarity in the first two days, 
and now do virtually all word processing. After two weeks users had two more days’ training for 
consolidation, more email, etc.
All levels were trained together because they didn’t want to take away too many people at
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a time from a section. However, this resulted in non-typists being put off by seeing typists at the 
keyboard. It was also thought later that higher level managers (Grade 7 ’s) should be trained as a 
peer group so that the enthusiastic ones could influence the less enthusiastic.
In the preimplementation period there were several presentations to users. A newsletter, 
MASCOT news, was sent out with information as to how things were going. The implementation 
itself took three and a half months. There was a help desk, which continued long after, and users 
were ’encouraged to play with it’.
Outcome of the pilot
Because of the reorganization, the pilot group changed; it moved back to Moorfoot, 
became part of a larger entity, the work itself changed, and it lost its field liaison offices and 
thus became a less good example. This made it hard to estimate the effects on the organization, 
and defeated one of the main purposes of the pilot. However, one view was that IT helped users 
to cope with these changes to their jobs and didn’t necessarily lengthen the learning curve.
An evaluation of the effects on human factors and activity was conducted very early, 
shortly after training was completed and no users had been trained for more than 6 months. 
Nevertheless, a 9% increase in productivity in document production was found, and a 50-70% 
decrease in document turn-around time. This gave them the ability to meet tight deadlines.
There was much less typing, and job satisfaction and skills had increased. Regrading of 
secretaries was considered to be too complicated as the grading system was so elaborate anyway. 
There were not many cost benefits.
It was found that 2% of staff were totally resistant, which compares with HUSAT 
findings. The uses were mainly word processing and email, while one or two had exploited it 
more. Six or seven managers used it some, two extensively, the others to send messages. Their 
secretaries did not like being bypassed in this way.
Specialists found they could have been more ’directive’ on some issues, on which users 
don’t really want to be bothered (e.g. file structure and file naming conventions). There could 
have been more tailoring. They thought they should perhaps have continued parallel working for 
a time, because the typists and personal secretaries had problems when their old equipment taken 
away and they had to continue with their workload while learning the new system. A major 
problem was that they had 80 terminals for more than 100 users, because the Treasury wouldn’t 
let them buy more. This was very inconvenient.
Extension of the project - MASCOT II
A business case was built on MASCOT I for MASCOT II, the extension of the OS to the 
whole of headquarters. This was authorised in January 1990. While waiting for Treasury 
approval, the Computer Branch started the procurement process and proceeded with planning 
implementation. A number of lessons had been learned from MASCOT I and were reflected in 
the new implementation strategy.
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PROMPT was found to be less suitable for OA than for DP, because it does not deal well 
with non-technical elements, is not user-based, and you have to QA (quality assure) each 
outcome/document. Evaluating tasks, e.g. activity diaries, was ’a pain’. It was eventually 
decided to use PRINCE methodology instead, as it was the Employment Department standard, 
was product-driven and more flexible.
The organization had learned that with OA, since use is discretionary, there was a need 
for marketing and job design to make sure it was used to the fullest extent, and for commitment 
from senior and middle managers to deal with the management of change The next phase would 
be approached with a marketing strategy and more detailed user education. While top 
management of the projected user branches were keen, partly due to the success of MASCOT I, a 
need was observed to get the commitment of Grade 7, as the usage and commitment of staff 
followed the example of the head. It was intended in the next phase to go to Grade 7s two to 
three months before and get them to discuss how they could implement it, emphasising that it 
was their system.
MASCOT I showed how important training and the help desk were. Psychologists also 
carried out a job design project, asking current (MASCOT I) users for their views on what should 
have been done. From this, a job design pack was developed to assist users in thinking about 
how to integrate MASCOT into their work a few months before the new system went live. 
Implementation plans involved consulting users with this pack, when the equipment was 
available, in workshop groups. These would consist of some horizontal groups such as personal 
secretaries and managers, as well as branch-based vertical workshop groups. The groups would 
be assisted by members of the implementation team and reps of the MASCOT I Users’
Association.
Implementation plans
The implementation team would be again a mix of technical and mostly non-technical 
people from the new customer services division of Computer Branch, trainers, and user reps. 
Implementation would be phased branch by branch, with a MASCOT co-ordinator for each 
branch, with authority even over managers, and implementation for the branch would be 
overseen by a co-ordinating committee consisting of branch manager, account manager for IT 
system, a rep from the implementation team and a rep of the end-users. Phasing in of the 
branches would be decided by the Director General’s Board, according to the degree of 
importance of the work to the TA as a whole.
Technology and strategy developments
There were related developments in organizational IT strategy and in the technology, 
which led to a much more ambitious project for MASCOT II than was initially envisaged, but 
also to delayed introduction. The IT strategy had originally been quite simple; it was for UNIX, 
Quadratron, and single-screen access. But there was a head office review of IT strategy which
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meant that MASCOT would link to all IT in the organization (which had always been an aim). IT 
data such as budgets and personnel were to become accessible to managers, as well as text storage 
and retrieval and project management. The technology would be quite different from the pilot, 
both because there had been a new release of Q-Office, CLIQ, and because they had decided to 
have PCs with DOS downloaded onto UNIX instead of dumb terminals because there is such a lot 
of good software on DOS, and many people are used to working with it. Thus, manuals had to be 
updated and existing users retrained, and they needed at least three months to test the new system 
because it was technically new. It was new not only for them, it was leading edge. DOS-UNIX 
links were being developed by Quadratron, and they were held back waiting for this software 
development. At the same time, a Corporate Communications Network was being installed to 
provide data communications between 850 locations including all Head Offices, Regional and 
Area offices.
A Systems Review (Final Report May 90) saw MASCOT now as more of a front-end into 
applications. The conception of the system had changed; users would turn on and access CLIQ, 
which had mainly WP, spreadsheet and databases. They could then go into DOS for DTP etc., and 
access other IT systems such as TARDIS, text retrieval, and the external NOMIS national database 
for Manpower. Each branch’s IT systems would be integrated with MASCOT. Management of 
information was now seen as a resource, and they were talking much more about effectiveness 
than efficiency.
Organizational Change
Computer Branch was reorganized into technical and customer oriented sections. The 
’customer account managers’ and their staff were people with technical backgrounds but it was 
classified as a non-technical job. A Human Factors Advisor with a non-technical background 
was appointed to assist in implementation, and saw his role as trying to take the user’s point of 
view, and mediating between what users want and what is technically possible, ’keeping them 
realistic’. Computer Branch were short-staffed and as a result they were contracting much of 
their work to consultants, such as marketing, training needs analysis, and evaluation.
The division of the TA into grades and branches would make it very difficult for the 
workshop groups to discuss the function of the unit as a whole and how work might be 
reorganized with the introduction of the new system. Such reorganization would raise grading 
and regrading issues, and as promotion was very important within the organization, unions and 
middle management might resist. Users were being told it was just a tool, not a radical change, 
but that they must consider how what they did affected other people’s jobs, e.g. if managers 
spent a lot of time inputting what a typist could do, how would it affect the typists.
Major impacts were expected on infrastructure/support workers. MASCOT I users were 
moved and reorganized with 20% staff cuts. Staff in the rest of the organization were worried 
about job cuts; 250 jobs were expected to be lost anyway, without MASCOT, but there would
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also be cuts due to MASCOT because the Treasury required saving the cost of the project,
£13.3m, and therefore they were looking for a 5% efficiency improvement in the organization as 
a whole. Posts might be lost but redundancies were not anticipated.
The TA lost some of its functions to the TECs, with whom relations were still being 
worked out. In London, MASCOT I users were moved to the Department of Employment. The 
Training Agency was abolished as such and become part of the ED, which raised all sorts of 
questions about the future of the proposed system. One reason was that the ED was conducting 
its own pilots with Office Power. It was also not at all clear what the number of users of 
MASCOT II would be or the number of terminals required. The target at one point was 900 staff 
in Sheffield on the three sites formerly TA, but a number of ED staff were also now at these 
sites. If all ED staff in Sheffield got MASCOT, the number of users would be 1500. The tender 
for the suppliers was for a minimum of 600 terminals, with 3-500 reserves, which could be added 
on later. In June 1991 the target was 1200 in Sheffield, plus 80 in London where they had a new 
branch, aiming at a 1:1 ratio including old equipment. At the same time the possibility that the 
ED might pull out of London was being discussed.
In June 1991, the contract was awarded to ACT. Mini-MASCOT servers were planned to 
be installed 1 July and tested from July 25. There was time pressure because of the need to 
spend the money allotted by the Treasury within the 2 year budget period, which ended April 
1993 no matter when they started. It looked as though all of Sheffield would be using CLIQ, but 
they didn’t know how much further it would extend in the ED group. The implementation team 
was to consist of the Project manager, Accommodation, Health and Safety, ergonomic, ACT 
Liaison, installation, and a data conversion manager (old data to MASCOT), under a Project 
Board chaired by the senior manager of the organization in Sheffield, also responsible for all 
staffing.
Conclusions
The Training Agency illustrates the difficulties of planning long-term investment in 
information technology in an organization which is subject to both constant and sudden change.
The careful evolutionary implementation approach seemed to be based on a false assumption of 
stability. The conception of the system also changed completely within a short period, partly due 
to advances in technology which enabled more integration. The merger with another Department 
which had been trialling a different system made it possible that all the effort in the TA would 
have been wasted. Given Treasury and other Government guidelines, the organization could not 
have proceeded differently, but if ever there was a case for putting in a basic office system 
quickly and then finding out what the needs were, this was it. It was also unlikely that the 
highly bureaucratic structure with its elaboration of grades etc. would allow work to be 
redesigned in any significant way to take advantage of the technology.
15. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. - UK and EUROPE, 1991-1992
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Background
Digital, a major computer manufacturer, has also been hit by the recession. Average 
margins are down from 50% to 5%, there have been redundancies and whole units have gone. It 
has an OS which has enabled some of the major organizational changes required in this situation. 
Initiation
In 1981 DEC had achieved world-wide network integration when the three major existing 
networks (engineering, manufacturing, all the others) merged. Electronic mail had been 
introduced for ’selected people’ such as senior managers. All-in-One was implemented in 1982. 
The company achieved a 1:1 computer ratio in the UK in the early 1980’s, with 20,000 users. 
Computer conferencing (see below) was added in 1984. In 1985-86 technological improvements 
including step function changes in computing power and network reliability, enabled email 
communications between all members. The IS Director Europe and country directors made a 
commitment to the large investment required to implement All-in-One across Europe. It took 
two and one-half years to implement. Email is now in its third or fourth generation with 30,000 
users across Europe, including the UK.
Design
There are now 100,000 organizational users, 90% of all employees. Even the canteen, 
which is subcontracted, is on the system. Facilities include messaging, conferencing, arranging 
meetings, videotext (databases). Documents from files can be appended to messages and sent 
anywhere. Computer conferencing has been very successful. Anyone can initiate a topic and ask 
for comments from any and all users of the system. In 1987-88 there were 1000 conferences 
going, 1500 now, some of which have been going for years. As for integration of media, telex 
and fax are now on the system, they are working on telephone and looking towards including 
video. Open Systems standards were making it possible to buy in ’foreign’ equipment, e.g. 
laptops, IBM and Apple. They were in the process of phasing in network-wide shared filing, 
which any PC can access, so that there would be only one copy of data anywhere in system.
The network service had to be rewritten to allow for the increase in numbers of people on 
it, plus the upgrade which is going on continually. In the next stage there will be access for staff 
from any office anywhere in the world. Any employee will be able to work from any Digital 
office - pick his/her desk for the day, log on and work as though at base.
Implementation
The IS department put in the infrastructure but the implementation approach was 
described as employee-led, not top-down. The hardware and software have developed over time, 
and the main products have been discovered, not engineered. For example, All-in-One was a 
local initiative in a U.S. branch which was diffused throughout the organization by imitation by 
other branches. The success of this approach is related to the organizational culture, which is 
described as ’high tech high touch’.
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Digital was described as a very communicative organization, even before the widespread 
adoption of computers. The technology fits easily into this culture. Managers are regarded as 
facilitators. They tend to recruit the ’naturally curious’ person and give them the tools to 
continue learning. They are trying to move towards a learning organization, a ’voyage of 
discovery’. The approach to employees is ’you can do anything’. This leads to widespread local 
development of applications by users and dissemination/adoption by example.
Organizational Change and other Outcomes
The office system has been a major enabler of organizational change. The Directors had 
this in mind when sanctioning the system; they had a vision to make the organization independent 
of location or structure. The OS has greatly increased flexibility. For example, one respondent 
changed from a UK to a European job, was assigned to a group which is based in the UK, Milan 
and elsewhere in Europe. They all physically stayed where they were, saving at least $200,000 in 
relocation expenses for each individual. Digital Europe ’changes its organization every year’, 
which would not be possible without the OS both to plan and to implement such changes quickly. 
Decision-makers no longer think about the technology, they just make decisions about the 
organization which assume it’s there. The OS has enabled organizational change such as more 
outsourcing and internal markets. Inter-company links with customers and suppliers have been 
developed in the last several years through X.400. This has resulted in a shakedown in suppliers 
to a core of those who are most compatible, plus an extended pool. P&O run all their canteens 
and vending machines; even the security guards are outsourced.
Internally, the company has been broken up into 100 or so entrepreneurial units with a manager 
who has business responsibility, after approval of a business plan which shows the return on 
investment. Some units have gone out of business. They are also trying to do away with country 
boundaries.
There had been major changes in secretarial jobs. As well as reduced numbers, they had 
become more assistants to a team. An attempt to make the secretary the ’super-user’ of WP and 
adviser to the team ran into trouble because of internal conflict with IS Dept. Efforts had been 
made to extend the IS group out into organization to become the local experts more in contact 
with the business and users.
Layers have been stripped out because of direct vertical communication and 
organizational change. The manager of an entrepreneurial unit reports to a director - three 
layers. The company had been growing at 1000 employees a year, but slowed down two years ago 
to reduce costs. Flexible working had been introduced so that 700 people could use a building 
designed for 400. In one location, people didn’t have desks; when they arrived at work they went 
to their group area and picked a desk for the day - no picture of the children, other personal 
things. Many worked from home, also significantly reducing real estate. There was an obvious 
danger of losing group spirit, exchange of ideas, so team meetings become more important.
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A mature system has its own problems. It is not a one-off investment, it needs continued 
commitment and expenditure or you will start to lose the benefits. There is a continued need for 
the training of new people, and to increase disk space so that response time doesn’t get too slow 
and users are not unduly restricted as to the number of documents they can have.
Conclusions
In Digital, there was a clear perception of an OS as an enabler of organizational flexibility 
and change, which has been realised. The OS has become a seamless, taken-for-granted part of 
the organization. Although there are technical (but mainly financial) problems about maintaining 
the level of service and meeting users’ aspirations, the main problems appear to be around 
maintaining structure, motivation and morale within the very fluid organizational form which the 
OS supports.
4.3 Conclusions from the case studies.
The case studies show a great diversity of uses of OS co-existing in different 
organizations within the time span of the research, as well as a diversity of organizational 
impacts, and of implementation approaches.
4.3.1 Design.
All of the systems studied were at least interdepartmental in scope. This was partly a 
result of deliberate selection, but I did not come across any systems which were confined to a 
single department. BAe and GKN were in a sense the most old-fashioned, administrative support 
systems in the traditional ’office automation’ sense, with little or no integration with other 
systems or between sites. However, both systems provided support for internal process 
integration in the form of group working on projects which had strategic significance, the 
putting together of contract proposals and take-over bids. All but two of the cases had or were 
working towards organization-wide OS, most of which were national and some international or 
global in scope in at least some respects (communications). KFS and the Education Department 
provided good examples of the use of OS for various forms of internal and external integration, 
which were rather easier to see than in enormous companies such as IBM and Digital.
Linkages between the office system and data processing and other existing systems were 
common. Managers and professionals as well as secretaries and typists were included in all the 
systems, and compared with earlier research, more of the former were actually using them. The 
extent to which managers did so varied considerably between cases.
4.3.2 Objectives.
Efficiency and cost-displacement were mentioned as one of the objectives in nearly every 
case, but in none was it the only one. Effectiveness was also referred to as an objective in nearly 
every case. In many, investment in office systems had to be cost-justified but that was not seen 
as the main reason for introducing them. In about half the cases, there was a clear strategic 
focus. The financial services organizations in particular were heavily engaged in business process
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integration and boundary-spanning customer service/delivery, as part of their business strategies. 
In three others, strategic benefits ’emerged’ after the OS was introduced.
4.3.3 Effects on jobs.
Effects on jobs were still greatest at clerical and secretarial level, both in terms of 
reduction in numbers and changes in work role. In some cases, their jobs had been enhanced, 
with more variety and satisfaction, in others their situation had worsened in some respects. There 
was little evidence of equivalent impacts on the jobs of managers and professionals. An 
exception was IBM and Digital, where managers were using the system to do some of the work 
formerly done for them by secretaries (which they now did not have), and there was a drive to 
control or reduce the number of managerial and professional staff as well. OS involve complex 
alterations in manager/secretary relationships and roles, which are worked out in quite different 
ways in different contexts. The unionised government departments appear to have paid the most 
attention to job design issues, but even here the outcomes were not all in the same direction 
(enhanced jobs).
4.3.4 Effects on organization structure.
Most of the organizations which were using OS strategically were also making major 
organizational (structural) change. This was clearly the case with the three financial 
organizations, where the OS was used for business process redesign. In BLT and KFS, 
organization change both preceded (and assisted) IT implementation, and further changes were 
resulting from the presence of the technology. In the public sector organizations, organizational 
change accompanied the introduction of the OS (ie. both were impelled by the same reasons) and 
some changes were made because of the OS. In the major computer manufacturers, the OS was 
seen as a means of achieving organizational change. The relationship between OS and 
organizational change was therefore very complex, and certainly not one of straightforward cause 
and effect. The entire issue of the effects of IT/OS on jobs and organization structure is 
discussed in detail in the following chapter, in the context of a theoretical framework for 
understanding the relationships.
4.3.5 Implementation approaches.
Implementation could be characterised as top-down or at least top-led in every case, 
which must have to do with the integrated nature of the systems. Within this, the degree to 
which adoption and use were voluntary or mandatory varied greatly. KFS provides a nice 
example of leadership and subtle coercion of managers, accompanied by a gradual and 
experimental approach to user needs which was very successful. The systems which were seen as 
strategic were mandatory and were also introduced fairly rapidly, while others were much more 
gradual and laissez-faire. Clear business need and a sense of urgency obviously affected the 
implementation approach adopted.
Big, organization-wide projects were phased in because of their size, and usually piloted.
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Formal methods of user participation were a conspicuous feature in only the government 
departments, but that is not to say that users had no influence in the other cases, especially where 
adoption and use were voluntary. Guimares (1993) found that some users have influence without 
actual formal participation. As OS increasingly include users who are more powerful because of 
their roles (such as some managers and professionals) we can expect that this will be the case and 
that we will have to distinguish not only between participation with and without influence, but 
influence with and without participation. In several organizations, of which IBM and the TA 
were good examples, there was a clear perception of a need to ’market’ the office system to users 
in general, and in the TA, to coax powerful users on board. These and other implementation 
issues will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Six.
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Chapter Five 
The Interaction of Technology and Organization 
A Process Model of Implementation
Introduction
So far we have considered developments in office systems technology and its 
organizational uses, in other words, the what and the why. In this chapter and the next, we 
consider in more depth how the desired organizational benefits can be achieved. This involves 
developing first, a conceptual process model of implementation, and second, a prescriptive 
approach based on it. In so doing, we move away from the exclusively rationalist perspective 
which underlies technology-strategy analysis towards a more interpretivist and political 
perspective (Kling, 1980; Reed, 1989). As Brunsson (1985) has shown, the rationality of 
decision-making differs from the rationality of action.
The interaction between technology and organization during implementation is one of the 
main determinants of IS success or failure (Mohrman and Lawler, 1984; DeLone and McLean, 
1992). By surveying the literature on the effects of IT in organizations, we come to a better 
understanding of the implementation process and the relationship between technology and 
organization, on which to base a prescriptive approach. Also, we have seen that the more 
strategic uses of office systems require concomitant organizational change, such as restructuring 
of departmental relationships and job redesign, and that one of the strategic uses of IT is to 
redesign organizations to make them more responsive to the environment. For this reason as well, 
we need to examine the relationship between information technology and organizational change.
5.1 Perspectives on technology and organizations.
In dealing with this question, we inevitably have to consider how to conceptualise the 
significant dimensions of technology and of organizations (Payne et al., 1990). Another issue is 
how to perceive the nature of the link between the two, which tends to determine the kinds of 
effects which are looked for (Crowston and Malone, 1987). In examining the implications of IT 
and OS for organizational change, we are concerned with the possible effects on organizational 
structure and the design of jobs within organizations. Apart from this, the concepts of 
organization and technology will be deliberately left vague for the moment, and the focus will be 
on the nature of the link.
The effects of IT on organizations have been discussed from two main perspectives which 
Markus and Robey (1988) call the technological imperative and the organizational imperative. 
These refer respectively to the organizational impacts and the organizational uses of technology. 
The term ’organizational impacts’ implies that technology is a causal factor, an external force 
which produces direct changes in organizations (Figure 5.1a). The organizational imperative on 
the other hand emphasises the flexibility of technology and the ability of designers and managers 
to employ it in the service of organizational goals and information-processing needs (Figure
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5.1b). These assumptions underly all discussion of the strategic use of IT. The third and more 
novel perspective discussed by Markus and Robey is the ’emergent’ or processual perspective, in 
which outcomes are seen to emerge from a process of interaction between technology and 
organization (Figure 5.1c). I will argue that this perspective both fits the evidence and provides a 
framework for developing a model of implementation. The variant of this perspective which I 
will develop is the introduction of technology as a mutual structuring of technology and 
organization.
5.2 Technological impacts.
The impact of IT on organization structure is a well-established field of IS research 
(Culnan, 1986), dating at least from Leavitt and Whisler’s influential 1958 Harvard Business 
Review article, ’Management in the 90s’. Despite a large body of empirical research and the 
undying fascination of the subject of technological impacts, there is little support for a strictly 
technological determinist point of view. Impacts have been found to be contingent on a number 
of different factors, such as organization size, environment, culture, and task routineness 
(Zeffane, 1989; Robey, 1977; Storey, 1987; Robey, 1981; Klein, 1986; Kling and Iacono, 1989). 
In a review of research on the effects of information technology use on organizations, Swanson 
(1987) listed a string of contradictory views and empirical results on each of the different 
dimensions of departmentalisation, hierarchy, span of control, functional differentiation, 
centralisation, and routinisation.
Much research on the effects of computers on work has focused on the issues of deskilling 
and routinisation. Such effects have not been found to be inevitable; nor has job enhancement. 
Widely different effects on jobs have been observed when the same technology has been 
introduced into different organizations or different parts of the same organization (Appelbaum 
and Albin, 1989; Land et al., 1983; LeQuesne, 1988; Barley 1986.) A study by Kraut, Dumais 
and Koch (1989) for example found that ’identical hardware and software within a single 
company can have positive effects on one job and negative effects on another, and can even have 
mixed effects on different aspects of the same job’.
To some extent the problems are methdological. Fry (1982), summarising the research on 
technology and structure from Woodward through 1980, attributed the confusion in the field to 
the different conceptualisations of technology and structure, the different levels of analysis and 
types of measures employed in empirical research. But the methdological problem may be more 
fundamental. Impact research is very often based on variance analysis, in which some level of 
technology use is correlated with organizational attributes such as locus of decision-making, use 
of formal means of control, and departmentalisation (e.g. Zeffane, 1989). Variance theories are 
concerned with explaining why things happen, in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (if 
X then Y). Research based on such theories attempts to measure presumed causal and dependent 
variables, and to predict levels of outcomes from levels of causal variables. According to Mohr
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(1982), research which is variance-theoretic in form is inappropriate in much organization
research because it rests ultimately on the notion of efficient causality, and is not concerned with
the time ordering and interaction effects among contributing variables. Swanson (1987) also calls
for a research methodology which is sensitive to time ordering, the interdependence of variables,
and to unique situational and historical context; ie. processual research:
What may be needed ... are studies imbedded in more general theoretical contexts, which 
absorb the research artifacts, viz. causal precedence attributions and levels of analysis, 
with which we routinely work....this suggests that determinants of information system use 
[managerial choice, strategy - FN] must be integrated with effects, and that individual, 
organizational and market contexts be jointly incorporated within individual research 
studies, (p. 199)
Another problem with impact research, especially in its variance form, is that it attempts 
to isolate the effects of technology on the different structural dimensions of organizations, rather 
than seeing the latter as holistically related. There is a straining for consistency among the 
dimensions which results in organizational configurations or a limited number of discrete types 
(Mintzberg, 1979; Miller and Mintzberg, 1983). Consequently, organizational changes tend to be 
from one configuration to another rather than along one dimension at a time (Miller and Friesen,
1982).
The third problem with impact research is the way technology and organization are
conceptualised. Both technology and organization structure are human artifacts, and the
relationship between them is mediated by human beings with views as to their purposes. The
role of human volition and meaning, including managerial intention, is often overlooked in
impact research (partly because of the difficulty of researching it using survey methods?)
Orlikowski and Robey (1991) have criticised the purely ’objectivist’ approach to both technology
and organization structure:
By presuming that technology is an object capable of having an impact on social systems, 
such research treats both technology and organization structures as objects. The metaphor 
of impact (one object colliding with another) implies objectivist assumptions, and where 
computers are treated as discrete objects capable of causing impacts, researchers will tend 
to find such impacts. The objectivist approach thus overstates the importance of 
technology’s material characteristics and ignores the social interpretations that may modify 
the impact of particular software systems or hardware configurations.
An adequate model of the relationship between technology and structure should not omit the 
rational choices of designers and decision-makers. Technology involves a plan and knowledge 
how to use it (Davies, Dawson and Francis, 1973); structural change and system design are both 
ways in which management and designers attempt to respond to organizational problems or 
opportunities (Bjom-Anderson et al., 1986); there were a number of examples in the case studies 
(BLT, KFS, IBM, DEC).
However, it is important to recognise that the introduction of new technology does not 
mean no change; technology has impacts at least in the minimal sense that it opens up new
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options for management (Storey, 1987), and for the workforce the introduction of new technology 
can be an occasion for redefinition of work roles (Barley, 1986, 1990). Clark et al. (1988) have 
attempted to rescue the concept of technology and to show that some technologies do have 
implications for work roles, although even with apparently quite determinate technologies, there 
is still ’design space’ in which organizational participants can influence impacts on jobs (see pp.
83 and 85 below).
5.3 The managerial perspective.
The ’organizational imperative’ is closely related to the strategic use of IT discussed in the 
preceding chapter. This approach is strongly rationalist, prescriptive and emphasises the element 
of managerial choice. It assumes that the technology itself has few inherent organizational 
implications, and that impacts, if any, can be controlled. The characteristics of computer 
technology are seen as a means of achieving managerial goals which are desirable in themselves.
If information technology is not deterministic, but can be used to support almost any kind of 
organizational structure or strategy, the management task is to decide on the appropriate strategy 
and design the structure and technology to suit it. In the strategic planning view, strategy drives 
both structure and technology (Figure 5.2). Outcomes, including impacts, thus depend on 
managerial intention, and the organizational parameters are assumed to be known. Therefore 
there is an assumption that both the goals of the system and the means-end relationships for 
achieving them are well understood. In the case of office systems, neither assumption is usually 
justified.
There is considerable research evidence to support the view that management’s intention 
does have a significant, if not all-powerful, role in shaping the effects of technology at job level. 
Managerial assumptions and strategic choice help determine the different outcomes which arise 
from the use of the same technology in different settings (Robey, 1981; Applebaum and Albin, 
1989). The nature of the choice presented to managers concerning the effects of technology on 
work and organization is usually phrased in terms of a polarity of outcomes, such as Zuboffis 
distinction (1988) between ’automate’ and ’informate’. It has been neatly presented in graphic 
form by Bjom-Andersen (1986) (Figure 5.3). Friedman (1977) has shown how these job design 
alternatives are related to the different control strategies which managers may pursue with 
computerisation: direct control vs. responsible autonomy. These correspond to the choice which 
Walton (1989) presents, between organizational strategies of compliance and commitment.
Empirical evidence supports the existence of these alternatives. Kling and Iacono (1989), for 
example, found that desk-top computerisation could be used to support either ’flexible’ or 
’regimented’ work groups. Appelbaum and Albin’s (1989) study in the insurance industry showed 
that the technology could be used to support either ’algorithmic’ or ’robust’ work designs - 
routinisation, centralisation, and more control versus increased organizational adaptiveness. In 
the latter cases, the skills and understanding of clerical workers were enhanced and more
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decision-making was delegated to them. We have seen in the export insurance case study that 
clerical workers, finding that their computerised work had become algorithmic, were seeking job 
redesign to make it more robust, the Account Manager idea. I represent a rational model of 
managerial choice including the alternatives in Figure 5.4.
The circumstances which determine how an organization should choose a job design and 
control strategy have been discussed to some extent in Chapter 3. While it has always been 
acknowledged that some organizations in some environments (e.g. those providing commodities) 
require a strategy of cost control and compliance, strategies based on commitment, ’informating’, 
and enhanced jobs are usually regarded as contributing most to the organizational flexibility 
required by environmental turbulence. There is also a strong implication among a number of 
academic and management writers that the nature of new technology itself requires flexible work 
organization. Osterman for example (1991, p. 242) argues that IT has characteristics which ’shift 
the cost-benefit calculus in favor of a particular configuration of human relations and job design 
characteristics’. McLoughlin and Clark (1988) quote Buchanan:
Sophisticated, flexible, expensive equipment needs sophisticated, flexible, expensive
people to operate it. The effective and safe operation of these new technologies requires
very careful attention to work design.
Similarly, a review of studies of CAPM implementation by Tranfield and Smith (1990) concluded 
that full exploitation of the benefits of the integrative characteristics of the technology requires a 
shift from co-ordination by bureaucratic rules to co-ordination by ideology. The difference is 
paradigmatic. But the idea that computer technology demands a particular configuration of work 
and organization could be a return to technological determinism, and does not fit the available 
evidence thus far, which is of a great variety of work arrangements (Fleck et al., 1990). Whether 
this condition is temporary, until the required organizational forms are discovered and 
disseminated, or more permanent, is impossible to say at this point.
In any case, the managerial perspective concedes to decision-makers a considerable degree 
of freedom to use technology to achieve their strategic aims. While the objectives of decision­
makers are obviously an important influence, it is one which can be overstated. To the extent 
that they perceive change in straightforwardly technological terms, they relinquish control over 
the social and organizational aspects. In practice, it is often difficult to discern a coherent overall 
management strategy in technology implementation; there is rather a series of managerial sub­
strategies at different stages of the process which may contradict each other (McLoughlin et al. , 
1985). Where implementation is delegated to line managers, who are more concerned with 
control, the tendency is towards deskilling and loose coupling (McLoughlin and Clark, 1988). In 
no way can ’strategists’ afford to underestimate the political and other potential difficulties of 
implementation.
5.4 The 'impact ’ o f office systems on organization structure.
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Much of the literature on the impacts of office systems should be seen in the light of the 
perspectives discussed so far. Some of the impact literature attempts to describe the effects 
which technology has already had on organizations, but much of it involves speculation about the 
impact which technology is likely to have if it is used by management to promote particular aims 
(Huber and McDaniel, 1986; Huber, 1990), but for which there is little evidence so far. These 
two rather different perspectives are often confused with each other and with a focus on 
unintended as against intended consequences, or technological impacts from below vs. outcomes 
consciously chosen by senior management on behalf of the organization. What we find in looking 
at the organizational impacts of OS is an enormous gap between the empirical findings on what 
has happened and the theoretical speculation about the potential of the technology to change 
organizations
5.4.1 The theory.
Basing their work on the organization theory of Thompson, Galbraith, and Perrow, 
Wainwright and Francis (1984) anticipated very considerable organizational consequences of the 
use of office automation. They believed that the technology enabled desired structural changes to 
take place, but the outcome would depend upon managerial intention. The choice followed the 
automate/informate dichotomy. OS allowed more flexible structures, more skill, discretion and 
autonomy - or on the other hand, more centralisation of control and less autonomy; more flexible 
structures - more reciprocal interdependence, co-ordination by mutual adjustment; or centralised 
structures - more pooled interdependence, co-ordination by standardisation. However, they 
found very little evidence of such changes in either direction in the four organizations they 
studied.
According to Olson and Lucas (1982), the critical component of OS in terms of 
organizational impact was its communications function. Using a mixture of theory and research 
evidence, they hypothesised that OS would facilitate and increase communications between 
departments; increase the span of control; make interdepartmental definition of boundaries less 
rigid; increase the organization’s ability to accommodate to structural change, by increasing 
information processing capabilities. Long (1987) predicted that the second phase of office 
technology would allow ’dramatic changes in structure and functioning’ including smaller and 
flatter organizations and greater use of matrix forms and adhocracies. The extent of 
centralisation and decentralisation would depend on the management approach; OS could be used 
either to increase control or ’create the conditions necessary for self-control by freeing employees 
from routine and tedious work, and pushing decision-making even further down the 
organization’.
5.4.2 The evidence.
As referred to above, most of the evidence of impacts has been at the job level and 
among secretarial and clerical workers. The NCC Survey of the impact of office technology in
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the U.K. and U.S. (1986), for example, noted much evidence of change in secretarial duties and 
responsibilities, but ’a distinct dearth of fundamental changes in organization structure’ due to 
the use of office automation. Those changes that occurred were mostly physical, ie. changes in 
either the architecture or organization of offices on site, or changes in the location where 
activities are carried out (e.g. away from the typing pool). The effects on centralisation and 
decentralisation were contradictory and confused. The European Foundation (1986) similarly 
found ’preference is given to those systems which do not involve organizational changes in the 
company’.
In the past, the lack of organizational impact or change could be explained in terms of the 
immaturity of the technology, its lack of integrative capacity. The case study research carried 
out for the current project, which covers a more advanced range of systems, also shows that on 
the whole few of these organizations had a strategy of deliberate organizational change with the 
introduction of OS, except for reduction in secretarial staff and administrative costs, which has 
been achieved in most cases. This is supported by the I AM/Touche Ross study and Gunson and 
Boddy’s research (1989) on the use of networks in Scottish organizations, which also indicate that 
there has been little organizational change. In my research, there was more change in jobs where 
OS were exploited for strategic ends, as in the financial organizations, where OS have been 
applied to primary processes with direct effects on customer service, and in the two multinational 
computer manufacturers, where the office systems are being exploited in order to facilitate 
organizational redesign or transformation, and have significant intended impacts. The dynamic 
nature of the industry, the prevalence of computer awareness, and the desire to provide products 
and a demonstration for customers have all played a role in this. Otherwise, organizational 
change has often been carried out before or independently of the introduction of OS (as at BLT). 
The Training Agency illustrates, perhaps in extreme form, some of the institutional obstacles to 
exploiting the kinds of organizational possiblities the technology permits.
On the whole, management do not appear to pursue any consistent organizational 
strategies when introducing office systems, even integrated ones. Most of the evidence on the 
organizational impacts of office systems points to their having been implemented within the 
existing management paradigm, and so organizational change has occurred more by accident than 
by design. (Gunson and Boddy do observe however that one of the organizations in their sample 
had cut out a layer of management after eight years.) I suggest that the reasons that OS have not 
been exploited more for organizational change involve both the ’what’ of change and the ’how’ of 
change. The technologies and organizational designs of the future are too different, too difficult 
for many managers to grasp. There is lack of understanding of technology on the part of top 
management, lack of vision, fear of organizational change, pursuit of the wrong objectives 
including cost-justifying the investment (Keen, 1991). The ’how’ of change concerns knowing 
how to proceed, how to handle the problem of implementation. The two are closely related, as
81
Mohrman and Lawler have pointed out: third-order feedback means that with the use of 
technology, you get gamma change, that is a change in the goals and the uses to which technology 
is put. Technology and organization interact and provide new implications for strategy. Hence 
the importance of organizational learning, of gaining experience through the use of technology, 
and of developing an infrastructure and a level of organizational use as a basis for further and 
unforeseen developments.
The nature of these problems also implies a research strategy. Process theories are likely 
to provide better models of the relationship between IT and organization structure, and to be able 
to encompass the critical element of implementation, than variance theories.
5.5 The processual perspective.
Markus and Robey (1988) distinguish a third, ’emergent’ perspective, in which outcomes 
are seen as determined neither by technology nor by the organization (and its management), but 
emerge from the interaction between the two (Figure 5.1c). Process theories are concerned with 
how things occur, in terms of necessary but not sufficient conditions and probabilistic processes, 
ie. how a chain of events leads to an outcome. Markus and Robey, along with Rogers (1984) 
suggest that process theories are more appropriate than variance theories to impact research, 
where the nature of the implementation process is known to be even more important to the 
outcome than the quality of the technology (Mohrmann and Lawler, 1984).
There has been a convergence in recent years on the idea that the outcomes of the 
introduction of new technology are not determinate but are the result of a process which varies in 
each situation. IS research has shown that the implementation process is an important factor in 
determining outcomes, both with regard to system ’success’ and impact on jobs. There is also a 
growing tendency in management studies to think in terms of process: organization (Weick, 1969; 
Mohr, 1982), structure (Ranson et al., 1980’; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980; Robey, 1991), culture 
(Riley, 1983), management control (Hopper and Berry, 1982), and management itself (Reed,
1989) have all been seen as emergent - the result (at a given point of time) of an ongoing process. 
In organization theory there has been a conventional distinction between structure as a system of 
roles and process as a stream of activities (Robey, 1991), but as John Freeman has said (1978):
One researcher’s structure... is another’s process... All structures are the end result, or the
chosen moment, of a process, (p. 341)
Studies of the introduction of different technologies, in different contexts, and starting 
with quite different theoretical assumptions, have found that effects on jobs and organizations 
are the result of an interaction between organization and technology, and not the direct 
consequence either of any particular managerial strategy or of the technology itself. In Britain, 
much empirical work has sprung from attempts to test Braverman’s thesis that new technology is 
used by management primarily in order to deskill, fragment and control the labour force in a 
Tayloristic fashion. By now Braverman’s thesis in its original form has largely been discredited
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(Storey, 1985; Friedman, 1987; Hyman, 1987; Reed, 1989), and what has come out of this body of
research is a far more sophisticated understanding of the relationship of technology and
management to work organization, which stresses the non-deterministic character of the process
(Wilkinson, 1983; Storey, 1987; McLoughlin and Clark, 1988; Clark et al., 1988; Fleck et al.,
1990). Wilkinson (1983) argued that ’the technical and social organization of work can best be
seen as an outcome which has been chosen and negotiated’. He showed how at various stages
decisions had to be made which provided organizational actors, including workers, engineers and
managers, with opportunities to influence outcomes in line with their own objectives (often using
the notions of efficiency and ’one best way’ as ideological weapons to legitimate their social and
political choices). McLoughlin and Clark (1988), reviewing the literature on technological change
and work, noted that technology is introduced in a context of existing organizational
arrangements, and that in the course of interaction during the implementation process, the
original managerial objectives (whatever they may originally have been, to deskill or enhance
jobs) in introducing new technology may well be modified, attentuated, or even reversed by the
actions at ’critical junctures’ of lower level managers pursuing their own sub-strategies, and staff
members acting individually or collectively. Clark et al. (1988), in their empirical study of the
introduction of new telephone exchange equipment, showed that even with a more determinate
technology than IS, there was considerable ’design space’ after system selection in which
significant choices could be made which affected impacts on work and organization. The
primary characteristics of technology (which they call the engineering system) and its appearance
influenced the choices which could be made; its strongest impact was at the level of work tasks
and skills, much less so at the level of the division of labour and supervision. However, because
of the behaviour of organizational actors at critical junctures, the outcomes were not necessarily
those intended by designers or by senior managers in the early stages of the process. Fleck,
Webster and Williams carried the analysis back a step further to the models of work organization
underlying the original conception and promotion of various technologies, and also found that no
particular work outcomes were implied even by integrated technologies like CAPM (see also
Tranfield and Smith, 1990). ’Even where there appear to be clear-cut principles underlying the
design of a particular technology, the implementation of these has not conformed to the
stereotyped prediction which appeared in the early literature’. CAPM for example did not
necessarily bring about organizational integration.
in all our cases the apparent technological trajectory petered out, failed, became 
fragmented or was diverted or reversed ... as soon as it is adopted and implemented within 
industry it becomes subject to a much wider range of forces, all of which operate within 
the context of constant shifts in economic and political conditions in society at large.
These forces in the implementation process act on the offerings of promoters and 
designers. This interaction serves to reconstitute technologies... which are then again 
modified in response to the industrial conditions which they meet (p. 637).
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They noted that in every case, CAPM systems had to be customised to meet the needs of the 
organizations into which they were introduced. This is the ’dimensioning’ or detailed design to 
suit the particular workplace or application discussed by McLoughlin and Clark, which provides 
occasions for structuring. Dorothy Leonard-Barton (1988), examining the implementation of a 
large number of different technologies, found that ’re-invention’ is necessary because technology 
never exactly fits the user environment, it is ’misaligned’ in various ways: original specifications, 
stage of knowledge in production process, the delivery system, performance criteria, cost/benefit 
at different levels.
These misalignments can be corrected by altering the technology or changing the 
environment - or both... Because this mutual adaptation process is interactive and 
dynamic, technology may determine structure or vice versa, depending upon when the 
relationship is observed.
Hence ’recursive adaptation’ between technology and organization occurs in small or large cycles. 
The latter involve ’strategic change’, e.g. the alteration of performance criteria and reward 
systems throughout the organization. Such adaptation may be either beneficial or detrimental to 
the organization as a whole.
In research specifically on information systems, a perspective has also developed in which 
outcomes or impacts are seen as the result of a complex process of interaction between IT and the 
organization:
organizations introducing technology are complex systems slowly changing over time.
New technology is but one perturbation around which the system adjusts. Thus both 
managers modify some of the goals they had in introducing technology when they start to
see some of its effects, and users of the technology adapt it to their previous work
procedures, as well as adapting their work procedures to it (Kraut et al., 1989, p. 237).
we view desktop computerization as a complex social and technical intervention since a 
user of desktop computing interacts with the social dimensions of the computing 
environment and work arrangements, as well as with the equipment. This appproach is 
derived from our... model of computerization which views computerization as dependent 
on mixes of equipment and social practices which develop with a history in a particular 
social setting’ (Kling and Iacono, 1989, p. 342).
There is considerable evidence that the implementation process is highly political, with many 
parties - specialists and users as well as managers - pursuing their own interests as far as they can
(Newman and Rosenberg, 1985; Markus, 1983; Willcocks and Mason, 1987). Technological
innovation creates uncertainty and possible new bases of power or sources of conflict (Pettigrew, 
1973). The sheer unpredictability of the process of introducing information systems sets limits on 
managerial choice and leads to all manner of unintended outcomes (Barley, 1986; Kling and 
Iacono, 1989; Newman and Robey, 1990).
A given IS can thus be seen as the result of a stream of decisions, non-decisions and 
accidents, a mixture of the conscious goals and strategies of individuals and groups, compromises
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resulting from their interactions, and constraints outside their control. The impacts on 
organization structure are likewise the consequence of a series of decisions and interactions 
among different interest groups or actors in different roles within the organization, and of chance 
occurrences including external events (Markus and Robey, 1988). The ’emergent’ perspective on 
the relationship between technology and organization consequently emphasises its interactive, 
two-way character - both can be changed as a result of the interaction. No consistent ’impacts’ 
can be found because the relationship is non-deterministic, with the outcome both for the 
organization and the technology emerging from interaction among various stakeholders during 
system development and implementation. The meanings which they attribute to the situation also 
affect outcomes. The process of implementation itself is particularly important, and intervenes 
between managerial intentions and actual outcomes. Figure 5.5 is my model of the mutual 
structuring of technology and organization as an emergent process.
Another way of looking at the issue is in terms of the impacts which organizations have 
on information systems (Jones, 1990; LeQuesne, 1988; Noble and Newman, 1993). It has long 
been recognised that these impacts occur, but they have usually been seen in terms of individual 
user ignorance, resistance to change, or ’politics’, not in terms of a misfit between organization 
and technology. The concept of ’organizational invalidity’ (Ginzberg, 1980; Markus and Robey,
1983) went some way towards recognising organizational impact. Politics does not emerge from 
nowhere, it is shaped by existing organizational realities.
At this point we have to consider what we mean by technology. Clark et al. (1988) 
defined technology as an engineering system having primary and secondary characteristics. The 
primary characteristics consist of the system principles and their overall configuration, and their 
physical realisation in hardware and software. Once such a system has been selected, the ’design 
space’ available for modification of the technology is limited. Different technologies obviously 
vary in the extent to which they can be adapted but most have secondary characteristics which 
are alterable. The development or customisation of IS software in-house affords far greater 
opportunity for modification than the telephone exchange technology discussed in detail by 
Clark. Information systems are a particularly flexible form of technology, and there are many 
opportunities for the organization to impact on system design, including:
1) the initial decision regarding the choice of which technology to use, which
may reflect different managerial motives (Wilkinson, 1983) and political interests (Pettigrew, 
1973);
2) the design process itself (LeQuesne, 1988). The systems development process is usually 
extended, and genuine user involvement is an opportunity for organizational interests to shape 
design. Users or their representatives are most likely to influence the eventual form of the 
system in a manner consistent with their perceptions of desirable organizational outcomes (Kraut, 
Dumais and Koch, 1989).
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3) the responses of users to installed technology (Wilkinson, 1983).
It is just at such critical junctures that individuals, acting in their organizational roles, are able to 
adapt technology to the existing structure.
In conclusion, both organization structure and technology as embedded in an organization 
are the outcomes of a process over time which is not deterministic, exclusively rational or 
exclusively political. The most useful model of the relationship between technology and 
organization is one of mutual structuring, in which features of the technology, the pre-existing 
organizational context, managerial choice and action, and the choices and actions of other 
organizational actors also have a role. Here I build on the previous model to produce a more 
developed emergent model of implementation. (Figure 5.6), which is explained more fully below.
A basic process model includes the following elements; a set of antecedent conditions, a 
probabilistic process, and outcomes (Mohr, 1982). In the case of IT/OS implementation, the 
antecedent conditions are the outer (environmental) and the inner (organizational) contexts 
(Pettigrew, 1988). These explain the why of change, and lead to the content (the what of change) 
and the process over time (the how of change). The outer context includes both general strategic 
contingencies (conditions in world markets) and contingencies specific to the product market 
(Child, 1987). The inner context includes size, structure, culture (Pettigrew, 1988), managers’ 
interests derived from their position in the organization, and managerial meaning systems (Storey, 
1987). Another level is that of the existing organization of tasks, the technologies in use, and the 
existing discretion of users (Kling and Iacono, 1989).
Managerial goals concern the outcomes desired both from the technology and for the 
organization, including the strategy of control, and the design decisions which more or less follow 
from those (depending on the uncertain process of communication between managers and 
specialists). Senior management with specialist advice makes a choice regarding the technology, 
that is its primary features and the assumptions built into those. Senior management also makes 
decisions about the implementation strategy to be followed, and the social interventions 
accompanying technical change, including user involvement and control (Kling and Iacono, 1989). 
The distance and pace of change are also important features of the implementation process over 
which there is some choice.
Once the process has been initiated, other stakeholders attempt to influence it according 
to their perceptions. Orlikowski and Gash (1991) have shown how the technological frames or 
interpretative schemes regarding IT and its use may differ among these various parties.
Implementation takes place over time through a series of stages. A conventional scheme 
of stages consists of initiation, design and development, installation, and institutionalisation. This 
is usually thought of in linear terms, but may in fact be iterative. These stages are a convenient 
starting point for indicating the critical junctures at which significant decisions affecting the 
future of the system have to be made.
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Figure 5.6
Finally, actual outcomes can be observed and compared to the intended outcomes. The 
outcomes of particular interest are the perceptions of success among the various stakeholders, and 
alterations in work and organization.
5.6 Structuration.
A purely interpretative approach to information systems fails to take sufficiently into 
account the constraint on actors exercised by institutionalised patterns of behaviour and the 
distribution of power and resources. While actors create their social world, they never start with 
a blank slate. Structure is the outcome of a process of interaction at a given point in time, and 
partly dependent on the interpretations of actors, but it is also a condition for and constraint on 
further action. In the structuring of technology and organization, outcomes for both emerge from 
their interaction, but occur within a context of prior understandings, meanings, and constraints. 
Structuration theory provides an additional layer of depth to our understanding of the interaction 
between technology and organization.
Giddens’ theory of structuration is one of the most recent attempts to overcome the 
dichotomy in sociology between structural-functionalist and interactionist perspectives, between 
an emphasis on the structural constraints on action, as exemplified by ’social facts’ in Durkheim, 
and structures as creations of conscious self-reflecting actors. (Note also in sociology Van den 
Berghe, 1963; Berger and Luckman, 1966; in organization theory Benson, 1977, Astley and Van 
de Ven, 1983). Giddens attempts to show that existing structures are the conditions for processes 
to occur, at the same time that they are recreated, sustained or modified by these processes. An 
analogy is language. Without its pre-existence we cannot speak; it is therefore a condition of 
action. When we speak a language, we help to perpetuate it, but also, languages change over time 
through the accumulation of successive small modifications by many actors.
In organization theory and in sociology, organization structure and social structure have 
usually been conceived as more or less enduring patterns of social relations which carry an 
implication of external constraint on individuals. Giddens uses the term structure in a different 
sense from this; what others have defined as structures he calls social systems. He has 
incorporated the structuralist (in linguistic theory) idea of structure as an underlying code which 
is evidenced only in conduct and in the mind. Structures are defined as sets of rules and 
resources and are properties of social systems; structuration is the way a social system is 
reproduced by the application of rules and resources. He also discusses structural sets, 
structuring properties and structuring principles but the differences become quite abstruse and 
are not really necessary for our purposes.
The aspect of structuration theory which has drawn most attention in relation to IT is the 
duality of structure:
the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both 
medium, and outcome of the reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously 
into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and ’exists’ in the generating
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moments of this constitution’ (Giddens, 1979, p. 5.)
While Giddens is concerned with the conditions for system reproduction, his theory (unlike 
Parsons’ for example) contains the ever-present possibility of change, because agents ’could 
always do otherwise’. He criticises the idea that structures only constrain individuals, pointing 
out that structures also enable and that the persistence of structures is entirely dependent on 
individuals, because they exist only as memory traces or as instantiated as social practices.
Giddens sees the system level and the level of interaction as linked by interpretative 
schemes, resources, and norms. These ’modalities’ of structuration are ’the central dimensions of 
the duality of structure in the constitution of interaction’. That means they are drawn on by 
actors in their interaction but are at the same time the means by which structure is reproduced. 
Thus modalities operate between two levels of analysis, the institutional and the strategic action 
of individuals. They can be analytically distinguished but are never found empirically separately 
from one another and tend to be mutually reinforcing. In any interaction, actors draw on all 
three modalities (see Figure 5.7). Interpretative schemes are cognitive, relating to the common 
stock of knowledge, ’the world taken for granted’, and concern the communication of meaning at 
the level of action. At the system level these are structures of signification. Facility can be seen 
as power, which comprehends both transformative capacity and relations of autonomy and 
dependence, or as resources, which provide actors with the ability to realise their intentions. 
However, in so doing they reinforce existing structures of domination. Interaction is also 
governed by norms, concerning the sanctioning of conduct, rights and obligations. Norms derive 
from, and through use of moral sanctions based on them, reinforce systems of legitimation.
These three modalities constitute the process of structuration.
Structure is therefore an unacknowledged condition of action in Giddens’ theory of 
human agency (Figure 5.8), and is at the same time an unintended consequence of action. This is 
consistent with functionalist sociology. But Giddens also emphasises the knowledgeablity of 
actors, who ’know’ a great deal about the conditions and consequences of what they do (’practical 
consciousness’), without necessarily being able to express it (’discursive consciousness’). They are 
continually engaged in the reflexive monitoring of their own actions. Actors’ more or less 
informed intentions therefore must also be taken into account in the analysis of social conduct. 
Here Giddens distinguishes between ’intentions’, ’rationalisations of conduct’ (explanations which 
actors could give if asked after the fact) and ’wants’, recognising these are not always the same.
Before considering how structuration theory has been employed in information systems 
research to deal with the relation between technology and organization, it is useful to digress 
somewhat and see how it has been applied to management and organizations. Giddens’ own 
theory of modem organizations sheds light on the relationship between IT and organizations.
5 .7  Giddens ’ theory o f modem organizations.
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In Giddens’ view, the theory of organizations should be set in the context of a theory of
social organization. Modem legal-rational organizations are a special case of social organization,
which is the bracketing of time and space by social systems.
What, then, is an organization? It is a social system which is able to ’bracket time-space’, 
and which does so via the reflexive monitoring of system reproduction and the 
articulation of discursive ’history’. (Giddens, 1987, p. 153.)
Structuration theory is concerned with social organization as the central problem of sociology, the 
persistence of social systems over time and space, or how the duree of day-to-day life is linked to 
the longueoi institutions. Giddens defines social systems as recurrent social practices, or 
regularised relations of interdependence between individuals or groups. The application of 
discursive knowledge, including social science, to system reproduction and change is an intrinsic 
feature of modem societies. This occurs through organizations and social movements, which ’are 
the two ways in which reflexive appropriation of knowledge about the social life is mobilized in 
the modem world’ (1987, p. 48). Organizations are also characterised by the conscious 
application of knowledge to their own reproduction.
All organizations involve the mobilisation of allocative resources, which is command over 
objects, and administrative or authoritative resources, which is command over persons. (These 
are also the bases of domination, seen as a structural feature of social systems.) But ’no matter 
how complete the power of one individual or group might be over others, resources are always 
available whereby subordinates can reciprocally influence power holders’, by means of 
concealment, withdrawal of co-operation, etc. - this is the dialectic of control which is a 
characteristic of all power relationships.
Information is central to the problem of order. In oral cultures, the past is manifest in the 
present in the form of tradition, in conditions of co-presence (face-to-face interaction). The 
invention of writing was a condition for the development of large states in antiquity because the 
keeping of records systematised social relations across time and space. The invention of printing 
and literacy were similarly conditions for the modem state and political democracy. ’In 
organizations, information is systematically gathered, stored and drawn upon in the stabilizing of 
conditions of social reproduction’ (1987, p. 48). ’A modem organization is a social system in 
which information is regularly used, and its discursive articulation carefully coded, so as to 
maximize control of system reproduction’ (1987, p. 155) Clock time, timetables, the keeping of 
files, accounting, and impersonal bureaucratic rules are means for the co-ordination of social 
activities over ever larger distances of time and space - ie. the extension of social systems in 
space and time. In their turn, the development of electronic media of communication (including 
television and video) have large but uncertain implications for organization in the contemporary 
world (1979, p. 204). (’What writing was to traditional states, printing - and later electronic 
media - are to the modem era’ [1987, p. 149]. ’Electronic media separate presemce in time from
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presence in space, a phenomenon of decisive significance for contemporary forms of collectivity’ 
[1984, p. 203].)
Giddens’ theory of organizations thus provides further theoretical support for the idea 
that new media of communication may lead to new organizational forms, although he does not 
indicate what they might be, except that they will be spatially more encompassing. He implies an 
extension of control: following Foucault he focuses on surveillance by means of the collation and 
retrieval of information and by architecture. He thus focuses excessively on domination at the 
expense of legitimation and the symbolic order, resulting in concentration on particularly 
oppressive forms. Although he notes within organizations the existence of high-trust as well as 
low-trust positions, he does not concern himself with the extension of high-trust forms of control 
to lower level positions or the extent to which electronic media might facilitate this.
5.8 Structuration theory applied to management processes.
Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood (1980) in a very influential article drew on early 
Giddens and Bourdieu in order to explain features of organization structure and how they change 
over time. They attempted to overcome the usual dualism of formal organization structure and 
the ’informal organization’ by conceiving of organization structure as an emergent, including both 
the prescribed framework and interaction. They defined organization structure as ’a complex 
medium of control’ which is produced and reproduced in interaction, yet shapes that interaction. 
’Realised’ organization structures are the product of structuring; ’structuring is a process of 
generating and recreating meanings’ (p. 4).
The aspects of organization on which they focus are provinces of meaning, power, and 
contextual constraints. Provinces of meaning incorporate interpretative schemes (including 
evaluative sentiments, stocks of knowledge, and systems of belief), values and interests. At the 
same time organizations are dependencies of power, which equals the capacity to determine 
outcomes, grounded in differential access to material and structural resources. Power is most 
effective when power holders have institutionalised their provinces of meaning in the structuring 
of interaction. Their analysis is thus far similar to Giddens’ except for combining the realms of 
signification and legitimation in the concept of ’provinces of meaning’. Contextual constraints 
are those of contingency theory, but the environment is also seen as a source of legitimation for 
the organization’s own structural arrangements. The sources of change in organization structure 
are: revised provinces of meaning; inconsistencies and contradictions in values and interests; loss 
of power by the dominant coalition; a major change in context; contradictory contextual 
constraints.
There are also structurationist analyses of managerial work, like Willmott’s (1987), which 
have attempted to show the connections between the day to day activities of managers (the level 
of interaction or strategic conduct) and the framework of capitalist work relations (the 
institutional level). Whittington (1992) criticises Willmott as having still too (economic)
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deterministic a view of managerial agency. He attempts to show how managers ’have a choice’ 
because of 1) the complexity of rules and resources internal to the firm, and 2) their 
participation in other structures outside the firm. Each firm thus can express diverse structural 
principles, and symbolic and cognitive structures of organizations have to be studied in this 
broader social context.
Reed (1989) has borrowed from structuration theory in his conception of management as 
practice - ’a loosely connected set of mechanisms, processes and strategies directed at the 
assembly of other practices concerned with the production of goods, services and ideas’ (p. 25). 
This concept brings together what he sees as the three prevailing perspectives on management, 
the technical (systems rationalism), political (negotiated order) and critical (Marxist/economic 
determinist). Control is central to this practice, and confronts the dilemmas of the dialectic, 
which is that any strategy of control in some way increases the potential for resistance by 
subordinates.
5.9 Structuration theory applied to IT.
Although structuration theory has been employed in IS research in a number of different 
contexts, only Coombs, Knights and Willmott (1992) have so far brought a structurationist 
perspective on management and organization to bear on the ’effects’ of information and 
communications technology (ICT) in organizations. Their concern is with ’how ICT is both 
mediated by, and contributes to, the social construction of the reality of organizations’. They 
analyse this in terms of the concepts of culture, control and competition, which are analogous to 
Ranson’s categories of provinces of meaning, power, and contextual constraints. ’Culture’ 
includes social practices and the meanings which support them, control the exercise of power and 
the process of negotiation, and competition labour and capital markets. ’I.T. (must) be analyzed 
as a phenomenon of the political economy that produces unique mechanisms of power within 
organizations but is itself affected - in terms of its information content and mode of adaptation - 
by particular cultural, control and competitive contingencies that are both internal and external to 
their point of intervention’(p. 59).
On the whole, IS research has followed management studies in focusing on the more 
abstract aspects of structuration theory, largely ignoring institutional context. The focus has been 
on the duality of structure because of its perceived advantage of overcoming unnecessary and 
artificial oppositions between structure and process, individual and organization, action and 
systems perspectives, macro and micro levels of analysis and between qualitative and quantitative 
research (Orlikowski and Robey, 1991). Walsham and Han (ICIS 90) saw structuration as a 
promising framework for studies of IS use and of the institutional character of IS, IS 
development, and IS strategy formation.
Although structuration theory has been applied in rather different ways in empirical 
research in IS, there is a central concern with the implications of technology for organizational
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change. Barley (1986) believed the introduction of new technology could best be seen as an 
occasion for structuring, that is for modification or maintenance of existing organizational 
structures/patterns. He found, like others, that technology could have effects at the immediate 
job level but not necessarily at structural or organizational level. Poole and DeSanctis (1989) 
looked at the implications of structuration theory for group decision support systems - why there 
were different structural outcomes with different groups. Lyytinen and Ngwenyama (1992) 
analysed computer-supported cooperative work from a structurationist perspective. They noted 
that CSCW has emergent properties which could reshape organizational practices. The goals of 
CSCW are likely to be negotiated and renegotiated by actors over time. Attempts to mandate use 
lead to failure; if the work process is dependent on CSCW, it must be legitimated by the meaning 
negotiated for it in the organizational context.
Orlikowski (Organization Science, forthcoming) and Orlikowski and Robey have been 
interested in the role of technology in the structuration process; how technology is constructed by 
and constrains actors. IT is both constituted and constitutive, a product of human action and a 
medium of action. Information technology mediates the relationship between the everyday 
behaviour of organizational actors and the social structure (institutional properties), because it 
affects each of the modalities which link the two levels: interpretative schemes, resources, and 
norms. Orlikowski and Robey developed a framework to show how structuration could be used 
in research on the system development process and on the social consequences of IT use, noting 
that a more adequate model would integrate the relationship between the two. They thus address 
the question of organizational change or the structuring of organizations as well as the structuring 
of technology. (Implementation, in the sense used here, encompasses both system development 
and much of the social consequences, or interaction of technology and organization.)
The interaction between actors and technology can either reinforce or transform structure 
(institutional properties) (Figure 5.9), but Orlikowski and Robey do not indicate the conditions 
under which one or the other outcome is more likely. They are skeptical about claims that the 
use of IT will have the unintended consequence of altering organizational structure. In the two 
examples they give of research which integrates system development and social consequences, the 
effect of organizational use of IT was to reinforce the existing structure. However, they do not 
consider organizational change as a possible result of managerial intention. Similarly, when 
Orlikowski (1991) examined the question of whether the use of IT would transform organizations, 
she found that the use of CASE tools in a software consultancy reinforced the existing system of 
control. In this case, there was no evidence of managerial intention to do otherwise.
Newman and Robey (1991), applying structuration theory to the process of system 
development, conceptualised the latter as a series of episodes or encounters between users and 
analysts which takes place in the context of antecedent conditions, which for them are the prior 
history of relationships between the parties. The outcome of interest was whether the character
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Orlikowski, Organization Science, forthcoming.
of those relationships would change or stay the same as a result of the development of a 
particular system.
Structuration theory has therefore been used in the IS/IT literature to a large extent to 
deepen the emergent model by showing what ’the interaction of technology and organization’ 
means in greater detail, especially the relations between macro and micro level, the level of 
constraints on actors and their interpretation and modification of the situation. The focus of 
interest hovers around the issue of whether organizational change will occur as an unintended 
consequence of the use of the technology, but there is a reluctance or inability to specify the 
conditions under which this outcome will occur.
This problem derives from a central weakness of structuration theory; in insisting that 
actors are both always constrained and always ’could do otherwise’, Giddens makes it impossible 
to indicate the conditions under which actors are likely to change or to preserve systems (Archer, 
1990). This has to do with the character of structuration theory as meta-theory; it contains no 
first-order theories, explanatory generalisations or variables (Gregson, 1989; Stinchcombe 1990), 
nor is it likely that testable propositions can be derived from it. It tends to be used more as a set 
of organizing concepts. The sources of change must be derived from some other body of theory, 
as Ranson et al. do, for example (p. 90 above), and as the organization 
development/organizational transformation literature discussed in the next chapter does.
The implementation of information technology can certainly be seen as a process of 
structuration (there is little in the social world that cannot). But implementation is planned 
change, and in structuration theory as it has been used so far, there is much more emphasis on 
unintended consequences than on planned action. The intendedly rational pursuit of their ends 
by powerful organizational actors (managerial choice) must feature in a structurationist account 
of implementation, as well as the unintended consequences arising from the interaction of 
technology, context, and actors. That is why managerial choice is represented in my emergent 
model (Figure 5.6).
Structuration can provide a framework for understanding the mutual structuring of 
organizations and technology as well as IS implementation as a dynamic process. It is capable of 
encompassing both the ’rational actor’ perspective and the unintended consequences of interaction 
between organizational members at all levels and technology or its development. In other words, 
structuration theory has the potential to integrate successfully the rational-analytic and 
interpretative-political perspectives, the reasons for information systems use and the effects of 
information systems in organizations.
To draw together and expand the discussion so far, implementation can be seen as a
process in which actors of various kinds (any of these may also be users of the technology):
senior management and their advisors 
IT specialists
middle and junior managers and their assistants
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non-managerial staff 
operational staff
other stakeholders (customers, etc.)
have intentions which they strive to carry out through the reflexive monitoring of their own and 
others’ conduct. The intentions themselves may change as a result. Intentions may be highly 
rationalised or actors may not be able to express them at all.
The conditions of their actions are accessible to actors to varying degrees. Most organizational 
actors are highly aware of and able to express reasons for their actions, including internal and 
external constraints. But no actors will be fully conscious of, much less able to articulate, all of 
the conditions of their actions; these are the unacknowledged conditions of action, which include 
unconscious motives and unquestioned assumptions derived from prevailing interpretative 
schemes and normative structures (’culture’, ’provinces of meaning’). Nevertheless, these will 
affect their intentions and the more or less rational interpretations which they give to them. 
Outcomes, for example effects on organizational structure, are a result of the acknowledged and 
unacknowledged conditions of action and the intentions pursued by the various actors, (as well as 
accidents) and may confirm or diverge from the status quo or from the intentions of senior 
management. An unintended consequence may be the reinforcement of the unacknowledged 
conditions of action.
From the point of view of the management of implementation, structuration theory has 
two uses: 1) it draws attention to the constraint exercised on all parties by the existing structures 
of signification, legitimation and domination. The rational perspective emphasises the conditions 
of which actors can be aware, not the assumptions which prevent other things coming into their 
awareness. To become aware of these constraints is the beginning of liberation from them; 2) as 
IT implementation like any organization change is more or less deliberate structuration, what 
occurs at the level of interaction throughout the process is important because it has ultimate 
effects at the institutional level, as well as drawing on that level. The attempt to manage the 
process so as to obtain outcomes which are desirable from the point of view of management, 
involves continual reflexive monitoring and control of the conduct of self and others; it means 
awareness of and attention to what is happening with regard to meanings, norms and resources 
(not just financial, but power as well), all along the way, and the judicial use of authority over 
resources and people as well as the symbol system, to keep the process consistent with desired 
ends. The use of resources is usually well recognised in implementation, but less attention is paid 
to the symbolic and meaning systems.
This account provides the basis for the prescriptive or normative models discussed in the 
next chapter.
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Chapter Six
Implementation Strategies for Integrated Office Systems
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a prescriptive model of implementation, or 
implementation strategy, for integrated office systems, which builds on the descriptive/analytical 
model of the previous chapter. I first review existing approaches to implementation, and show 
how some take account of various features of the emergent model. These are then related to the 
particular problems of implementing integrated office systems.
We have seen that the realisation of strategic goals for OS often depends on changing the 
organization as well as introducing technology. Some authorities believe that the exploitation of 
IT requires change on the scale of organizational transformation, while others regard the 
capabilities of information technology as enabling the kind of major organizational change which 
organizations need to undergo in any case in order to meet the demands of the contemporary 
environment. The association of IT/OS with paradigm shift leads to a consideration of the field 
of organizational transformation, which is concerned with the nature of fundamental 
organizational change and how to implement it. The relation of OS to first- and second-order 
change is discussed, followed by an implementation approach for integrated OS.
6.1 Review o f existing implementation strategies fo r  office systems.
Prescriptive approaches to the introduction of IT are informed to a greater or lesser 
degree by awareness of the complex behavioural implications. Much of the research on IS 
implementation has been concerned with identifying discrete factors leading to success or failure 
(Meredith, 1981; Kwon and Zmud, 1987). As we have seen, the factor or variance approach has 
not been very successful. In the prescriptive literature, these become ’Critical Success Factors’, 
intended to meet the needs of practitioners wanting an immediate guide to introducing new 
technology. Rather than being related coherently, as in a structured approach or methodology, 
success factors are treated for the most part as ’independent events’ (Kwon and Zmud, 1987). 
Hirschheim (1985b) notes that ’many of the postulated solutions are superficial, obvious, or 
both... approaches such as these are less than complete or coherent implementation strategies... 
(they) are a direct consequence of a simplistic notion of organizational change’ (p. 158).
There are also more structured approaches, usually consisting of a set of steps and stages, 
which are intended as practical guides to implementation and are usually addressed to a 
managerial audience. Often based on a wealth of experience and containing many valuable 
insights, they may incorporate some discussion of success or risk factors, but usually represent a 
more coherent view of implementation without necessarily reflecting an underlying theory of 
technological and organizational change. They are more comprehensive than information system 
development methodologies (ISDM) in that they pay far more attention to the rationale for 
investment, the potential and characteristics of technology, and management of the change
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process, but less to system design. In the office systems area, examples are Price (1979) for the 
NCC, the report on the DTI pilots (KMG 1986), Bate, 1987; Johnson and Rice, 1987; Doswell 
(1990), Meyer and Boone (1987); Keen (1983, 1986, 1991).
It is not possible to discuss all of these approaches; in any case there is a great deal of 
duplication. The prescriptive implementation approaches (or methodologies) which I will focus 
on here are those which relate particularly well to the descriptive emergent model of 
implementation presented in the last chapter (Figure 5.6). An adequate implementation strategy 
must take into account the features of the processual model developed above, and as well as 
pursuing organizational goals attempt to control the emergent characteristics, which are:
mutual impacts of technology and organization 
uncertainty regarding outcomes, including impacts 
resistance/adaptation by users 
stakeholder politics
meaning systems and interpretative schemes.
The problems can be paired with the approaches as follows:
Table 6.1
'Emergent' problem
Interaction of technology 
and organization 
Emergence, uncertainty 
Effects of users 
Effects of other stakeholders
Politics
Behavioural issues generally 
Meaning systems
Implementation Strategy 
Sociotechnical systems/design 
Incrementalism
User involvement/participative design 
Soft Systems Methodology, stakeholder 
analysis and involvement
Soft Systems Methodology, incrementalism 
political implementation approach 
Organizational Development 
Management of meaning
The managerial choice perspective discussed in Chapter 5 rests heavily on the rationalist 
assumption that the goals of the system and the means of achieving those goals can be well 
understood in advance. But we have also seen that the goals themselves change, and that the 
process of reaching them is fraught with uncertainty. The implementation strategies which deal 
with emergence can be characterised as process-oriented rather than goal-oriented. Traditional 
information system development methodologies and project management techniques are goal- 
oriented in that they take the goal as given, and the process of getting there as purely rational or 
technical. While goal-oriented strategies may be most appropriate for limited, technical and 
well-bounded problems, process-oriented approaches are more suitable for the sorts of change 
efforts where the consequences have wide but as yet uncertain implications, and where there may
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be a number of different interpretations (T244, 1985). The introduction of strategic office 
systems is more likely to be the latter kind of change.
6.1.1 Sociotechnical design.
Most IT and especially OS implementations have been perceived as a limited technical 
change, intended to improve the functioning of the organization as it currently exists, and with 
little strategic focus. Technology-led implementations ignore and therefore are unable to control 
organizational impact, with the frequent results of resistance, nonuse, system failure, and 
degradation of jobs. Sociotechnical design can be seen as a response to these failures of dominant 
practice, and as a way of controlling organizational impacts by anticipating and planning for 
them (Bjom-Andersen, Eason, and Robey, 1986), by designing the social system jointly with the 
technical system (Mumford and Weir, 1979; Eason, 1988). In terms of the perspectives discussed 
in the last chapter, by explicitly recognising the interaction between technology and organization 
and the emergent impacts on jobs, and providing a technique for controlling them, sociotechnical 
design is an attempt to extend the area of managerial choice beyond the technical system to the 
social system.
6.1.2. Incrementalism.
Incrementalism appears to be a reasonable response to change situations where there is a 
large amount of uncertainty, both as to ends and to means (Quinn, 1980). The common view is 
that IS/OS implementation should be incremental and evolutionary, following the typical pattern: 
pilot, assess, expand (Bair and Nelson, 1985). As we saw in the Training Agency case, an 
organization in which people do not feel they know enough about the technology, its uses and its 
effects, will want to allow time for learning. A gradual approach also has the advantages of 
allowing cohesion to be built, and making it easier to maintain congruence or fit between the 
technical and social systems (Nadler, 1982; Liker et al. , 1987). Participative socio-technical 
design has typically been incremental because user involvement is very time consuming and 
because there is a limited ’window’ for participation, when users sufficiently understand the 
potential of technology in order to effectively influence design, and before the final system has 
completely crystallised (Eason, 1988; McLoughlin and Clark, 1988). Prototyping and evolutionary 
design allow users to continue to influence the technical system throughout the process.
6.1.3. User involvement/participation.
One way of categorising implementation strategies is according to who participates and 
where they are located in the organization (Table 6.2) (Wainwright and Francis, 1984; Francis, 
1986; Eason, 1988) or who and how they participate (Bjom-Andersen, 1986) (Table 6.3).
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Table 6.2 
Possible Design Approaches
Who participates
All design done by 
computer specialists
Users participate in 
design of systems
Centralised
Where
located
Decentralised
Table 6.3 
Design Approaches
How
Who Traditional Radical - off-the-peg
Expert-driven Life-cycle Sower
Participative Socio-technical Grass root/anarchy
User involvement in information system design has been recommended for a number of reasons, 
both practical and moral; among them are awareness of the power of users to influence 
implementation outcomes, and the possibility of different interpretations of IT and its uses. 
Socio-technical design has been strongly identified historically with user participation, in part 
because of the democratic job design principles underlying the STS approach. If the 
implementation process is closely related to the nature of outcomes, and if an ’informated’ or 
empowered workforce is one of the outcomes desired, a participative implementation strategy is 
far more likely to lead to this end than an exclusively top-down strategy.
6.1.4. Stakeholder involvement.
In IS implementation, there are stakeholders other than direct users who have an interest 
in the introduction of a new information system and whose attitudes and behaviour toward it can 
make or break it. These include indirect users, managers, internal and external customers and 
clients. Soft Systems Methodology recognises the dubious nature of organizational goals and the 
potential for conflicts of values and interests among stakeholders in all kinds of organizational 
change. It has been applied to information systems development by Checkland (1981), by the 
CCTA in the COMPACT office systems methodology (Noble, 1991), and by Avison and Wood- 
Harper in Multiview (1991), among others. Stakeholder analysis and representation on steering 
groups and working parties are not exclusive to SSM however and are found widely in the 
prescriptive literature.
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6.1.5. OD approaches.
Recognition of IS implementation as a complex behavioural process led to interest in OD 
approaches, with the Lewin/Schein stage model being particularly widely used in the literature. 
Walton (1989), whose approach will be discussed at greater length below, draws on OD, as does 
Benjamin (1993). Willcocks and Mason (1987) explored the use of OD approaches and concluded 
that they were limited because they were focused at the level of individual behaviour and 
attitudes and were consequently unable to deal with power relations and the context in which 
behavioural change is to occur. However, they viewed OD as a set of tools and techniques such 
as attitude surveys, group diagnostic meetings, and team-building, rather than as a coherent 
approach to organizational change. Recent developments in OD make this view rather out of date 
(see Section 6.3 below).
6.1.6 Political approaches.
SSM, with its emphasis on the definition of the problem from the perspectives of the 
various parties concerned, provides a means of dealing with the ’politics’ of implementation, by 
getting some of it into the open for discussion and negotiation. In Quinn’s view, ’logical 
incrementalism’ provides the space in which to manage the political activities of building support 
and commitment to a broad strategic goal. Willcocks and Mason’s approach to systems 
implementation is also based on their analysis of the highly political nature of the process. They 
emphasise the importance of establishing the legitimacy of change and managing meaning, 
mobilising power, and maintaining flexibility of approach, but they do not attempt to spell out 
how this can be done.
6.1.7 The management of meaning.
Three recent comprehensive approaches to implementation which stress politics, the 
management of meaning and legitimation, as well as some of the generic strategies already 
covered, are discussed below.
Buchanan and Boddy, in two recent works on project management (Buchanan and Boddy, 
1992; Boddy and Buchanan, 1992), based in part on their research on IT projects, define three 
approaches to change management, the rational-linear, which is the classical project management 
approach, the participative, and the political. The project management approach is concerned 
with problem-solving, the participative with establishing ownership, and the political with 
establishing legitimacy. They argue that the change agent must address all of these aspects, and 
the content, control and process agendas associated with them, but that in certain contexts (e.g. 
organic organizations, change efforts which are perceived as radical and as central to the 
organization’s core processes), the process agenda becomes more important, especially the political 
aspects. In these cases, legitimacy is key. They use the literature on strategic change, especially 
Pettigrew’s (1985) analysis of implementing strategic change as a process of legitimisation through 
the management of meaning, and Johnson’s (1990) discussion of the role of symbolic action by
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leaders, to analyse the politics of change, and on this basis to suggest the kinds of political and
process skills needed by change agents to be effective. These prescriptions are directed to the
change agent who is working at the middle levels of the organization and who therefore has to
’manage up’ as well as down, and may be highly vulnerable if the project fails. Although they
develop the political approach they do not reject either the rational-linear or the participative in
its favour, but argue all three are necessary to some degree, the emphasis varying according to
context, which they specify. (They also point out how the rational-linear model serves to
legitimise a process which behind the scenes may actually be highly political.)
Nutt (1986) carried out empirical research which supports this approach. Nutt found four
dominant types of tactics actually used by managers to implement various kinds of planned
change in 84 organizations. These were:
Edict - sponsors of change issue directives requiring adoption 
Persuasion - experts attempt to sell a change they have devised 
Participation - representatives of different interest groups determine 
the features of change
Intervention - key executives justify need for change, monitor change 
processes, define acceptable performance, and demonstrate improvements
Edict and persuasion were the tactics most commonly used, and on the whole the least successful.
Participation was more successful (84% of cases as against 43% of edict cases), but intervention
was wholly successful. The specific steps of an intervention strategy were:
Acquire the authority to manage a change process and appraise performance
Apply new norms to identify performance inadequacies
Justify the new norms or demonstrate the feasibility of improving practices
Develop specific proposals for change, involving multiple stakeholders or interest groups
Demonstrate improvements in performance
Monitor performance
Robey (1991) implies that intervention as a tactic is successful because, even more than
participation, it reflects the emergent process view of organization design; it
respects the emergent properties of organizations while acknowledging the need to control 
them. Change is managed through the skillful use of language and symbols to mobilise 
and focus the efforts of others without yielding control. Power derives from active 
involvement in the process rather than from arbitrary authority.
Thus, notable aspects of an intervention strategy are the continued active involvement and 
leadership of the manager in charge, attention to legitimating change, and involving stakeholders 
without relinquishing the process to them.
Walton (1989) has produced an implementation approach for large, integrated IT systems 
which directly addresses the interaction of technology and organization and other issues of 
emergence. He argues the necessity of integrating IT strategy with business and organizational 
strategy, and indicates that a choice is to be made in the latter between strategies based on 
centralisation and compliance, decentralisation and commitment. However, throughout the book
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he argues the advantages of an HRM strategy based on commitment and continued learning.
The key ingredients of a successful implementation are 1) alignment of business, 
organization and IT strategies; 2) commitment/support/ownership; 3) competence/mastery of IT. 
These are developed over three phases, generating the context for IT, system design, and 
introducing and diffusing the system (Figure 6.1). Each phase has its own tasks or ’action levers’, 
becoming more specific as implementation progresses. The first phase is given unusual attention, 
and consists of a) creating a strategic vision which matches the business and technology strategies, 
and aligns the technology and organization strategies; b) promoting commitment and competence 
among work force and managers through communication and participation; c) developing ’broad 
and informed political support’ by allowing ’all major stakeholder groups ... to assess the IT 
proposal from their different perspectives’ (p. 92).
In the design phase, Walton indicates that while the choice of the primary technology is a 
strategic and therefore a top management decision, the secondary features of the technology and 
organization design should be determined using socio-technical design and job design criteria to 
promote competence and motivation. Participation by users and others with different 
perspectives in this phase is seen as legitimating the process, contributing to a favourable political 
environment and a sound design.
Phase Three is the introduction and diffusion of the system. Here the tasks are to ensure 
continued alignment with the vision, strengthening user support into ownership (substantially by 
managing meaning), and enabling the users to develop from competence to mastery by providing 
training, technical and organizational support. For Walton, the key implementation issues are 
socio-technical design (or ’simultaneous development’), the breadth and depth of participation, 
and leadership from the top, especially in the first phase but also throughout the life of the 
project. His implementation strategy is thus comprehensive, structured, and well founded in an 
understanding of both technology implementation and organizational change.
6.2 Discussion o f implementation approaches.
6.2.1 Structuration theory and prescriptive implementation approaches.
These prescriptive implementation approaches deal well with various aspects of the 
emergent character of the process and reflect an increasing theoretical sophistication about 
managing the process of organizational change, including its political aspects. From the point of 
view of structuration theory, implementation of planned change is a ’moment’ or episode in a 
continuing process of management, seen as the structuring of reality for other people within the 
organization context. Management is continually monitoring the conditions for system 
reproduction and the achievement of system goals. In initiating change, management determines 
the need to alter some condition, based on this monitoring, and applies knowledge and control 
over rules and resources in order to achieve it. One aspect of implementation is the pursuit of 
their goals by knowledgeable and powerful organizational actors, which is met by the strategic
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Walton, 1989
and rational-linear models.
From this point of view, the role of senior management is to create the institutional 
context within which the appropriate (sanctioned) interactions can occur, which will then 
reinforce the institutional context. This is the top-down aspect of implementation, and it is 
necessary but not sufficient. Change is not so straightforward because the ’realised’ 
structure/social system is not entirely the creation of management, but has emerged over time 
through the continuous interplay between the institutional level and the level of interaction. As 
Patricia Riley asked at the end of her paper on a structurationist account of political culture 
(1983):
If organizational development is conceptualized as planned cultural change, how should 
the intervention incorporate the existence of mindlessly recreated structures of everyday 
practices?
Any significant change or disturbance in the system affects the modalities - most obviously the 
distribution of allocative and authoritative resources (rewards and power), but also the meaning 
system and norms. Because other organization members are also knowledgeable actors, they will 
assess the desirability of change for themselves by drawing on available interpretative 
frameworks to attribute meaning to it, will consider how it affects their own access to resources, 
and draw on existing norms to justify their conclusions. Their attitudes will be significant 
because subordinates always have some power to resist. Implementing change therefore means 
intervening at the micro level of those who are directly involved, understanding and influencing 
how they perceive it and securing their support. The interpretative frames of organizational 
actors at this level need to be brought into alignment with those of the initiators of change 
(Orlikowski and Gash, 1991), which cannot be done by delegating most of the process to others, 
such as IT specialists.
Organizations are among other things systems of power and domination. Socio-technical 
design, OD, SSM and participative approaches have not always been successful in dealing with 
this aspect of organizational change. Buchanan and Boddy, Nutt and Walton directly address the 
strategic and political context of change, the need to deal with politics and maintain control over 
the process. The skills of the change agent, as Buchanan and Boddy argue, include the 
appropriate use of ’manipulation and threat’. However, change must also be legitimated through 
the management of meaning, involving the realms of signification and legitimation as well as 
domination. Walton in particular considers that implementation must pay a great deal of 
attention to the engineering of consent. Participative approaches have an important role to play 
in legitimating change, because they are consistent with the structural principles of the political 
order external to the organization.
Domination is the application of allocative and authoritative resources to secure the 
change. Signification involves drawing on a widely shared symbolic order to demonstrate the
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need for change and to interpret it. Naming a project and giving it a high profile leader are 
obvious symbols of the project’s importance. Legitimation of change draws on existing norms 
either internal or external to the organization (growth, progress, efficiency, productivity, 
rationality), either directly or to justify new norms (such as quality, customer service/care). Most 
acts address all three at once.
The political approach supplements but does not replace either traditional project management or 
participation. The aspects of the change agenda which should be stressed are contingent on the 
organizational context, the nature of the change proposed, and the stage in the process.
6.2.2 Integrated office systems and prescriptive implementation approaches.
How useful are the implementation strategies discussed above for the implementation of 
strategic OS? Integrated office information systems are more involved with core processes, are 
more critical to the organization’s success or failure, and are much larger scale projects affecting 
a large number of users and other stakeholders. Strategic uses of OS have significant implications 
for organization design, the design of jobs, human resource requirements, and management style 
and skills. Therefore attention to process - the building of commitment and support and the 
legitimation of change - are more important than ever in implementation.
The introduction of integrated OS is beset by contradictions. They must be centrally 
planned and controlled but have local support; they represent radical change but must be 
implemented incrementally. We will deal with each in turn. Such projects must be led from the 
top because 1) they must be related to the organization’s business strategy 2) they may affect core 
business processes; 3) the need for standardisation of IT throughout the organization; 4) the 
impacts on organizational structure; 5) the scale of the investment; 6) the long-term nature and 
resource requirements of the project. User-led change tends to optimise on individual user needs 
at the expense of the total system (Boland, 1981); user involvement can provide an opportunity 
for users to divert projects to suit sectional interests (Noble and Newman, 1993); and where users’ 
interests will not be served, and where the organization structure and balance of power are to be 
changed, user participation is counter-indicated (Child, 1977; Markus, 1981). There are 
limitations to the extent to which users can participate in a) strategic change b) rapid response to 
a crisis c) large, cross-functional integrated systems. Yet as we have seen project success often 
depends on local knowledge and commitment; ’empowerment’ through technology cannot take 
place if users do not understand the technology.
The problem may be partly resolved by Grindley’s distinction between trajectories and 
projects. The development of an integrated OS can be seen as a technological ’trajectory’ 
(Grindley, 1989); it must be built up gradually within the context of long term objectives and 
broad policies established at the top, but proceeds by means of short-term, more clearly defined 
projects. In these there is more scope for bottom-up participation.
The implementation approaches described thus far do not explicitly take account of
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paradigm shift (although Walton implies it). As we have seen that OS can be implicated in the
use of IT to transform organizations, we now turn to the field of Organizational Transformation
for a different perspective on implementing large-scale organizational and technological change.
6.3 Organizational transformation.
Dissatisfaction with OD as practiced in the early 80s led to a greater concern with large
system and strategic change, resulting in the new field of Organizational Transformation (Porras
and Silvers, 1991). Typical OD interventions had become concerned with obtaining a better fit
between different internal elements of an organization, or a better external fit between the
organization and the environment (Goodman and Kurke, 1982; Lundberg, 1984), thus drifting
away from OD’s earlier, more strategic concern with renewal and revitalisation. The focus on
’fixing things’ within current frameworks suggested that change needed to be only homeostatic,
ie. adaptive to a steady state. OT in contrast concerns paradigmatic change, involving a major
shift in the organization’s world-view and meaning systems as well as its practice. OT is
therefore of particular interest from the point of view of structuration theory, and is highly
relevant to the idea of IT-enabled paradigm shift discussed at the end of Chapter 3. The
application of OT to IT implementation has only just begun to be explored.
6.3.1. The nature of organizational transformation.
OT involves a reconceptualisation of both the nature of change and the process of change.
OT is change in type or state as opposed to change in degree (Schon, 1971). The distinction has
been characterised in different ways. Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch (1974) distinguished
between first-order change, which ’occurs within a given system which itself remains unchanged’
and second-order change, or a change in the system itself. Smith (1982) contrasted morphostatic
change, which occurs according to the ’instructions encoded within the system’, with
morphogenic change, in which the basic governing rules themselves become altered.
Morphogenic change is a change in essence, as in the change of genetic code (Levy, 1984).
Tichy (1983) identified strategic change as ’nonroutine, nonincremental, and discontinuous
change which alters the overall orientation of the organization.’ Golembiewski et al. (1976)
distinguished alpha change, which is a variation in level along some relatively stable dimension;
beta change, which is also along a stable dimension but where the ’measuring rod’ has changed
due to subjects’ altered expectations; and gamma change, which is ’a quantum shift in ways of
conceptualizing salient dimensions of reality’. Porras and Silvers noted:
Gamma change is a radical shift in an individual’s assumptions about causal relationships, 
the values attached to various dimensions of reality, and the interpretive frameworks that 
describe reality. In other words, gamma change describes a ’paradigm shift’ in 
organizational members’ mental constructs.
As gamma change is a change in state as opposed to a change of degree within a given state, 
alpha-change measurement devices cannot pick up gamma change.
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Mohrman and Lawler in 1984 indicated the relevance of these ideas to research on the 
organizational impact of IT. Such research has usually focused on alpha change, whereas the 
most important impacts may be the result of gamma change, which often occurs because the 
cybernetic nature of the technology allows it to be adapted by users to achieve new goals (third- 
order feedback). This is a major cause of difficulty in evaluating the effects of IT, both the 
impacts and the benefits.
Bartunek and Moch (1987) introduced the idea of third-order change, in which the 
alternative paradigm or interpretative scheme is not assumed to be known in advance, but is 
discovered by organization participants themselves. The aim of an intervention is to help 
organization members to become aware of the interpretative schemes they already hold, partly by 
showing them various alternatives, and introducing structures which enable them to see the 
existing scheme from different perspectives and to choose an alternative paradigm. Although 
Bartunek and Moch are mainly concerned with third-order change as an intervention strategy, 
they are also, less explicitly, describing the organizational archetype or paradigm of the learning 
organization. The idea seems to be more closely related to double-loop learning and gamma 
change than is second-order change.
Orlikowski and Gash (1991) achieved a partial integration of OT and structuration by 
applying the ideas of first-, second- and third-order change to the technological frames, or 
interpretative schemes regarding IT and its uses, of different groups. In first-order change, the 
managerial intention is to use IT to increase productivity and efficiency, or control costs; second- 
order change is the use of IT to change the way of doing business, including the strategic and 
innovative uses of IT discussed in the 80s, such as business process redesign. They argue that IS 
do not yet embody third-order change, which would involve awareness of the technological 
frames themselves. ’In the learning organization, groups need to be sensitive to the 
appropriateness of their current frame to the organizational context and environment’ (pp. 20-1).
IS do not currently ’support double loop learning by questioning their own premises’.
6.3.1 The process of change.
The concepts of first- and second-order change are inextricably linked with a model of 
how change occurs, which relates revolutionary to evolutionary change. First-order change is the 
most common because organizations are strongly self-reinforcing or self-reproducing. ’(First- 
order) internal change may be a way for the system to remain the same’ (Levy, 1984, p. 10). 
’Consistency develops between various features of the organization - after a point any change of 
direction may be extremely difficult; the process has generated not just a particular structure, but 
many of the conditions that appear to justify and require just such a structure’ (T244, 1985).
Thus, organizations tend to evolve for long periods in the same direction, an extension or logical 
development of their existing type, which Miller and Friesen (1980) refer to as ’momentum’. The 
structural change which does occur is most commonly incremental and piecemeal. Revolutionary
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or ’quantum’, ie. concerted, rapid and dramatic change in structure occurs infrequently and only
when absolutely necessary. Change of type is resisted until the need is overwhelming due to long
delay. When second- order change comes, it is in response to the crisis caused by the build-up of
problems during evolutionary development.
6.3.2 Sources of stability.
Kahn (1982) observed that the obstacles to change are the opposite side of the coin to
stability and persistence, and that some resistance to change is essential for organizational
survival. Miller (1990), Miller and Friesen (1982) attributed the difficulty of making major
structural change to the need to maintain organizational gestalt, or congruence among the
elements of structure, strategy and environment. Other writers have identified different sources
of resistance to change. Schon (1971) saw the roots of ’dynamic conservatism’ as self-interest
and the threat that change poses to sense-making. The strategies of dynamic conservatism are
selective inattention, repelling, containing and isolating change, co-option, and making the least
change possible. Greenwood and Hinings (1988) indicated three kinds of reasons organizations
rarely change type: 1) cognitive: structures and processes are designed to filter out critical
information; 2) the need may be recognised but the costs appear to exceed the benefits; 3) power:
as organizations are also patterns of privilege and disadvantage, ’dominant coalitions maintain
their interests by denying structural reorientation.’ According to Gersick (1991), there are three
barriers to change: cognitive, motivational, and obligation. Cognitive barriers involve
interpretative schemes; motivational barriers include fear of loss, uncertainty and failure; in
addition there are (normative) constraints of obligation among internal and external stakeholders.
Interest has shifted from organization structures to the underlying interpretative schemes
or ’provinces of meaning’ which organization structures embody (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988).
These sets of ideas, beliefs and values, together with the structures and processes which serve to
implement and reinforce them, constitute a design archetype, which ’may have the attribute of a
paradigm with its connotation of world view and intractability’ (p. 301). Coherence comes from
the consistency between interpretative schemes, structures and processes, rather than from
congruence between structure, strategy and environment.
Gersick (1991) calls change which is characterised by long evolutionary periods
punctuated by short revolutionary ones ’punctuated equilibrium’. The pattern is explained by the
existence of an underlying order or ’deep structure’, which ’is what persists and limits change
during equilibrium periods and.., is what disassembles, reconfigures, and enforces wholesale
transformation during revolutionary punctuations.’
Deep structure is the set of fundamental ’choices’ a system has made of 1) the basic parts 
into which its units will be organized and 2) the basic activity patterns that will maintain 
its existence... (it) may be thought of as the design of the playing field and the rules of 
the game....The activity patterns of a system’s deep structure reinforce the system as a 
whole, through mutual feedback loops (p. 17).
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6.4 OS, first-order and second-order change.
As we have seen in our discussion of the organizational benefits and strategic uses of OS, 
the introduction of OS has overwhelmingly been perceived as a limited, technical change or first- 
order, alpha change where the goal sought is a changed level of existing outputs. The reasons 
relate to the barriers to second-order change discussed above: cognitive (the traditional 
unawareness of technologists and managers of the organizational implications of new technology; 
avoiding the need to challenge the existing organizational paradigm), and it also appears to 
involve less effort (apparent benefit exceeds cost). IT in general has overwhelmingly been 
perceived as a first- order change at the level which Venkatraman characterises as ’localized 
exploitation’, and has been implemented within the existing organizational paradigm, in which 
case it will usually reinforce existing systems of control (Orlikowski, 1991) because of managerial 
inertia, lack of vision and understanding among the dominant coalition, and fear of disturbing 
the existing distribution of power. Organizational change appears in the form of emergent 
’impacts’ as, before, during and after implementation, everyone tries to adapt IT a) to what they 
are already familiar with and b) what is to their advantage.
Orlikowski and Gash (1991) indicated that the strategic use of IT represents second-order 
change, or the move from one paradigm to another which already exists. In this section, the 
strategic uses of OS discussed in Chapter 3 - internal process integration, boundary spanning, and 
organizational infrastructure - are considered in relation to second-order change. The criteria for 
second-order change are:
- changes required in organization structures and processes
- new approach to HRM, job design, work, commitment
- different style of management required
- change in world view or interpretative scheme.
6.4.1 Internal process integration.
Internal process integration (Business Process Redesign, reengineering) usually involves 
the application of IT capabilities to redesign key business processes (Davenport and Short, 1990), 
although in the view of some practitioners the role of IT is secondary and supportive to the main 
task of reorganizing work so as to obtain greater responsiveness to customer needs. Job redesign 
is thus intrinsic to internal process integration, and proponents such as Hammer (1990) argue that 
jobs should be enriched, workers empowered to make decisions, and given the information to 
enable them to do so. The devolution of responsibility to lower levels is in itself radical in its 
implications: more diffuse roles, team working and less formal hierarchy require different, more 
facilitative management roles and skills (Davenport and Short). Most processes also cross 
existing structural boundaries, which means organizations should really be completely redesigned 
around processes. However, even those organizations which have successfully carried out 
reengineering of their major processes have as yet gone only halfway in this direction (Coates-
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Walker, 1992).
Business Process Redesign is often carried out in response to a crisis, and may be part of 
other organizational changes such as TQM. Important features are customer focus, setting 
performance targets which are ’stretching’, and improving speed, quality, and cost all at once. 
Together with the structural changes, this does seem to represent an alternative paradigm for 
organizing, which challenges most traditional assumptions (Stalk and Hout, 1990; Hammer, 1990; 
Davenport and Short, 1990; Coates-Walker, 1992). Because of the cross-functional nature of 
BPR, managerial ownership and commitment are extremely important. Such projects must have 
very high level support; the management of some processes is integrated only at the level of the 
CEO. Consequently, the different versions of BPR (Markus and Turner, 1992) agree that ’vision’ 
at the top is a prerequisite. Davenport and Short for example stress that process objectives must 
be set in the context of high-level strategic business vision. There appears to be a need for a 
change in world view.
However, there is not as yet a unified paradigm for BPR. Davenport and Short explicitly 
locate BPR within the Tayloristic industrial engineering tradition, while Hammer, and Nolan and 
Norton place more emphasis on job redesign and enrichment. Markus and Turner (1992) have 
suggested that other approaches which are applicable are sociotechnical design, new 
organizational forms/organizational architecture, organizational transformation, and task 
alignment, each with its own implications for implementation. In this field, the experiments are 
currently underway, the outlines of the new paradigm may be emerging but the conditions for 
success are not yet completely clear. We have second-order change in the making.
Computer-supported cooperative work is a form of internal process integration which 
applies to tasks which are mainly reciprocal rather than sequential. It often involves process 
redesign and success is highly dependent on social factors (Bullen and Bennett, 1990; Lyytinen 
and Ngwenyama, 1992). Second-order change may be required at the level of the group; the 
more the organization depends on or is constituted by such groups, the more organizational 
transformation will be required.
6.4.2 Spanning boundaries/interorganizational systems.
Some uses of OS to span boundaries, such as executive support systems, marketing and 
strategic analysis, do not require any significant organizational change. However, 
interorganizational systems are likely to do so.
Internal process integration leads logically to the idea of integration across organizational 
boundaries; indeed, the customer focus of much business process redesign will ensure this 
happens anyway. There are different degrees of linkage between organizations, some of which 
require greater organizational change than others. Three broad levels of integration can be 
distinguished: EDI, interorganizational systems, and business network redesign (Venkatraman, 
1992; Billinge, 1992). EDI requires only a common technology platform for data interchange.
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The motive is to eliminate paper and rekeying between organizations. The requirements are: 
agreed data standards, a standard structure for information, and the software to make the 
connection. Interorganizational systems (IOS) build on EDI, but require more of a partnership. 
Integration moves from the level of simple transaction processing, to the transactions which give 
rise to inventory (JIT), to the sharing of design information, quality control, and forecasts of 
demand. As integration proceeds, customers become interested in cultivating relationships with 
fewer, closer suppliers. Business network redesign exploits IOS for business advantage 
(Venkatraman). Organizations become more tightly coupled in the way their businesses are run; 
while the early strategic uses of IOS were seen as ’locking in’ suppliers and customers, greater 
benefit is now seen as coming from collaborative advantage, the use of the network to obtain 
added value for all partners. This may in turn involve totally new products (Level 5). The key 
issues become: electronic communication, permeability of organizational boundaries, fewer levels, 
interdependent responsibilties, team v. task focus, organic form, and strategic alliances as against 
vertical integration (Venkatraman, 1992).
Cash and Konsynski (1985) argued that IOS affect the organization, having first-order 
impacts on business processes, second-order impacts on the skills required of employees, and 
eventually, when an IOS is used for a key business function, on organization structure and 
business strategy . Business network redesign involves major organizational change for all 
parties. Because the harmonisation of business and IT systems produces even greater 
interdependence, issues of power and trust can outweigh arguments about efficiency and market 
benefits in decisions concerning the implementation of such systems (Clemons and Row, 1992; 
Prekumar et al., 1992). The creation of strategic alliances clearly represents a paradigm shift or 
second-order change (Stalk and Hout, 1990; Keen, 1991).
6.4.3 Infrastructure/platform.
The development of an IT infrastructure is strategic in its own right because it enables an 
organization to use the information it has and to act upon it (Venkatraman, 1992); it supports 
existing strategies (Billinge, 1992), provides the basis for as yet undiscovered strategic 
applications (Hopper, 1990), and positions the organization for the more radical levels 3-5. It is 
thus a precondition for organizational transformation, without necessarily requiring organizational 
transformation for its implementation.
The problems of implementing an IT infrastructure are technical, financial, project 
management and political. They are more difficult to cost justify because many benefits are 
qualitative, or spread across different functions; they represent very large projects, with long lead 
times and large management costs, which affect large numbers of staff; they must be centrally 
planned and designed but also require local support in order to succeed. They need top 
management sponsorship because of their political implications and because they are strategic 
(Keen, 1986, 1991; Hopper; 1990). Platforms which cross functional boundaries, allow access to
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corporate databases, the sharing of information, and compression of time and distance will have 
an impact on organizational structures, either intended or unintended (Gunson and Boddy, 1989; 
Keen, 1991). However, the implementation of an IT platform is most likely to represent only 
first-order change unless it is perceived as a means of redesigning the organization.
6.4.4 The use of IT to create new organizations.
This represents second-order change if the new paradigm is already defined, which is 
often the case. If the object of redesign is a learning organization, and the paradigm has to be 
discovered, this use of IT represents third-order change.
We can conclude that the implementation of most strategic OS represents at least second- 
order change. As IT projects get bigger, more central, and more strategic, there is an apparently 
irresistible tendency for them to become associated with the idea of paradigm shift.
6.5 Implementing organizational transformation.
Among OT experts, it is agreed that first-order methodologies will not produce second- 
order change. Implementation approaches for second-order change vary depending on the stage 
to which they are directed. Lundberg (1984) describes these three phases of ’transitioning’ as 
inducement, management, and stabilisation, which correspond to unfreezing, changing, and 
refreezing. Second-order change involves first of all some crisis, either natural or induced, which 
reveals the shortcomings of the present paradigm (Bartunek and Moch, 1987). Second, the 
alternative paradigm must be discovered, diffused, accepted and legitimised (changing). Thirdly 
comes the institutionalisation of the new paradigm. According to Levy and Merry (1986), the 
change agent’s task at each major stage is to:
facilitate departure from old paradigm
facilitate creation of a shared vision that is a new paradigm
facilitate alignment of members with the new vision and their commitment to change
6.5.1 The crisis.
The driving forces for second- order change may be internal, external, or result from the 
interaction between the two (Levy and Merry). The existing paradigm may be revealed to be 
inconsistent with task or environmental contingencies, there may be low commitment to the 
existing scheme, or power dependencies may be altered (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988). 
Lundberg distinguishes different aspects of the inducement stage: permitting conditions (surplus 
of resources; sense of readiness for change; some degree of coupling; agents: managerial strategic 
awareness and competence), enabling conditions: (degree of domain forgiveness or threat; 
organizational/domain congruence) precipitating conditions (organizational growth or decline; 
stakeholders’ demands; crises, real and perceived; atypical performance demands) and triggers, 
which are more specific events, such as the arrival of newcomers or a sense of time running out 
(Gersick, 1991).
The need for change is perceived only through organizational filters and change
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inhibitors. ’Human systems eventually finish their deep structures’ agenda, but ... as long as
events occur against the backdrop of the same deep structure, they are treated or interpreted in
ways that preserve the system’s inertia, and therefore, incremental solutions are sought. The
handwriting on the wall cannot be read’ (Gersick, 1991, pp. 236-7). Levy and Meriy note:
when crises are faced and normal modes of problem solving and management are first 
seen to be inadequate, calls often arise for going ’back to basics.’ Failure here is usually 
followed by muddling through and massive tinkering with the system... When this does 
not work, breakthroughs in basic approach are sought.
The implementation tasks of the first stage are to create awareness of need for second- 
order change and encourage the search for new possibilities, ideas and choices. This may be done 
by raising awareness of the content of the current paradigm and of the existence of alternative 
paradigms, encouraging letting go, energising, reframing. Approaches may focus on the 
paradigm directly, e.g. by creating awareness of the existence and impact of the current 
paradigm, or indirectly, via the belief system, organization mission and purpose, focussing on 
myths, symbols and metaphors or on second-order problems and symptoms (Levy and Merry, 
1986).
6.5.2 Diffusing the alternative paradigm and managing the transition to the new state.
The focus of creating organizational vision may be on top management as catalyst - or at 
the individual level (Porras and Silvers). However, both macro and micro levels must eventually 
change. Revolutionary periods are characterised by uncertainty, generating hope and fear 
(Gersick). Nadler (1982) has discussed the need to deal with anxiety and to motivate constructive 
behavior in managing transitions to uncertain future states. This involves creating a vision of the 
future, preparing people for uncertainty, as well as defining the future state as being made up of 
transitions. There is also a need to deal with politics and power in this stage, partly via open 
communication (Levy and Merry), but also according to Nadler, by creating a small and cohesive 
senior planning group to monitor change regularly, rewarding senior management collaboration/ 
team performance, increasing leader visibility, and demonstrating confidence and consistency.
The transition state must be controlled by defining a series of short, incremental transitions to 
alternative futures, maintaining tight linkage between those who plan and those who manage the 
transition, greatly increased two-way communication flows. Beckhard and Harris (1977) have 
also discussed transition management in organization-wide efforts in considerable detail.
6.5.3 Institutionalisation.
Institutionalisation is defined as the persistence over time of a behavior, performed by 
two or more individuals (Goodman and Dean, 1982). Once institutionalised, the behaviour exists 
as a social fact, ie. it is part of social reality external to any individual. ’After stabilization, the 
transformed social processes and actualities take on a rulelike status in social thought and action’ 
(Lundberg, 1984, p. 66). One of the necessary conditions for institutionalisation is normative
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consensus and awareness, and consensus on values relevant to the behaviour. ’Reinforcement, 
reward allocation, procedure formalization, and similar processes are devices commonly used...’ 
(Lundberg, 67).
6.6 Discussion o f OT implementation.
6.6.1 OT and OD.
Levy and Merry (p. 33) contrast typical OD and OT interventions as follows:
Table 6.4
Organizational Development 
Intervention
Paradigmatic Change Intervention
Does not challenge the current 
paradigm
Starts with diagnosing problems and 
searching for solutions 
Goal setting
Challenges and changes the current 
paradigm
Starts with a new vision or a crisis
in the old vision
Looking for a new purpose, core
mission
Emphasis on ideology, cultural, 
political and technical dimensions 
Alignment of people and systems with 
a new purpose 
Future orientation 
Starting a new future
Emphasis on cultural dimensions: 
values, attitudes, and norms 
Agreement on solutions
Present orientation 
Continuity with past
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OT implementation prescriptions draw to a great extent on traditional OD, but address a 
larger framework. One of the most obvious differences is of course the focus on changing the 
paradigm as the object of intervention and the creation of vision as the means of achieving it. To 
facilitate second-order change, ’one has to change the "metarules" (the rules of the rules) of the 
system’ (Levy, 1984, p. 18). According to Gersick, articulation of a new vision around which 
deep structure can reform is central. As Davis (1982) puts it, transformation is a change of 
context, ie. of the unquestioned assumptions which filter experience and create reality. The 
major strategic shift is the questioning of context, moving from not knowing to knowing you 
don’t know. Paradigm change is so profound that it will pervade all other aspects of the 
organization: it ’will entail changes in the organizational philosophy, mission and purpose, culture 
and core processes’ (Levy, 1984, p. 17).
6.6.2 OT and structuration theory.
OT represents the application of psychology, social science, systems theory and natural 
science models to major organizational change. It is therefore a specific example of the reflexive 
use of discursive knowledge in modem organizations.
The perception in OT of the way that macro and micro levels interact to produce stability 
corresponds to the duality of structure in structuration theory. The analysis of the conditions of 
system reproduction in OT in terms of cognitive, emotional, and normative barriers and self- 
interest is entirely consistent with structuration theory. Giddens would argue that social systems 
also tend to persist because of the habit and routine, derived from the need for ontological 
security. The latter is closely related to the concept of identity, stressed by Boland (1992) as well 
as Coombs, Knights and Willmott (1992). In modem societies people derive their identities to a 
great extent from the organizations in which they participate, particularly their work 
organizations, which should help us understand the depth of resistance to change sometimes 
encountered.
Within OT there is some difference of view in whether the focus of interest and therefore 
the target of change is structures in the sense of systems, interpretative frames/meaning systems, 
or underlying codes. A change in the latter will obviously be most profound. Interpretative 
schemes are important but are only one dimension of social systems. Smith’s ’basic governing 
rules’ and Gersick’s ’deep structure’, however, closely approximate Giddens’ idea of structure as 
an underlying code or system of rules which is only manifested in action. The problem is first, 
how to identify it, and second, how to get at it in order to change it.
OT addresses meaning systems/interpretative schemes, but does it also adequately address 
power and legitimacy, that is, systems of domination and legitimation? OT recognises 
differential access to power as part of the explanation of system stability, but does it take account 
of this in explaining change? OT appears to assume the benign practitioner/consultant assisting 
benevolent leaders to design wholly beneficent organizations. There seems to be an implicit
113
unitary view of the organization, an assumption that the interests of the organization as a whole 
in change are consistent with those of its members. Also, even accounts of second-order change 
are largely oriented to description of the process, and say little about what the content of the new 
paradigm or interpretative scheme might be. Fascism was a new paradigm once.
6.6.3 OT and emergent implementation approaches.
The process-oriented implementation strategies discussed earlier in this chapter have 
ostensibly been addressed to first-order change. However, STD has at least some of its origins in 
an ambition to democratise industrial organizations, a second- or even third-order change (Porras 
and Silvers). Organizing around semi-autonomous workgroups is a second-order change at the 
lower levels of the organization which has large, if largely unrecognised, implications for higher 
levels of management (Child, 1977). In the past, when such experiments failed, it was often 
because they were perceived as threatening management control and the existing management 
paradigm (Kelly, 1978; Bladder and Brown, 1978). These and other earlier initiatives such as 
QWL have more recently become legitimated (to senior management) in strategic terms.
Buchanan and McCalman (1989) have shown how a paradigm such as high-performance work 
systems, with its associated notions of empowerment and flattening the hierarchy, creates and 
legitimates a broader management context in which lower level STD can occur. Similarly with 
Walton’s concept of an organizational strategy based on commitment rather than control.
There is a continuity then between strategic organizational transformation and process- 
oriented approaches and other management ideas which have been around for some time. OT 
does not make these redundant but on the contrary focuses them and breathes new life into them. 
They can usefully be combined with new insights derived from the notion of implementing 
second-order change. This informs the next section where I develop an implementation strategy.
6.7  Implementing integrated office systems.
I have argued from the outset that an implementation strategy for integrated OS must take 
account of both rational and political perspectives. The approach outlined below therefore takes 
account of the main insights developed in the first and latter halves of this dissertation. Also, the 
emergent perspective analysed in Chapter 5 enables one to make a choice among existing 
normative approaches to implementation. Structuration theory points to the need for a holistic 
approach to change, and to the importance of legitimation and the management of meaning. Both 
structuration theory and the analysis of strategic uses of OS indicate the relevance of 
organizational transformation. The implementation strategy therefore has to combine the 
strengths of the emergent prescriptive approaches and the insights derived from the management 
of major organizational change.
6.7.1 Audit
The historical framework I presented in Chapter 2 can be used to help an organization 
assess where its office systems currently are: data processing and MIS only, isolated applications,
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generic OA, or integrated/integrating systems, together with Venkatraman’s five levels which are 
for IT in general.
6.7.2 Initiation
As the case studies have indicated, initiation of an OS can come from a variety of 
different sources and for a variety of reasons, including external pressure/events, crisis, evolution 
of internal systems, other organizational changes, and a sense of inevitability (’it will come 
anyway; why not be first?’) However and wherever this occurs, senior management must be 
involved at an early stage, for the reasons discussed in Section 6.2.2. above, including the need 
for central and long-term planning and resourcing, and the size and scope of the project.
Senior management must identify the business need, how an integrated OS can meet it, 
and the likely organizational implications. Where there is no explicit overall business strategy, 
consideration of the strategic use of IT can be an occasion for developing one, using approaches 
such as SSM and Critical Success Factors. The information-processing framework I developed in 
Chapters 2 and 3 (Fig. 3.1) can be used as a guide to strategic applications for OS, and the model 
of managerial choice presented in Chapter 5 (Figure 5.4) used to consider the technology and 
organization selection and design criteria.
At the same time, the order of organizational change required should be considered. I 
have discussed in full which types/uses of OS imply which orders of change in Section 6.4 above. 
Some important aspects of implementation strategy depend on this decision.
6.7.2.1 First-order change
First-order change will seek to fit the OS into the existing organizational structure with 
the least possible disturbance. An implementation strategy of localised incrementalism will deal 
adequately with the introduction of OS where:
1) the proposed system is not central to core processes
2) it does not represent radical change in technology or work 
practices
3) it can be introduced gradually
4) it is intended for one unit or area, or can be introduced one unit 
at a time.
A strategy of shared responsibility between managers, specialists and users, incrementalism, and 
attention to job design criteria will enable some emergent impacts to be dealt with. However 
even such limited change projects should be managed with attention to maintaining authority and 
control. Project risk needs to be assessed. The greater the uncertainty, (e.g. the greater the 
distance between the technology being implemented and that with which the organization is 
already familiar, the more interdependencies, external and internal change, the greater the pace 
of change and the more radical it is, and the more central to the organization’s primary task), the 
riskier the project and the more political the process will be.
Most organizations have passed this phase of localised exploitation of IT and are now
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attempting to use OS as part of an integrated IT platform, to redesign internal processes, for 
interorganizational systems, or all three. The implementation of an integrated IT platform differs 
from localised exploitation mainly in that:
1) cost justification must be on a different basis
2) it represents a major long-term investment
3) the need for common standards of hardware and software
4) it crosses organizational boundaries
5) it may touch on or include core processes.
It is thus technically and politically complex, involving more of the uncertainty factors discussed 
above, but is not usually associated with major organizational change efforts (see Section 6.2.2 
above); a combination of the process-oriented approaches discussed earlier (stakeholder analysis 
and involvement, incrementalism, the management of meaning) will be relevant.
6.7.2.2 Second-order change
The critical thing in second- order change is that the alternative paradigm be known or 
discovered before it can be moved to, that the vision be created. Therefore, an implementation 
approach for the first phase of second-order change will focus on creating awareness of the 
nature and influence of the old paradigm, showing how it is associated with the perceived crisis 
and with second-order problems. That is, it will be concerned with changing interpretative 
frames.
One of the main issues is whether to attack the existing paradigm directly or indirectly.
If a direct attack on the existing paradigm is too threatening, two alternatives are ’leading from 
where you want to be’, that is, assuming that the appropriate culture and organization are already 
there, waiting to be discovered (Davis, 1982), or stimulating change by amplifying changes in the 
environment instead of dampening them down, which can be done by adding information, 
especially about the system itself. The change agent can surface and compare different internal 
views, and contrast the organization’s survival mechanisms with its ’real’ purpose (Goldstein, 
1988).
The other main issue is where to start, with top management or a small group on the 
periphery. In either case, change begins in a nucleus, and must become well established there 
before diffusing.
6.7.3 ’Transitioning’
Certain features of the control agenda in the transitional phase apply to both first-order 
and second-order change:
Establish long-term objectives for the OS and make resources available for them.
Develop an IT strategy for the OS or relate it to existing IT strategy: hardware, software,
scope, policies, standards.
Break implementation plan down into a series of projects.
Establish a steering committee representing major stakeholders, reporting to senior
management;
Appoint a high profile project manager/leader with authority; not an IT specialist.
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Establish clear lines of authority and decision-making process.
Appoint a multidisciplinary project team.
Involve users in each project in design of jobs and secondary features of technology.
Monitor and evaluate at regular intervals.
In second-order change the transition phase also involves the diffusion of the new 
paradigm throughout the organization. It is necessary to assess the obstacles to change: as we 
have seen these are: the congruence or fit among existing elements; cognitive barriers: sense- 
making, interpretative schemes; emotional barriers: fear, uncertainty; self-interest: vested interests 
in the existing distribution of resources, cost of changing appears to exceed benefit. A change in 
social system means change across a wide front (in the structures of signification, domination, 
and legitimation). This is partly accomplished by providing alternative interpretative schemes 
and establishing new norms, but these must be backed up by a consistent allocation of 
facilities/resources (power/control). Legitimation and communication are the key tasks of this 
stage. The management of meaning and legitimation are aided by pointing out the deficiencies of 
the existing paradigm, by contrasting it with the organization’s own purposes/mission, or an 
external standard (e.g. bench-marking), establishing new performance criteria and demonstrating 
their feasibility.
6.7.4 Institutionalisation
The third phase, institutionalisation or persistence of the change, involves monitoring, 
evaluating and maintaining change, using various feedback mechanisms and continuing to support 
it through the reward system (Beckhard and Harris, 1977; Goodman and Dean, 1982).
6.7.5 Third-order change
There are real questions over how far senior management can or should attempt to change 
organizational culture from the top down. The overall terms of organizational culture may be 
defined by top management, as mission or strategy, but structuration theory shows us that a real 
culture is also an organic growth and in a sense the property of all organizational members. The 
dominant model of second- order change is that senior management acquires the new paradigm 
first and then instills it in subordinates. This does not seem to be a good model for implementing 
a ’learning organization’, whose aim is to increase the system’s ability to analyse and change 
current paradigms and to envision future ones. The development of a learning organization must 
involve first of all enabling all organization members to understand the existing paradigm and 
then to discover what paradigm they wish to move to.
Such interventions should be designed to help employees increase their ability to develop 
their own solutions, by showing alternatives, in order to increase awareness of the present 
schemata, and introducing structures which enable members to see from different perspectives. 
Participation can become gamma change.
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Conclusions
1. Summary and overview.
The problem set out in the first chapter was the need for an implementation strategy for 
OS which would address both business and user requirements, and take account of the 
organizational impacts of technology.
1. We have seen that office information technology has been steadily advancing in its 
integrative capacity. This means that it involves potentially all workers who produce or handle 
information in an organization, and that systems are designed which provide communication 
across functional and organizational boundaries, and which enable individuals and groups to 
connect with other (e.g. data processing) systems. A technology such as OS, which crosses 
vertical and horizontal boundaries in and between organizations, must have great potential for 
organizational change.
2. Integrated office technology can consequently support strategic as well as the 
efficiency/effectiveness goals of earlier computerised office systems. I have suggested that OS 
can be used strategically in order to reduce uncertainty in three major areas: task/production, co­
ordination, and the environment, by means of respectively: internal process integration, 
organizational infrastructure, and boundary-spanning systems.
3. The achievement of strategic goals in each of these areas depends to a great extent on 
making changes in organization design at the same time as changing the technology. Whether 
requiring or enabling, office information systems can be seen to be moving away from their 
rather humble role as administrative support to a key role in shift of management paradigm.
4. At the same time, there is increased awareness of the difficulty of implementing 
strategic systems, and the important role which the implementation process plays in producing the 
kinds of changes desired (or not desired) by those who initiate it, the uncertainty of outcomes, 
and the influence of many different actors. Structuration theory improves the model because it 
takes account of structure and process, micro and macro levels, and comprehends actors’ 
intentions and goals as well as contextual constraints and the unintended consequences of their 
actions.
5. A number of prescriptive implementation strategies and approaches take account of the 
emergent nature of the implementation process. There is increasing awareness of the necessity to 
legitimate change and to manage meaning. Implementation strategy is contingent on a number of 
factors, one of which is the nature and magnitude of change involved, especially whether it is 
change within the existing management and organizational paradigm or to a new one. Many of 
the uses of integrated OS involve second-order change, to which the theories and prescriptions of 
organizational transformation are applicable. This kind of change is an explicit process of 
structuration. The problem of implementing it is how to ensure the integration of the 
institutional/macro and interaction/micro levels. Ideology and processes of legitimation are
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crucial to this endeavour.
2. Contribution.
As I said in my introduction, because of the nature of the topic, the research and 
consequently this dissertation covers a wide front and part of the contribution to knowledge must 
lie in the synthesis of a number of perspectives, which have not been brought together 
previously, to bear on the problem.
There is also an empirical contribution, in the bringing together of available data together 
with the results of the MD survey, and the case studies in fifteen organizations, which have 
shown how integration of office systems is proceeding, how they are being used, the benefits 
sought, the impacts at job and organizational level, and the implementation approaches being 
employed. Office systems are coming to be perceived as strategic in some contexts, in high- 
performing organizations and where information-processing is a primary task, and it is in these 
situations they are likely to be involved in major organizational change.
At the level of theoretical synthesis, I have shown how the rational-analytic perspective 
can be combined with the interpretative-political, especially in Chapter 5 (Fig. 5.6). I have 
related the analysis provided by largely descriptive studies of implementing new technology to 
the prescriptive literature. I have applied structuration theory to implementation and shown its 
strengths and weaknesses. I have shown how OS are involved in organizational 
transformation/the design of new organizations, and considered how to apply OT theory and 
practice to implementing OS.
Also, my analysis of each area has carried it a step further. I developed a functional 
classification of offices based on an information-processing perspective, related it to the IT- 
strategy literature, thus producing a scheme for assessing strategic applications for OS, which I 
later included in the implementation approach. In Chapter 2, I also produced a historical survey 
of the development of office systems, showing how the theme of integration had emerged, and 
providing a framework which organizations can use to audit their own position. In Chapter 3, I 
showed how OS are involved in the new organizational/management paradigm. In Chapter 5, I 
developed a model of managerial choice from the ’organizational’ perspective, a model of 
implementation as an emergent process, and combined them in a descriptive model of 
implementation taking into account context, rational choice, technology, and process factors. I 
critiqued the use of structuration theory in IS research and showed how structuration can provide 
a framework to unite the rational-actor and interpretative perspectives on organizations. In 
Chapter 6, I showed the relevance of structuration theory to prescriptive implementation 
approaches. I showed how the main uses of integrated OS relate to first-, second-, and third- 
order change. I applied OT to the implementation of IT, and integrated earlier ’emergent’ 
implementation approaches with OT insights and implementation strategies to suggest an 
implementation strategy for integrated OS.
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3. Reflections on learning and avenues fo r  further research.
This project began as what seemed like a straightforward study of implementing office 
automation, with the aim of informing managerial practice. There were few prior assumptions 
except that a) from my background knowledge of organizational theory/behaviour and b) my 
interests in job redesign, sociotechnical systems, and the relations between technology and 
organization structure, and c) my previous research on the organizational and social consequences 
of information systems, I anticipated that organizational change would be an important issue.
What has happened along the way? Two broad areas stand out. The first significant 
developments concerned the technology and its uses, which were changing rapidly under my feet, 
so to speak, while I was studying them. I soon discovered the trend in office systems towards 
integration, and I became convinced that such systems potentially yielded far more benefit to 
organizations than ’generic office automation’. Consequently, I produced for myself a working 
model of integrated office systems based on reading and live examples. While adequate 
descriptively, it did not seem to answer how OS could best be addressed to really urgent, possibly 
strategic business needs. This led to a survey of the IT/strategy literature and the information- 
processing model, which seemed to provide a high-level general framework for relating OS to 
business strategy.
Meanwhile, events gallop ahead. The functionality-for-cost ratio of IT continues to rise 
and technological means of integration have proceeded apace. New uses (or at least new fashions) 
for IT/OS emerged during the period of my study, notably business process redesign, inter­
organizational systems, networks/organizational platforms/infrastructure, and computer- 
supported cooperative work. I could accommodate these ideas in my information-processing 
model, but in the IT world the focus has certainly shifted away from OS as such to these 
concepts, which are perceived as strategically significant, and have become research industries in 
their own right. The difference between OS and other forms of IT, which was never very clear, 
has become, in my opinion, hopelessly blurred.
This is related to the concept of ’the office’, as a definite work institution. For analytical 
purposes it was never very useful and is becoming less so all the time. Although teleworking (on 
the ’electronic cottage’ model) has not taken off and I do not believe it will, the physical and 
temporal boundaries of the office have certainly altered beyond all recognition in some 
organizations, and this trend will increase. With the greater availability and use of computers 
linked with telecommunications, more people such as salespeople and professionals work from 
their cars, from their homes, from customers’ offices, and so forth. In parts of DEC, the notion 
that the office worker has one fixed place of work with his/her own desk has already been 
broken down.
Also, there is a phenomenal amount of information-processing in and around the 
production of goods and services (retail trade is a notable example) which does not necessarily
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take place in an identifiable ’office’. Yet the problems in using and implementing IT do not seem 
to be very different from the emerging significant areas of OS. The focus should be on similar 
information-processing needs, or similar business processes, rather than on whether they occur in 
an ’office’ or not.
During the course of the research, the issue of using IT to redesign/transform 
organizations emerged as particularly significant for OS. While the idea fascinates researchers, 
actual examples seemed thin on the ground. Part way through my study, I attempted to include 
some by visiting large computer companies. They confirmed what was happening ’at the leading 
edge’ but I was not able to collect enough information from these very large organizations, either 
to feel that I had a good comprehension of how they implemented change, or to judge whether 
their was an example many other organizations would wish to follow.
The topic of ’the new management paradigm’, the radical organizational implications of 
business process redesign, inter-organizational systems, etc., as well as structuration theory, 
indicated that approaches to major organizational change/transformation could be relevant to 
implementing OS. OT is an enormous and interesting field in itself, which I have only been able 
to survey superficially, and of which I had no direct experience or case study examples. 
Consequently I felt there were gaps in my understanding of implementing such change, and I 
wonder whether the consequences for the people who work in such ’transformed’ organizations 
will be as advantageous for them as they are supposed to be, particularly in a world recession and 
a fiercely competitive cost-cutting climate.
The entire area of IT/new organizations/organizational transformation is a candidate for 
future research; it could not be dealt with adequately in the project I had set myself. If large- 
scale social experiments of this kind are underway, there is a great need to observe and study 
them closely and longitudinally.
The second broad area of learning is theoretical. I was already familiar with the emergent 
perspective on implementation, and structuration theory was a logical extension of it. Also, there 
are close correspondences between OT and structuration theory, which I have indicated, 
especially in the analysis of system stability, persistence and conservatism, and the role of 
underlying codes/assumptions/interpretative frames in maintaining systems/structures. A fuller 
comparison of OT and structuration theory than I have been able to do in the context of this 
dissertation could be interesting.
However, I came to believe that structuration theory, somewhat ironically, has a great 
weakness in not being able to explain change - ie. when and under what conditions actors alter 
their frames of reference and modify the institutional ’givens’/world-taken-for-granted. Because 
of the very high level at which the theory is framed, Giddens tells us that novel behaviour can 
originate at any time, but under what conditions does it, and when does it persist and become 
institutionalised? OT has drawn on natural science, group behaviour and psychotherapy for
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concepts to explain change, but there are other areas (outside organization theory) which could be 
relevant such as the study of creativity, innovation, the diffusion of innovation, and (of 
particular interest to me) social movements.
Structuration theory provides a demonstrably useful conceptual framework for studying 
management, organizations and IT, particularly the idea that organizations are continually going 
through a structuring process even when ’no change’ seems to be the order of the day, and that 
implementing organizational change is a deliberate process of structuring, involving a shift both 
at the institutional level and at the level of interaction. Using structuration theory prescriptively 
is quite a different matter because the usual focus on unintended consequences gets in the way. I 
suspect Giddens not only has no interest in assisting this project but is deeply suspicious of 
attempts at social engineering (see his comments on systems theory as a potent ideology [1979, pp. 
74-5]). Ideas about how to implement system change also have to come from some other body of 
theory.
There are also a number of methodological problems about studying or applying 
structuration empirically (Robey, 1992; Gregson, 1989). I believe that one can only get beyond 
the level of application already achieved (Orlikowski and Robey, Newman and Robey, etc.) by 
deep immersion in case material (such as Barley’s), with the risk of coming out with nothing that 
was not well known before. Certainly the methodology which I chose to study office automation, 
a series of visits to several organizations, was not appropriate to making any empirical 
contribution to applying structuration theory to IT.
Another large, problematical theoretical area is technological determinism. I must say that 
for a long time I found it a powerful tool for understanding social evolution and history as well 
as organization structure and workers’ experience of their jobs (Blauner, 1964; Woodward, 1965). 
However, the literature on implementing technological change indicates otherwise: what we have 
observed so far is no specific, necessary impacts of IT, alternative job designs and organizational 
implications of the same/similar technology, and all sorts of unexpected, uncontrolled ’emergent’ 
impacts depending on context. At the same time, I am drawn to the case put by Freeman and 
others that IT represents a shift in techno-economic paradigm and that as with other technology 
change of the same magnitude, major managerial, organizational and institutional changes will 
eventually follow. The problem may be one of time scale; technology is determining only in the 
long run.
But at present we can only hypothesise that this is the case; we cannot prove it. In addition, I am 
not at all sure that we can specify the parameters of any new organizational paradigm in advance, 
or that they will be benign or desirable from a social or humanistic perspective. This issue is 
obviously a major area for research and is closely linked with the question of IT, OT and new 
organizations.
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APPENDIX I 
Office Automation Survey 
The survey on the use of office systems was carried out in 1989 in order to establish 1) 
the extent of use of office automation, 2) the purposes for which companies were investing in 
office systems, and the relation to business objectives as they saw it, 3) problems which they 
were having in implementing such systems or in realising the benefits which they sought. 
Questionnaires were addressed by name to the managing directors/chief executive officers of the 
250 leading companies by growth and profit listed in Management Today. June 1989. We 
received 55 replies, including 41 completed questionnaires. Because of the very high level to 
which we had addressed our questionnaire, we felt that 41/250 (16%) was a satisfactory response 
rate. While it does not enable us to answer with any conviction the first of our questions, about 
the extent of OA use, there were enough replies to deal with the other questions, providing we 
are careful not to generalise too much either to the larger population of successful companies, or 
to British industry as a whole.
As well as the problem of getting replies from chief executives of major businesses, 
another reason for the relatively low rate of response could be the difficulty which senior 
managers have in understanding the nature of office systems. We asked whether the organization 
used ’office systems/office automation either as a formal "OA" system or as a combination of 
personal and central computing and communications’. It was evident from the replies that, in 
spite of our careful phrasing of the question, there was still a lot of scope for uncertainty as to 
what office systems are.
Those who replied that investment in OS was important to strategic objectives were asked 
to which objectives they were important. The results are shown in the first column of Table 3.1. 
The same respondents were also asked how office systems were important to their strategic 
objectives. A number of respondents did not make a clear distinction between means and ends in 
the case of some kinds of objectives, and so there is a degree of overlap, as shown in the second 
column of Table 3.1. Further, all respondents who said their organization used or was planning 
to introduce an OS in the next two years were asked what were or would be their objectives in 
investing in OS, and to rank them. The objectives and their rank order are shown in Table 3.2.
There is obviously considerable overlap in the replies to these questions, with strategic 
objectives for the organization not being distinguished clearly from the means of realising them. 
Therefore, the replies for all three questions are shown together in Table 3.3 below.
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Table 3.1 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR OS
(Any mentions) WHICH HOW
1.. Improved communications 9 7
2 . Improved customer service / 9 0meet market demand
3 ,. Management control 5 2
4 . Reduce overheads, costs 5 0
5 ,. Functional co-ordination 2 3
6,. International & divisional
co-ordination 2 3
7,. Growth, development 4 0
8 . Organization change 3 0
9.. Management aids 1 3
10.. Quality 3 0
11.. Effectiveness, performance 2 0
12 . Responsiveness 2 0
13 . Improved management 2 0
14 . Efficiency, productivity 2 0
15 ., Competitive edge 1 0
Table 3 .2
OA OBJECTIVES
Rank Order
OA OBJECTIVES 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Communication 10 3 3 0 0 16
Access to information 4 1 2 2 2 11
Cost reduction 2 6 1 1 1 11
Efficiency, productivity 5 3 2 0 0 10
Speed, response 3 1 3 0 0 7
Service, customers 2 2 2 0 0 6
Effectiveness, value added 3 3 0 0 0 6
Across-co. co-ordination,
communication 3 1 2 0 0 6
Improve existing systems 4 0 0 0 0 4
Management, exec. info. 0 2 1 0 0 3
Common, sharing info. 0 2 0 1 0 3
Better, more accurate info. 2 0 0 0 0 2
TOTAL
16
9
7
5
5
5
4
3
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1
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Table 3.3
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, MEANS, AND OA (OBJECTIVES COMBINE
Obj ective Strategic Means OA Total
1 . Communications 8 5 16 29
2 . Cost reduction 5 2 11 18
3 . Economy, productivi­
ty, efficiency 2 6 10 18
4 . Internal coordina­
tion, communication 4 6 6 16
5. Customer service 9 0 6 15
6. Responsiveness, speed,
timeliness 2 6 7 15
7. Access to info. 0 2 11 13
8. Effectiveness 6 0 3 9
9. Mgmt. control 5 2 0 7
10. Mgmt. aid, exec.
info. 1 2 3 6
11. Better, more accurateinformation 0 4 2 6
Description of sample
Size - number of employees Turnover
>10,000 = 20 £2 bn. + = 7
5001-10,000 = 7 = >£1 bn.<2 bn. = 6
1001-5000 = 10 = >.5 bn.cl bn. = 6
1000 or less = 1 = >250 m.<500m. = 5
= >100 m.<250m. = 7
No answer = 2 = >50 m. <100m. = 3
= >10 m.< 50m. = 0
=>lm.<10m. = 2
No answer = 5
Ownership Number of Sites
PLC = 32 
Part of group =
1-10 = 6
11-50 = 13
51-100 = 3
101-150 = 3
151-200 = 2
201-250 = 0
251-500 = 5
501-1000 = 1
1001 + = 2
Range = 1 - 3000
Sector
Manufacturing 
Oil, gas, chemicals 
Retail and distribution 
Service
Transport and telecommunications 
Holding company, head office 
Construction 
Trading
17
7
4
4
3
3
2
1
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